HART
v.
STATE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this workers' compensation case, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed an attorney's fee award of $70,800 but reversed and remanded in part because the deputy commissioner improperly included $16,983 in past-due compensation that was paid before the attorney's involvement in calculating the value of benefits secured.
The court affirmed most of the deputy commissioner's decision but reversed and remanded the portion that included the $16,983 in past-due compensation. Compensation paid prior to the attorney's involvement cannot be considered benefits secured by that attorney and therefore should not be included in the base value upon which attorney's fees are calculated.
[1] Attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases are calculated based on the value of benefits secured by the attorney for the claimant.
[2] Compensation paid to a claimant prior to the involvement of an attorney cannot be included in the calculation of attorney's fees.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Compensation paid prior to involvement by this attorney cannot be considered to have been "benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing" as required by statute, and thus, should not be included in the value of the award upon which attorney's fees are based.”
Establishes the core legal principle that attorney's fees under section 440.34 can only be based on benefits the particular attorney actually secured, not benefits obtained through other means or persons.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn attorney represented a claimant in a workers' compensation case. The deputy commissioner calculated the value of benefits secured by the attorney a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Attorney'S Fees In Workers' Compensation cases and more on FLexlaw
JOANOS, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case the employer and carrier (E/C) were ordered to pay $70,800 in attorney’s fees in accordance with section 440.34, Florida Statutes. They appeal the amount of this award, taking issue with the calculations adopted by the deputy commissioner in establishing $467,000 as the value of benefits secured for the claimant by the attorney. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Of the several arguments made by the E/C, one merits reversal. As part of the amount of total benefits secured by this attorney the deputy commissioner included a figure of $16,983.00 for past due compensation. We agree with the E/C that it appears from the evidence that at least some of this amount was paid to the claimant prior to the filing of any claim by the attorney whose fees are in question. Compensation paid prior to involvement by this attorney cannot be considered to have been “benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing” as required by statute, and thus, should not be included in the value of the award upon which attorney’s fees are based.
Except for this one aspect of calculation, we find the decisions of the deputy commissioner to be reasonable, supported by competent, substantial evidence, and fully in accord with section 440.34, Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, we affirm the Order, including all the calculations adopted by the deputy commissioner, except that portion which includes benefits paid the claimant through the effort of someone other than the attorney whose fee is being determined. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand for recalculation of the attorney’s fee consistent herewith.
SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.