EVA MINNICK, APPELLANT,
v.
EDNA KEENE, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1962-03-23
No. 2854
SHANNON, C. J., and ALLEN and WHITE, JJ., concur.
139 So. 2d 172 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1962) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

This case concerns whether a passenger who offered to pay for certain expenses on a road trip was still considered a "guest" under Florida's guest statute. The court held that simply contributing to expenses does not remove a passenger from guest status.


Holding

No, the allegations in the amended complaint were insufficient to remove the plaintiff from guest status under the Florida guest statute. A mere agreement to pay a share of expenses does not constitute compensation or remove the passenger from guest status.


Key Quotes

“The question involved in this appeal is whether the allegations of the amended complaint are sufficient to remove the plaintiff from the status of a guest within the meaning of the Florida guest statute, Fla.Stat. § 320.59 F.S.A.”

This quote frames the central legal question of the appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff, Eva Minnick, alleged that the defendant, Edna Keene, agreed to drive her from Tampa, Florida, to Terre Haute, Indiana, and then continu…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was taken from a final order dismissing the amended complaint of plaintiff, Eva Minnick. The question involved in this appeal is whether the allegations of the amended complaint are sufficient to remove the plaintiff from the status of a guest within the meaning of the Florida guest statute, Fla.Stat. § 320.59 F.S.A.

.(

The essence of the amended complaint was that the plaintiff learned that the defendant was making a pleasure trip from Tampa, Florida, to Chicago, Illinois, and that the defendant agreed to take the plaintiff to Terre Haute, Indiana “in consideration of Plaintiff paying Defendant for certain expenses to be incurred on said trip between Tampa, Florida, and Terre Haute, Indiana, Defendant to continue on her journey to Chicago * * *

The facts alleged clearly fail to show joint enterprise or commercial transportation, thus leaving the plaintiff a remedy, if any, under the guest statute, to which she declined to resort by amendment. See Coral Gables Securities Corporation v. Miami Corporation, 1936, 123 Fla. 172, 166 So. 555; Yokom v. Rodriguez, Fla.1949, 41 So.2d 446, 448. The fact that a guest agrees to pay a share of the expenses of a trip does not necessarily establish a joint enterprise nor that he was a paying passenger. Mere contributions to the expense of an automobile trip ordinarily are not construed as compensation or payment for transportation but are usually treated as mere acts of courtesy. See Yokom v. Rodriguez, supra; McDougald v. Couey, 1942, 150 Fla. 748, 9 So.2d 187.

Affirmed.

SHANNON, C. J., and ALLEN and WHITE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …o. 2d 446. This journey was not for the purposes of companionship, pleasure, social amenities, hospitality, and the like, as in Sullivan v. Stock, Fla.App.1957, 98 So. 2d 507, and it was not a share expense trip as in Minnick v. Keene, Fla.App.1962, 139 So. 2d 172. The parties here were total strangers. The facts here are to similar effect as those in Katz v. Ross, C.C.A. 3rd 1954, 216 F. 2d 880, and are more positive, as to payment for transportation, than those in Wagnon v. Patterson, 1954, 206 Ala. 297, 70…
  • Evelio Casas v. Moya, 193 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
    …that case and the instant case are distinguished from the cases of McDougald v. Couey, 1942, 150 Fla. 748, 9 So. 2d 187; Yokom v. Rodriguez, Fla.1949, 41 So. 2d 446; Sullivan v. Stock, Fla.App.1957, 98 So. 2d 507; and Minnick v. Keene, Fla.App.1962, 139 So. 2d 172. See also Gibson v. Hageman, Fla.App.1965, 179 So. 2d 894. We further hold that the question here was not whether or not the jury would have found that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence; the question clearly is whether or not, upon the e…
  • Reyes v. Parsons, 226 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
    …Fla. 201, 4 So. 2d 525. . See Annotations in F.S.A. § 320.59 ; 3 Fla.Jur., Automobiles, § 113 et seq. . Swilley v. Economy Cab Co., Fla.1951, 56 So. 2d 914. . McDougald v. Couey, 1942, 150 Fla. 784, 9 So. 2d 187; Minnick v. Keene, Fla.App. 1962, 139 So. 2d 172. . Yokom v. Rodriguez, Fla.1949, 41 So. 2d 446. . Sproule v. Nelson. Fla.1955, 81 So. 2d 748, 76 A.L.R.2d 1066. Id. . Sullivan v. Stock, Fla.App.1957, 98 So. 2d 507.…

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