TROY WILLIAM ARMSTRONG
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Where sexual battery is charged using non-sexual organs, penetration is a required element, and conviction cannot rest on union alone.
[1] When a sexual battery charge involves contact made by something other than a sexual organ, penetration is a required element of the offense and union alone is insufficien…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Sexual battery is defined as 'oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object . . . .' Thus, where the contact is made by something other than a sexual organ, in this case Armstrong's mouth, penetration is an element of the charge.”
Footnote explaining the statutory definition and the distinction requiring penetration when non-sexual organs are involved
Armstrong was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. Count II charged Armstrong with violating section 79…
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 5D2024-1508 L.T. Case No. 2020-CF-001402
TROY WILLIAM ARMSTRONG, Appellant,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County. Alicia R. Washington, Judge.
Jennifer Walker Cogdill, Fleming Island, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
April 24, 2026
MACIVER, J.
Troy Armstrong raises multiple issues challenging his judgment and sentence for multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. Among Armstrong's assertions is that he is wrongly convicted of violating section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2020), by penetrating or having union with the victim's anus with his mouth (Count II). Armstrong asserts and the State concedes that union is not sufficient for this specific
charge¹ and there was no evidence of anal penetration. On the State's concession of error, we reverse Armstrong's conviction for Count II.
We reject Armstrong's remaining assertions and affirm the remaining counts without further discussion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for further proceedings.
LAMBERT and KILBANE, JJ., concur.