NATHAN BEAN, PETITIONER,
v.
H. G. COCHRAN, JR., DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court discharged a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the petitioner was represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty to manslaughter, thus rejecting his claim of being denied the right to counsel.
No, the petitioner was represented by counsel, the public defender, when he pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
“It appears from the unrefuted allegations' of the return and from the affidavit and exhibits attached thereto that petitioner was represented in the trial court by counsel, the public defender of Broward County.”
Establishes the factual basis for the court's decision regarding representation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe petitioner claimed he was denied counsel in the Court of Record when he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The respondent's return, supported by an a…
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The petitioner alleged that he had been denied the right of counsel in the Court of. Record wherein he pleaded guilty to the offense of manslaughter. We issued a writ of habeas corpus and the respondent has filed his return.
It appears from the unrefuted allegations' of the return and from the affidavit and exhibits attached thereto that petitioner was represented in the trial court by counsel, the public defender of Broward County. This return discloses that the petitioner conferred with his attorney on several occasions and was advised of his rights, and that, thereafter, with his counsel present, he freely and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to the offense of manslaughter, the charge having been reduced from second degree murder.
Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus heretofore issued is discharged, the cause dismissed, and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the respondent.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, THOR-NAL, O’CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
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