CLARK DANIEL MAYERS
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 1st DCA | 2018-12-17
No. 18-2926
Greg Abbott
Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2018) Positive Treatment

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Synopsis

The First District Court of Appeal granted a petition for writ of prohibition in a Stand Your Ground immunity case, holding that Chapter 2017-72 of the Florida Statutes, which shifted the burden of proof from the defendant to the prosecution in immunity proceedings, applies retroactively. The court certified conflict with the Third and Fourth Districts regarding whether the amendment violates Florida's savings clause.


Holding

The court granted the petition and held that the 2017 amendment to section 776.032(4) should be applied retroactively, requiring the state to bear the burden of proving the petitioner was not entitled to immunity. The court remanded for the trial court to discharge the petitioner if the state failed to meet this burden.


Headnotes

[1] A statutory amendment shifting the burden of proving Stand Your Ground immunity from defendant to prosecution is procedural in nature and applies retroactively to charges…

[2] Where a trial court finds evidence regarding self-defense inconclusive and alternatively determines the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving lack of immunity,…

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Key Quotes

“In the context of the denial of a motion to dismiss on Stand Your Ground immunity, prohibition has typically been the preferred remedy because the issue involves a determination of whether the circuit court has continuing jurisdiction over the defendant.”

This establishes why prohibition is the appropriate remedy for challenging a trial court's denial of Stand Your Ground immunity.

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Facts & Procedural History

The petitioner sought a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on Stand Your Ground immunity under Flor…

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Opinion of the Court

burden to show that Petitioner was not entitled to immunity. Because we have recently approved the retroactive application of chapter 2017-72, §§ 1-2, Laws of Florida, which took effect June 9, 2017, and which shifted the burden of proof from the defendant to the prosecution, we grant the petition.1 See § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. In Commander v. State, 246 So. 3d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), we were faced with the question of the retroactive application of the amendment to section 776.032(4). There, the State conceded error on appeal because the prosecutor had agreed “the state had the burden to prove that [defendant] was not immune from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground law.” Commander, 246 So. 3d at 1303. We accepted the State’s concession of error in Commander and cited with approval Martin v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1016, 2018 WL 2074171 (Fla. 2d DCA May 4, 2018). In Martin, the Second District determined that the statutory amendment to section 776.032(4) was procedural and therefore should be applied retroactively to shift the burden from the defendant to the prosecution.2 1 “In the context of the denial of a motion to dismiss on Stand Your Ground immunity, prohibition has typically been the preferred remedy because the issue involves a determination of whether the circuit court has continuing jurisdiction over the defendant.” Rosario v. State, 165 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

In Edwards v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2345, D2345 n.1, 2018 WL 4997631, *1 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 16, 2018), we read Commander to mean that “in this district we have applied the amendment retroactively.” The retroactive application of the statute was also approved by the Fifth District in Fuller v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2237, 2018 WL 4659067 (Fla. 5th DCA Sept. 28, 2018). The Third and Fourth Districts have set forth cogent arguments that the retroactive application of the amendment to the burden of proof would violate the savings clause in article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. See Love v. State, 247 So. 3d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), rev. granted, SC 18-747, 2018 WL 3147946 (Fla. Jun. 26, 2018); Hight v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1800, 2018 WL 3769191 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 8, 2018). The courts in Love and Hight held therefore that the amendment to section 776.032(4) operated only prospectively. The court in Hight recognized that we held to the contrary in Commander and certified conflict. Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court will have to determine which view is correct, and we therefore certify conflict with Love and Hight. Based on Commander, Martin, and Fuller, we grant the petition, quash the order denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and remand for the trial court to discharge Petitioner pursuant to the trial court’s alternative finding that the State did not meet its burden if the amendment to the burden of proof in section 776.032(4) was applied retroactively.

PETITION GRANTED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED. ROBERTS and MAKAR, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

_____________________________ Michael Ufferman, Tallahassee, for Petitioner. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Footnotes
2 Because the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution stems from “the presumption of innocence which attends the defendant throughout the trial,” Florida’s civil case precedent relied on in Martin in holding the burden of proof to be procedural and not substantive would not apply to the State’s burden of proof at trial for the offenses charged. See Reynolds v. State, 332 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (holding that the “presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial”); Cordell v. State, 157 Fla. 295, 296, 25 So. 2d 885, 886 (1946) (holding that the presumption of innocence is fundamental law and well-established in Florida).

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