JEAN A. LATTA, APPELLANT,
v.
PARKER A. LATTA, APPELLEE
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In this second appeal of a divorce case, the Florida District Court of Appeal addresses whether the trial court could vacate a previously awarded lump sum alimony of $10,000 on remand for other proceedings. The court held that alimony determinations are separate from property rights and, once vested and not challenged on the first appeal, cannot be vacated in subsequent proceedings.
The court held that the trial court erred in vacating the lump sum alimony award because alimony is separate and distinct from property rights, the award had become vested and final on the first appeal, and it was not included in the matters authorized for reconsideration on remand. The business valuation was supported by evidence and showed no abuse of discretion.
“The matter of alimony is separate and distinct from a determination of property rights of the parties.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that alimony awards cannot be reconsidered or vacated based on changes to property determinations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJean Latta and Parker Latta were divorcing. The initial decree granted the divorce to the husband and found the wife entitled to alimony, with jurisdi…
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This is a second appeal in this case. See Latta v. Latta, Fla.App.1960, 121 So.2d 42. In the initial decree, in which a divorce was granted to the plaintiff husband, the *444chancellor found the wife “entitled to some consideration in the matter of alimony in periodic installments or in a lump sum award,” and reserved jurisdiction pending an effort by the parties to effect a property settlement. Later, the parties having failed to do so, an amended decree was entered in which the chancellor found the circumstances of the parties favored lump sum alimony, granted such alimony to the wife in the amount of $10,000, and required her to transfer to the husband her interest in the jointly owned home property.
On an appeal by the wife from that, amended decree neither she nor the husband assigned as error or complained of the lump sum alimony award, and that portion of the decree was not disturbed on appeal. We affirmed the granting of the divorce, which the wife challenged, but we reversed the decree as to the provision requiring the wife to transfer to the husband her interest in the residence owned by them as tenants by the entireties, and for failure to determine and establish her interest in the business, and remanded the cause for further proceedings with reference to those two matters.
After remand, a second amended decree was entered which is now on appeal by the wife. In that subsequent decree or order the chancellor found the wife not entitled to alimony, and vacated the previously granted lump sum alimony. Her interest in the husband’s business was fixed at one third, and the net value of the business was determined to be $2,000. On the present appeal the wife contends that the evidence required a higher value to be placed on the business and she seeks reversal of the withdrawal of her alimony. The appellee has failed to file a brief, a delinquency which appellate courts in this state repeatedly have condemned. See rule 3.7, subd. b. F.R.C.P., 31 F.S.A.
Appellant’s contention regarding the business lacks merit. The chancellor’s decision in that matter had due support-in the evidence. Nor are we impressed by appellant’s argument that more evidence on that point was available and that the chancellor erred in not making provision for additional testimony. It was discretionary, and no abuse of discretion is shown.
On the question of the alimony, the chancellor’s order shows he felt that since the provision of the earlier decree for transfer to the husband of the wife’s interest in the residence could not stand, the $10,000 alimony granted her (which the chancellor appears to have considered to approximate the value of her interest in the residence) should be taken away. In so providing the chancellor committed error.
The matter of alimony is separate and distinct from a determination of property rights of the parties. Eakin v. Eakin, Fla.1958, 99 So.2d 854; Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380, 35 So.2d 6; Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796, 82 A.L.R. 537.
The determination in the original and first amended decree that the wife was entitled to alimony, was final, and the award therein to her of lump sum alimony became vested. Blocker v. Ferguson, Fla.1950, 47 So.2d 694, 697-98; Yandell v. Yandell, Fla.1949, 39 So.2d 554, 556. The earlier appeal left that part of the decree untouched, and it was not included in the two features of the decree as to which further proceedings in the trial court were authorized and directed on remand.
Therefore the chancellor was not at liberty, on proceedings following remand of the cause, to vacate the previously granted award of lump sum alimony, and the order appealed from is hereby reversed to that extent. In other respects the order is affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). By definition, an award of lump sum alimony vests in the recipient at the time of the final decree, and is not subject to defeasance or modification. Latta v. Latta, 135 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Keller v. Belcher, 256 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Just as it is within the trial court’s discretion to order an award of lump sum alimony, Ortiz v. Ortiz, supra, it is within the court’s discretion to determine what ali…
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Horne v. Alton L. Horne, 289 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…timely appeal therefrom. We are faced with the question of whether the above-quoted provision wasone for periodic or lump sum alimony. If the provision was for lump sum alimony, it became a vested property right, Latta v. Latta, Fla.App.3rd, 1961, 135 So. 2d 443, and survives the subsequent remarriage of the wife, absent a contrary provision in the agreement. If, on the other hand, the provision is for periodic alimony, the obligation would be modifiable and could terminate on remarriage. Morris v. Morris,…
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Morris v. Morris, 272 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…dered Morris to pay the arrearage of $900.00 within sixty days and to continue making the payments until he had complied with the final judgment and the orders of the court. Lump sum alimony is a vested property right, Latta v. Latta, Fla.App.1961, 135 So. 2d 443, and therefore survives death, Payne v. Payne, Fla.App.1967, 201 So. 2d 590; Van Boven v. First National Bank in Palm Beach, Fla.App.1970, 240 So. 2d 329. Lump sum alimony may properly be payable in installments, but in the cases reviewed the amount…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ashleigh M. Moye v. Moye (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
- Holmes v. The Atl. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 103 Fla. 1071 (Fla. 1932)
- Rosalind E. Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071 (Fla. 1932)
- Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380 (Fla. 1948)
- Latta v. Parker A. Latta, 121 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1958)
- Blocker v. Ferguson, 47 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1950)