RUTH BRISTOW MALOY, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES H. BRISTOW, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY BRISTOW, DECEASED, HARRY W. BRISTOW, ALBERT G. BRISTOW, JOHN BRISTOW, NELLIE SCHULZ AND GLADYS GILLEN, APPELLEES
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The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of a plaintiff's suit for an accounting due to lack of prosecution. The court found the trial judge acted correctly in dismissing the case after the plaintiff repeatedly failed to proceed with the trial, despite being given continuances and warnings.
No, the trial court did not err. The plaintiff's repeated failure to proceed with the trial, despite continuances and clear warnings from the court, justified the dismissal for want of prosecution.
“It is an inherent right of the court, and therefore one existing independently of the statute, to dismiss a suit for a failure to prosecute it with due diligence.”
Establishes the court's inherent power to dismiss cases for lack of prosecution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff, representing herself, sought an accounting. The case was noticed for trial on July 28, 1961, but not tried. On August 29, 1961, the pla…
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The appellant, who was the plaintiff below, seeks reversal of an order dismissing her suit for accounting, for want of prosecution. The cause was noticed for trial before the court on July 28, 1961. For a reason not disclosed on the record it was not tried then, but came on for final hearing before the court on August 29, 1961. On that occasion, at the request of the plaintiff, who had acted without counsel throughout, the chancellor granted a continuance to September 7. When the cause came on again for trial and final hearing on September 7 the plaintiff was unwilling to proceed and the chancellor entered an order dismissing her suit for want of prosecution. In so doing the chancellor was eminently correct. In State ex rel. Croker v. Chillingworth, 106 Fla. 323, 143 So. 346, 347, the Supreme Court said: “It is an inherent right of the court, and therefore one existing independently of the statute, to dismiss a suit for a failure to prosecute it with due diligence.” See also Anderson v. Broward, 45 Fla. 160, 34 So. 897; Welgoss v. End, Fla.App.1959, 112 So.2d 390. Plaintiff had been given the opportunity to obtain an attorney to assist her, and when she chose to represent herself and proceed without coun*802sel the chancellor was careful to inform her of the status of the matter, that the case was ready to be tried and unless progressed would have to be terminated.
Affirmed.
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Reddish v. Forlines, 207 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)…assenteufel v. Howard Johnson, Inc. of Fla. (Fla.1951), 52 So. 2d 810. . 24 Am.Jur.2d 49-51, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 59; see also 167 A.L.R. 1062. . Macfarlane v. Hills, 50 Fla. 566, 39 So. 994. . Maloy v. Bristow (Fla.App.1962), 138 So. 2d 801. . 24 Am.Jur.2d 51, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 60. . Owens v. Ken’s Paint and Body Shop (Fla.App.1967), 196 So. 2d 17. . Rosenfeld v. Glickstein (Pla.App.1967), 200 So. 2d 242. .Declaration of Rights, § 4, Florida Constitution, F.S…
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Gonzalez v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 327 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…l basis of which is supported by the record. We, therefore, conclude that the dismissal was proper under the trial court’s inherent power to dismiss a cause which is not being prosecuted with reasonable diligence. See Maloy v. Bristow, Fla.App.1962, 138 So. 2d 801. Affirmed.…
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Sandor Szabo and Joan Szabo v. Essex Chem. Corp., 461 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…e contained in our rules. We are not unmindful, however, of the court’s inherent power to dismiss a cause which is not being prosecuted with reasonable diligence, Gonzalez v. Ryder Systems, Inc., 327 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Maloy v. Bristow, 138 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 381 (Fla.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976, 83 S.Ct. 1111, 10 L.Ed.2d 142 (1963), or, on its own motion or by motion of an interested party, to dismiss a cause for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 1.420(…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Chillingworth, 106 Fla. 323 (Fla. 1932)
- Welgoss v. END, 112 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Anderson v. Pulaski Broward, 45 Fla. 160 (Fla. 1903)