ROBERT J. JESKEY, APPELLANT,
v.
YELLOW CAB COMPANY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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A taxi driver sued another taxi driver for damages from a rear-end collision. The jury found for the defendant, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that even though the plaintiff's sudden stop created a presumption of negligence, the defendant's explanation (that he was following closely and could not stop in time) was sufficient to rebut the presumption and present issues of contributory negligence to the jury.
The court affirmed the trial court's decisions. The defendant's explanation that he was following closely and could not stop in time was sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from the unexpected stop, thus presenting issues of negligence and contributory negligence for the jury. The ordinance evidence was properly admitted because it was for the jury to determine whether failure to give a hand signal was a proximate cause of the collision, and the photograph was admitted for a proper and limited purpose.
“We agree with the circuit judge that the facts above stated created a presumption of negligence and not an inference of negligence, and that, in the absence of an explanation from the defendant, a verdict should have been directed by the lower court in favor of the plaintiff.”
Establishes the legal principle that an unexpected stop creates a presumption of negligence that can be rebutted by defendant's explanation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo taxi cabs were traveling south on Lejeune Road and then eastward on Northwest 7th Street at 12-15 mph. The plaintiff cab suddenly stopped (for 20-…
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This action was brought by the driver of one taxi cab against the owner of another, for damages for personal injuries received when the two cabs were involved in a collision. The case was tried before a jury and a verdict was rendered for the defendant. Motion for new trial was denied, judgment entered on the verdict, and the plaintiff appealed.
Appellant contends that the trial court should have directed a verdict for him on liability; that there was no issue of contributory negligence; that it was error to admit into evidence a City Ordinance requiring a hand signal for stopping; that error resulted from admitting a picture of the car after repairs were made; and that a new trial should have been granted.
The cabs had picked up passengers at Miami International Airport and were proceeding downtown, one behind the other. The accident occurred on Northwest 7th Street, some 40 feet east of its intersection with Lejeune Road. The cabs travelled south on Lejeune and turned eastward, onto Northwest 7th Street. Their speed at that time was estimated at 12 to IS miles per hour. A gasoline service station was located on the southeast corner of that intersection. According to plaintiff, though no£ seen by the defendant’s driver, a car pulled out into 7th Street from the station and, instead of proceeding eastward with the flow of traffic, cut across 7th Street in front of plaintiff and went west. That, said plaintiff, caused him to stop suddenly. He did not extend his hand, but his brake lights signalled the stop. He did not look to the rear before stopping, so did not know the state of the traffic immediately behind. He testified, however, that he was stopped for 20 to 30 seconds before *377his cab was struck from the rear. Defendant’s driver testified that he was proceeding a car length-and-a-half behind the plaintiff; that he saw the brake lights and attempted to stop, but could not stop or maneuver in time to avoid collision. It should be noted that what happened was an unexpected stop at a location or place in the block where such a stop was unlikely. The passengers were not injured.
The trial judge was eminently correct in denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, and in denying the motion for new trial. Appellant cited and quoted from McNulty v. Cusack, Fla. App.1958, 104 So.2d 785, where it was said:
“We agree with the circuit judge that the facts above stated created a presumption of negligence and not an inference of negligence, and that, in the absence of an explanation from the defendant, a verdict should have been directed by the lower court in favor of the plaintiff.”
The appellee argued correctly that there was “an explanation from the defendant,” which together with the circumstances of the accident, was sufficient to rebut the presumption and present issues of negligence and contributory negligence for determination by the jury.
We reject appellant’s argument that the ordinance relating to the hand signal should not have been admitted. ■ It was for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff’s failure to give the hand signal was the proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause of the collision. That duty and prerogative of the jury was not removed by admission of the defendant’s driver that he saw the brake lights, or because, when pressed on the point, he expressed the opinion that failure to give the hand signal made no difference. The effect of the hand signal, had it been given, was still problematic, especially if the jury chose to believe the defendant’s driver was only a car length-and-a-half behind.1 The photograph, admission of which was claimed by appellant to have been in error, was shown to be for a proper and limited purpose.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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The Greyhound Corp. v. Sudella Ford, 157 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)…McNulty case contains one duty for the defendant and one for the jury. The defendant must go forward with the evidence and the jury must decide the case on conflicting theories or facts. [*429] The case of Jeskey v. Yellow Cab Company, Fla.App.1962, 136 So. 2d 376, involved a rear-end collision. The facts in that case were briefly that plaintiff made a sudden stop because a car pulled out in front of him and that twenty to thirty seconds later defendant hit him from the rear. Defendant claimed he was followin…
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Chiles v. Beaudoin, 384 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…ion, the presumption is dissipated and the court should submit the case to the jury under ordinary rules of negligence. Keyser v. Brunette, 188 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Hott v. Funk, 165 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Jeskey v. Yellow Cab Co., 136 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). In order to avoid the quick stop exception to the presumption of rear-end negligence, the plaintiff points to the following portion of Mr. Hoffenkamp’s deposition testimony: Q How did this collision occur? A Well, I stopped at…
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Hott v. Funk, 165 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)…this witness at a point some distance from the intersection. In short, the evidence gave rise to a variety of permissible inferences and presented an issue of negligence for determination by a jury. Jeskey v. Yellow Cab Company, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 136 So. 2d 376; Greyhound Corp. v. Ford, Fla.App.1963, 157 So. 2d 427. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motions properly were denied. Affirmed. SMITH, C. J., and WHITE, J., concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Addie Irene Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498 (Fla. 1933)
- McNULTY v. Cusack, 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1941)