BEN C. MCGAHEY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN B. MCLEOD, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1961-12-11
No. 61-13
Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.
135 So. 2d 446 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1961) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court held that the Board of County Commissioners lacked the authority under the Home Rule Charter to add titles to initiatory petitions, as this power was not expressly or implicitly granted.


Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner submitted proposed amendments to the Home Rule Charter for approval. The Board of County Commissioners added titles to the petitions, which…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is taken from a final judgment awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus wherein the circuit judge ordered the respondent Board of County Commissioners of Metropolitan Dade County to adopt appropriate resolutions approving the form of initiatory petitions for proposed amendments to the Home Rule Charter which were submitted by the petitioner. The writ further directed the Board of County Commissioners to rescind resolutions by which the commission added to the petitions certain titles. We affirm.

On December 13, 1960, the appellee, John B. McLeod, requested the Board of County Commissioners to adopt resolutions approving the form of two separate petitions he proposed to circulate to electors in an effort to amend the Home Rule Charter. The commission concluded that the proposed petitions should be clarified in order to preclude the possibility of confusion in the minds of the electors. There was a clear basis for this conclusion. The changes made in the petitions were to add to one petition the following language: “This petition is to abolish Metro”, and add to the other petition the following language: “This is not a petition to abolish Metro”.

On December 28, 1960, appellee McLeod filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County a petition for writ of mandamus alleging that under the provisions of the Home Rule Charter the function of the Board of County Commissioners in approving initiatory petitions was purely ministerial and that the actions of the board in modifying such petitions were arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. There followed the issuance of the alternative writ, the filing of the *447return and entry of the final judgment now appealed.

The county urges that in order to affirm it is necessary that we hold that the Board of County Commission has only the ministerial duty to approve any and every petition initiating a proposed change in the charter. We hold it is not necessary, however, to define the discretion, if any, of the county commission in acting pursuant to sections 7.01 (1) and 8.07 of the Home Rule Charter1 in order to decide this appeal because the record establishes that the county commission did not approve or disapprove the form of the petition, but added to each petition a title. These titles may have set forth the purpose of the petitions, but they were also the commission's conclusion as to the effect of the petitions, if successful.

It is apparent that the commission may have acted entirely in accord with the best interests of the public. The stated purpose of the entitlement of the petitions by the county commission was to prevent confusion. We cannot, however, judge motives. The only question presented to us on this appeal is whether or not the county commission had the authority to add to a petition, for the initiation of a charter change, a title purporting to set forth what the commission believed to be the effect of the petition. The language of the charter sections involved does not grant nor does it imply that authority. Where a statute or charter provision does not give certain authority expressly or by implication to a governing body, such body cannot exercise a substantive power not conferred. Cf. Molwin Inv. Co. v. Turner, 123 Fla. 505, 167 So. 33.

The appellant, county, now urges that there is no duty upon the commission to either approve or disapprove petitions initiated to amend the Home Rule Charter. This position cannot aid the county on this appeal because the county took a contrary position in the return of the commission to-the alternative writ. The return contained the following:

“4. Thus, the Home Rule Charter may be amended or revised only upon affirmative vote of a majority of the electors of Dade County voting on the proposed amendment at an election called for such purpose. Proposed amendments to the Charter may be initiated by resolution adopted by the Board of County Commissioners, or by petition signed by the requisite number of qualified electors. Initiatory petitions must be submitted to and approved by the Board of County Commissioners as to form prior to circulation thereof. In order for an initiatory petition to have any lawful force and effect, its form must be approved by the Board. This imposes upon the Board the responsibility to review each initiatory petition and officially sanction, ratify, confirm and express a favorable opinion as to the form thereof. The power to approve implies the power to disapprove. Therefore, the controlling *448Charter provisions vest in the Board reasonable discretion in the exercise of such power. This function is discretionary in character, and not merely a ministerial duty.”

It therefore follows that the circuit judge did not err when he granted the peremptory writ upon the petition, alternative writ and return thereto.

Affirmed.


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  • Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Metro-Dade Fire Rescue Serv. Dist., 589 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …olve the question whether the enabling legislation contravened the Florida Constitution. It thus sheds no light on the present case, which involves the question whether the ordinance contravenes the charter. The County relies on McGahey v. McLeod, 135 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), but that case actually supports the position of the Fire and Rescue Service Board. The court there held that a certain power did not exist where “[t]he language of the charter sections involved does [*928] not grant nor does it i…
  • Bay Crest Util. Co. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Comm'n, 38 Fla. Supp. 61 (Hillsborough Cty. Cir. Ct. 1973)
    …ay be delegated to them under the constitution or by statutory grants. Crandon v. Hazlett, 26 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1946); Gessner v. Del-Air Corp., 17 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1944); Colen v. Sunhaven Homes, Inc., 98 So. 2d 501, (Fla. 1957); McGahey v. McCleod, 135 So. 2d 446 (Fla. App. 3rd 1961). Secondly, a review of Chapter 59-1352 shows that its primary purpose is a delegation to the respondents of the power to execute franchise agreements in order that the homes of the residents serviced by the sewage treatment plan…
  • Iorio v. Citizens FOR A Fair Tampa, 661 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
    …PER CURIAM. The motion for expedited appeal is granted; the order appealed is affirmed. See McGahey v. McLeod, 135 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d [*33] DCA 1961); cf. Smith v. American Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1992). DANAHY, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and LAZZARA, JJ., concur.…

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