EFROIM MAX ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
ELIZABETH MALIK, APPELLEE
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In this partition and quiet title case, the trial court entered a final decree awarding joint ownership and declaring the defendant a one-half owner of all the plaintiff's assets without allowing the plaintiff to present evidence in defense of the defendant's cross-claim. The appellate court reversed, holding that the decree violated due process by going beyond the pleaded issues and denying the plaintiff his day in court.
The decree violated due process because it exceeded the scope of the pleaded issues and deprived the plaintiff of his opportunity to be heard in defense of the cross-claim. The trial court's premature ruling before receiving all evidence and before the defendant completed her case constituted a clear departure from due process requirements.
“The Court: All right, I am ready to rule. I don't care whether anybody is finished or not. I am through.”
Demonstrates the trial court's premature termination of the hearing and refusal to allow completion of evidence presentation, establishing the due process violation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff filed a complaint for partition of real and personal property against the defendant. The defendant answered and filed a cross-claim for …
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Appellant, as plaintiff below, filed a complaint for partition against the appellee, as defendant below. The defendant filed an answer and cross-claim for damages in the nature of compensation due her for services rendered to the plaintiff, and suit to quiet title to the property involved, which pleadings were reviewed and approved by this court in Robinson v. Malik, Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 702. Thereafter, on final hearing, the plaintiff adduced evidence to support his complaint but did not offer any evidence in defense of the cross-claim, awaiting the cross-claimant going forward with her proof. The defendant then proceeded on proof of her cross-claim as to alleged compensation due her, and to establish her quiet title suit. Whereupon, before the cross-claimant completed her cause and rested her case, the chancellor announced the following:
“The Court: All right, I am ready to rule. I don’t care whether anybody is finished or not. I am through.”
The chancellor, without further testimony or evidence, entered the final decree appealed from, declaring the defendant and plaintiff the joint owners of the real and personal property, partition of which was sought, and declared the defendant to be a one-half owner in all the assets of the plaintiff, whether situated in this State or not.
The appellant-plaintiff assigns many errors as to the chancellor’s actions in entering the final decree, only one of which is necessary to consider in reaching a determination that this cause must be reversed; i. e., upon the errors assigned and the point argued thereon, that the plaintiff was denied due process of law as guaranteed by § 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. It is apparent from this record that the final decree goes beyond the issues framed in the pleadings and beyond the proof adduced. Therefore, it is a clear departure from the requirements of due process of law, particularly when the plaintiff was not permitted to have his day in court in defense of the cross-claim. See: Fiehe v. R. E. Householder Co., 98 Fla. 627, 125 So. 2; City of Coral Gables v. Certain Lands, etc., 110 Fla. 189, 149 So. 36; Ryan’s Furniture Exchange v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 118, 162 *446So. 483; State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491; 6 Fla.Jur., Constitutional Law, §§ 320, 322.
The final decree is therefore reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to the chancellor to proceed with a final hearing on the issues as framed by the pleadings.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Carroll & Assocs., P.A. v. Galindo, 864 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…mari Lake East Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 547 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(“[a] trial court violates a litigant’s due process rights when it expands the scope of a hearing to address and determine matters not noticed for hearing”); Robinson v. Malik, 135 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 8d DCA 1961)(a final judgment that “goes beyond the issues framed in the pleadings and beyond the proof adduced” is a “clear departure from the requirements of due process of law”). Accordingly, that portion of the summary judgment confirming…
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Bittson v. Steinman, 210 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…ould be no evidence whatsoever adduced which could support a verdict for defendant. We are of the opinion that, under the issues of this case as framed by the pleadings, defendant must be given his day in court. See: Robinson v. Malik, Fla.App.1961, 135 So. 2d 445. Therefore, the order appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ryan's Furniture Exch., Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109 (Fla. 1935)
- Matilda P. Fiehe v. R. E. Householder Co., 98 Fla. 627 (Fla. 1929)
- State ex rel. Dr. George A. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236 (Fla. 1940)
- The City of Coral Gables v. Certain Lands Upon Which Taxes Are Delinquent, 110 Fla. 189 (Fla. 1933)
- Efroim Max Robinson v. Malik, 115 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)