WRUBEL
v.
SAFECO INSURANCE CO. OF ILLINOIS
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The court held that the facts stated in the petition were sufficient to establish a resulting trust, entitling the appellant to one-half of the land.
[1] Resulting Trust: Facts stated in the petition were sufficient to establish a resulting trust in favor of the appellant.
[2] Deeds: Parol evidence is admissible to prove an additional or different consideration from that expressed in a deed.
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Discussing the admissibility of parol evidence to prove the true consideration for a deed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe father of the appellant and appellee purchased land and had it conveyed to them, with the appellee agreeing to pay the balance of the purchase pri…
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The consideration expressed in the deed from Gayle to Mary Burke is $350, paid and secured to be paid by Isaac Burke, appellee, a lien on the land being retained to secure the payment of $83 unpaid. But it has been well settled that it may be proved by parol that there is an additional or different consideration from that expressed in the deed. Besides the consideration expressed in the deed in this case is the one that passed from the original purchaser, the father of appellant and appellee, to the vendor, Gayle, and not the one which induced the father to cause the land to be conveyed to them instead of to himself.
If it be true, as stated in the petition, that appellant agreed, in consideration of the conveyance by Gayle to himself of an undivided half of the land, to pay off the two debts, it is manifest it was subjected and sold by reason of his failure to comply with that agreement, and his subsequent purchase from Grover should not therefore be held as enuring exclusively to his benefit or as securing to him the right to the entire tract to the exclusion of appellant. But taking the facts stated in the petition as true, which may be established by oral testimony, they are sufficient, according to the doctrine announced by this court as well as by other authority to create a resulting trust. He should therefore be regarded as holding an undivided one-half of the land in trust for her, particularly as according to the statements of the petition she has been in the continuous possession of and claiming one-half the land, and he has acquiesced in and never disputed her right thereto, until after the death of their father in 1883.
In our opinion the -facts stated in the petition are sufficient to constitute a cause of action and entitle appellant to one-half the land, and the court erred in sustaining a general demurrer to the petition and amended petition. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.