BROOKS

v.

STATE

Citator

Cited By

• Brennan v. Ryter, 339 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
  …is continued in the name of a defendant deceased, it is effective not because the law disregards the death but because the personal representative is estopped to deny its efficacy. Davis v. Evans, 132 So. 2d 476, 481 (Fla.App.1st, 1961), cert. den. 136 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1961). Rule 1.420(e) should not penalize a plaintiff for the absence of pointless activity in a case abated by his adversary’s death. The purpose of the former statute and of the Rule is to relieve courts of the burden of actions which plaintif…
• Mabel v. Baldwin, 397 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
  …does not constitute good cause. Ellard v. Godwin, 77 So. 2d 617 (Fla.1955). A creditor must strictly comply with the various provisions of a non-claims statute or the claim will be barred. Davis v. Evans, 132 So. 2d 476 (Fla.1st DCA), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1961). As in the instant case, the latter rule redounds to the benefit of the estate under the facts presented. The statutory mode of providing the personal representative with notice of a creditor’s claim is plainly set forth in Section 733.7…
• Rafkind v. Simon, 402 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
  …e alternative, the appellants contend, as between the immediate parties, that the decedent’s personal representative is estopped to deny her decedent’s assignment. They correctly rely upon Davis v. Evans, 132 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1961) for the proposition that an estoppel which would have bound a decedent binds his personal representative. In this case, it is readily apparent that the appellants, as purported assignees, were well aware of the prohibition against the dec…

Authorities Cited

• Maude Mears v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 132 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)