CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK THAW AND SOPHIE GORDON THAW, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1961-12-14
No. 61-209
Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and HORTON and CARROLL, JJ.
135 So. 2d 902 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1961) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The City of Miami appealed a declaratory judgment that invalidated Section 7(e) of Miami Ordinance 3963, which authorized the creation of liens on property for demolition costs. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that while the city has power to demolish unsafe buildings, it lacks statutory authority to impose a lien on property for those demolition costs.


Holding

Section 7(e) of the ordinance is void and unconstitutional because the City of Miami lacks charter or statutory authority from the Florida legislature to create liens on property for demolition costs. However, the city retains the power to demolish unsafe buildings and assess costs against owners through other means.


Key Quotes

“there is no apparent charter, statutory or other authority granted to the City of Miami by the legislature of Florida warranting the creation of a lien for demolition”

Establishes the primary basis for invalidating the ordinance—lack of legislative authorization for the lien mechanism

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Facts & Procedural History

The City of Miami enacted Ordinance 3963, Section 7(e), which provided that if property owners failed to comply with demolition orders from a board wi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The chancellor entered a summary declaratory decree in this action in which, inter alia, he found and adjudicated that § 7(e) 1 of ordinance 3963 of the City of Miami was void, unconstitutional and unenforceable for the reason that the city had not enacted a special ordinance or resolution authorizing demolition of the property in question or authorizing the creation of the lien on the property for demolition and the further fact that there was an unlawful attempt to delegate unfettered discretion to administrative officers of the City of Miami.

The ordinance in question, § 15, contained a separability provision, the effect of which was to preserve the remaining portions of the ordinance not declared invalid.

We conclude that § 7(e) of the questioned ordinance is void and unconstitutional for the reason that there is no apparent charter, statutory or other authority granted to the City of Miami by the legislature of Florida warranting the creation of a lien for dem-*903olítíon. Our conclusion in this regard should not be construed to mean that the City of Miami, under its charter, does not have the power to demolish buildings found to be unsafe or a menace to the health, safety and general welfare of the City of Miami and to assess such costs for demolition against the owner. Our only conclusion is that there is no grant of authority to the City of Miami, either in its charter, other legislative act or authority that would warrant the impressment of a lien on the property of a citizen of Miami for the demolition of a building found to be unsafe or a menace to health, safety and general welfare.

It follows that the decree appealed should be and is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

PEARSON, TILLMAN, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part).

I would not hold the entire section, (12-19 of the Code of the City of Miami) “void, unconstitutional and unenforceable”. The only portion found objectionable by the chancellor was that which provided for a lien. Cf. Bozeman v. City of Brooksville, Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 729.

Dissent
PEARSON, TILLMAN, Chief Judge

PEARSON, TILLMAN, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part).

I would not hold the entire section, (12-19 of the Code of the City of Miami) “void, unconstitutional and unenforceable”. The only portion found objectionable by the chancellor was that which provided for a lien. Cf. Bozeman v. City of Brooksville, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 729.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • City of Miami v. Thaw, 142 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1962)
    …Appeal dismissed without opinion. 135 So. 2d 902.…
  • City of Miami v. Thaw, 143 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1962)
    …Certiorari denied without opinion. 135 So. 2d 902.…
  • Thomas v. City OF W. Palm Beach, 283 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
    …[*110] PER CURIAM. We have reviewed the briefs and record on appeal and on the basis thereof we are of the opinion that no reversible error has been made to clearly appear. City of Miami v. Thaw, Fla.App.1961, 135 So. 2d 902; Citizens Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 1929, 98 Fla. 933, 124 So. 722; Winters v. Sawyer, 1971, 225 Tenn. 113, 463 S.W. 2d 705; West Realty Company v. Ennis, 1960, 147 Conn. 602, 164 A. 2d 409; City of Aurora v. Meyer, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 131, 230 N.E. 2d 200; M…

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