STATE OF FLORIDA

v.

KEITH ALEXANDER TIMES

Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC2024-0647

STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, vs. KEITH ALEXANDER TIMES, Respondent.

June 25, 2026

SASSO, J.

The State of Florida appeals an order suppressing evidence obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that was executed on the home of Respondent, Keith Alexander Times. It is undisputed that law enforcement violated section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2020), a knock-and-announce statute,¹ during the execution of the warrant. Based on that violation, the trial court granted Times' motion to suppress the evidence. Bound by State v.

1. Section 933.09 is one of two “knock-and-announce" statutes in Florida. Section 933.09 pertains to search warrants while section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2025), pertains to arrests.

Cable, 51 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2010), where this Court held that exclusion is the applicable remedy for knock-and-announce violations, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. State v. Times, 383 So. 3d 555, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). But the First District certified the following question as one of great public importance:

WHETHER EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER A VALID

SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED TO

REMEDY A VIOLATION OF THE KNOCK-AND- ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 933.09, FLORIDA STATUTES?

Id. at 560. For the reasons below, we answer that question in the negative.² In doing so, we quash the decision below and recede from our decision in Cable to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.

I

While investigating a suspected drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Leon County, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) determined that one member of the DTO, Ja'Mario Paramore, was using a residence to store narcotics and the

2. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

proceeds from their distribution. Based on that information, FDLE lawfully obtained a search warrant for the residence. FDLE and the Tallahassee Police Department executed the search warrant after forcibly entering the home with a battering ram. Times, 383 So. 3d at 557. Before entry, law enforcement knocked multiple times and announced their presence twice, demanding that someone come to the door. Id. However, it was not until seconds before entry that an officer stated that the police were in possession of a search warrant. Id. Paramore, Times, and two others were located inside the residence. Law enforcement located cocaine, the drug “Molly,” over $23,000 in cash, and two firearms. Times was ultimately charged with trafficking in amphetamines, possession of cocaine, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id.

Times moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, arguing that the officers violated section 933.09. Id. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the officers did not comply with section 933.09 because a resident is not required to open the door until the officer announces he has a search warrant, and here, the occupants were not given sufficient time after the officer announced the warrant to answer the door. Id. at 558. Based on this Court's precedent in Cable prescribing exclusion as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce statute, the trial court suppressed the evidence. The State appealed, but the First District affirmed. Id. at 560. In doing so, the First District agreed on the binding nature of Cable but noted that its holding requiring suppression for a knock-and-announce violation “appears [to] be the minority position among the various states that have considered the issue in the eighteen years since the United States Supreme Court decision in Hudson [v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)].” Times, 383 So. 3d at 560. Judge Nordby specially concurred, agreeing that the evidence must be suppressed but recognizing the State's "compelling arguments highlighting why [this Court's] precedent should be revisited.” Id. at 561 (Nordby, J., specially concurring). The State then sought discretionary review of the First District's decision based on the certified question of great public importance. This Court accepted jurisdiction.

II

A

There are two knock-and-announce statutes in Florida. See §§ 901.19, 933.09, Fla. Stat.; see also Times, 383 So. 3d at 557 n.1.

These are not new laws—section 933.09, which is the applicable statute here, was first codified in 1923. See ch. 9321, § 9, Laws of Fla. (1923). The knock-and-announce statutes represented a codification of the English common law, which “recognized the fundamental sanctity of one's home yet nevertheless provide[d] that an arresting officer 'may break open doors, if the party refused upon demand to open them.'” Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla. 1964) (quoting 1 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of The Crown 583 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 1736)).

Importantly though, the exclusionary rule was not a feature of common law. See Cable, 51 So. 3d at 444 (Polston, J., dissenting) (citing 8 John Henry Whitmore, A Treatise on the Ang[l]o-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2183 (3d ed. 1940) ("[I]t has long been established that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." (citing to English precedent dating to 1723) (emphasis omitted))). Even so, in 1964, this Court announced an exclusionary rule for knock-andannounce violations. See Benefield, 160 So. 2d at 711; Cable, 51 So. 3d at 438-39. And in 1982, Florida voters amended article I,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution to require conformity to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Fourth Amendment issues. See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. This development inserted the issue of whether the Federal Constitution demanded the knockand-announce rule into Florida's Constitution.3

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 (1995), marked the first time the United States Supreme Court expressly stated the knock-and-announce requirement was a feature of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry and therefore a matter of federal constitutional law. But in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the United States Supreme Court clarified that violations of the knock-and-announce rule did not require the suppression of all evidence found in the search. Id. at 594.

Following Hudson, two Florida district courts of appeal split on the issue of whether exclusion nevertheless remained the applicable

3. See Erin Elizabeth Cassinelli, Constitutional Law─Fourth Amendment—Knock and Announce: The Ninth Circuit Knocks and the Supreme Court Announces a Re-Emphasis on the Case-by-Case Analysis. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003), 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 295, 306 (2005) (discussing conflict among state and federal courts about the link between the knock-and-announce rule and the Constitution).

remedy for statutory knock-and-announce violations. Compare Cable v. State, 18 So. 3d 37, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that Hudson did not “displace the existing Florida precedent, which mandates the application of the exclusionary rule”), with State v. Brown, 36 So. 3d 770, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“[R]eversal is [independently] required . . . because of the holding of Hudson that even established violations of the [knock-and-announce] principle do not implicate the exclusionary rule so as to suppress pertinent evidence."). We resolved the conflict between the districts in Cable by siding with the Second District. 51 So. 3d at 441. We concluded that the exclusionary rule was the applicable remedy “[a]s a matter of state law.” Id. at 442. To reach that conclusion, we characterized our decision in Benefield as holding that “a violation of Florida's knock-and-announce statute vitiated the ensuing arrest and required the suppression of the evidence obtained in connection with the arrest.” Id. at 435. We concluded that "because the remedy of exclusion in Benefield was based on a violation of Florida's knock-and-announce statute, and not the Fourth Amendment,” Hudson did not require us to recede from Benefield. Id.

In addition to distinguishing Hudson, we set forth other factors that weighed against receding from Benefield. Specifically, we rejected the State's argument that the 1982 constitutional amendment to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, requiring that section to be interpreted in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, necessitated receding. Id. at 442-43. We concluded that, like Hudson, that amendment was inapplicable to a statutory analysis. Id. We also rejected the State's argument that Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2008), governed because, unlike the statute in Jenkins, the knock-and-announce statute at issue in Cable lacked an “explicit” remedy. Cable, 51 So. 3d. at 443.

B

Against this backdrop, we analyze the State's argument that this Court clearly erred in Cable when it determined that the remedy of exclusion of evidence should be applied for a violation of section 933.09. We review this issue de novo. See Statler v. State, 349 So. 3d 873, 878-79 (Fla. 2022) (explaining that holdings implicating both statutory interpretation and constitutional issues are reviewed de novo).

The issue in Cable was one of remedy. We therefore begin by examining the statutory text because the remedy for violations of a Florida statute “fall[s] within the purview of the Legislature." Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130. Section 933.09 provides that a law enforcement officer may forcibly enter a house while executing a warrant "if after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein." § 933.09, Fla. Stat. In other words, a law enforcement officer may not forcibly enter a home to execute a warrant until he or she has knocked, announced his or her authority and purpose, and been refused admittance. See id.

The plain text of section 933.09 does not authorize, let alone require, the suppression of evidence. See Cable, 51 So. 3d at 444 (Polston, J., dissenting) (“Florida's knock-and-announce statute at issue [in section 901.19] does not contain an exclusionary rule."); State v. Pruitt, 967 So. 2d 1021, 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (Villanti, J., specially concurring) (concluding that the exclusionary rule should not apply because “nothing in the language of section 933.09 requires suppression of the evidence if the rule is violated”). But chapter 933, Florida Statutes, is not without a statutory remedy. See Times, 383 So. 3d at 561 (Nordby, J., specially concurring). Indeed, chapter 933 deters violations of section 933.09 by threatening wayward police officers with criminal penalties. Chapter 933's enforcement provision—entitled “[e]xceeding authority in executing search warrant; penalty”—states that "[a]ny officer who in executing a search warrant willfully exceeds his or her authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.” § 933.17, Fla. Stat. (2025).4

Because section 933.09 does not itself contain an exclusionary rule and section 933.17 prescribes remedies for violations of section 933.09, we do not infer that the remedy of exclusion is available for violations of section 933.09.5 See Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130. We

4. This statutory enforcement mechanism dates to the original chapter law codifying the knock-and-announce rule for search warrants. See ch. 9321, §§ 9, 17, Laws of Fla. (1923). Like the current version of the statute, the 1923 enactment made the "[p]enalty for exceeding” an officer's “authority” under the Act a "fine[]" of up to $500, “imprison[ment] for not more than six months," and potential “suspension from and removal from office." Id. § 17. 5. Times argues that section 933.17 does not cover violations of section 933.09 because the former requires one to "willfully" exceed their authority while the latter has no mens rea typically do not insert remedies that the Legislature has omitted. See, e.g., QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo. Apartment Ass'n, 94 So. 3d 541, 553 (Fla. 2012); see also Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130 (noting that statute at issue did not expressly list the exclusionary rule as a remedy and, therefore, we do not infer that this remedy is available for violations of the statute). By contrast, the Legislature has demonstrated that, when it intends to include a remedy of exclusion, it knows how to do so. See, e.g., § 934.06, Fla. Stat. (2025) (prescribing exclusion as penalty for violation of wiretapping statute); § 318.14(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2025) (establishing that certain compelled statements during traffic investigations “shall not be used as evidence in any other proceedings”); see also Brooks v. State, 363 So. 3d 181, 184-85 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (holding that section 901.16, Florida Statutes (2018), did not require suppression of statements where the statute did not include that remedy).

Times argues that absence of explicit legislative authorization requirement. Times reasons that law enforcement would be free to not train themselves on section 933.09 and then be free from penalization. But this perceived insufficiency is a policy matter and does not make the remedy more or less applicable.

of an exclusionary rule should not deter us. This is so, Times submits, because while not explicitly stated in the statute, the exclusionary rule is part of the background against which the Legislature passed the knock-and-announce statute in 1923. Times therefore urges this Court to conclude that the Legislature would have understood a remedy of exclusion to be coextensive with a codification of the common law knock-and-announce rule, such that the remedy would be necessarily implied by the text. But a close examination of this argument reveals its weakness.

First, Times' attempt to demonstrate a historical context that included the exclusionary rule falls short. For pre-codification support, Times relies exclusively on Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922), in which two justices of this Court joined in an opinion discussing the exclusionary rule in the context of an alcohol possession offense. Id. at 332. But Chief Justice Browne's opinion in Atz was not an “opinion of this Court,” and his reasoning was therefore not binding precedent. See id. at 330 (opinion of Ellis & West, JJ.). So limited, we reject Times' characterization of this opinion as the "default" position of the Court. But even if the opinion were indicative of a developing legal principle, Chief Justice

Browne's reasoning in Atz was based on what this Court viewed as a constitutional violation6 rather than a statutory violation. Id. Thus, any time Atz references “illegally" acquired evidence, it is in a markedly different context. Id. at 332. Atz therefore does not dissuade us from our understanding that, by codifying common law, suppression was not an applicable remedy for a violation of section 933.09.

Second, Times' post-codification arguments fail as well. Times argues that if this Court “had interpreted the intent of the legislature incorrectly . . . there would undoubtedly be a lot more legislative activity on the issue.” But “[w]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.” Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020, 1030 (Fla. 2023) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.)). What is more, the view that we can assume a certain construction is correct because the Legislature has not

6. Further, the constitutional violation at issue in Atz examined vastly different facts than this case. For example, the police were “admitted by the defendant” into the property and did not have a search warrant. Atz, 94 So. at 330.

amended a statute is based on the “patently false premise that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by what the current [Legislature] desires, rather than by what the law as enacted meant.” Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). So, we reject this argument.

C

Having determined that a remedy of exclusion is not required nor authorized by section 933.09, we conclude that our decision in Cable was wrongly decided. And in retrospect, it is clear how we committed that error.

Our primary mistake in Cable was failing to assess whether Benefield was correct as a matter of statutory interpretation. Instead, we presumed that the remedy of exclusion was justified based on "state law grounds” and concluded that Hudson did not prohibit a state from providing exclusion as a remedy for knockand-announce violations. Cable, 51 So. 3d at 442.

The problem with employing that presumption is that Benefield's decision to exclude the “fruits of the search” was not grounded in an analysis of the statute, and it is unclear whether we grounded the remedy in state law or instead in federal constitutional law. Benefield involved a warrantless search that we concluded was “unreasonable under any standard that would be approved by a free country.” 160 So. 2d at 709. And although we noted that one of the officers' many transgressions included a disregard of the responsibility to knock and announce, we ultimately held that “the fruits of the search being the product of an unlawful arrest and a search incident thereto, should have been excluded by the trial court upon proper motion.” Id. at 711. Further, while we noted the common law underpinnings of the knock-and-announce statute, we did not suggest that an exclusionary rule was similarly a feature of common law. Id. at 710.

As a result, we erred in Cable when we overread Benefield and applied it in a case involving a search pursuant to a warrant where the sole issue was one of remedy for a statutory violation. We then misunderstood our role as a court, first by discounting section 933.17's chosen remedy, and then compounding that error by concluding that we could therefore supply one. That error put us in tension with precedent like Jenkins, where we have acknowledged that the inclusion or omission of remedies for statutory violations is a legislative prerogative.7

A conclusion that a predecessor Court has erred, however, does not end our analysis. “[O]nce we have chosen to reassess a precedent and have come to the conclusion that it is clearly erroneous, the proper question becomes whether there is a valid reason why not to recede from that precedent." State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020). “The critical consideration ordinarily will be reliance.” Id. But here, no reliance interest compels adherence to Cable because no one 'altered his behavior in expectation of the' remedy holding from which we recede.” State v. Manago, 375 So. 3d 190, 203 (Fla. 2023) (citing Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507).

7. The dissent's position that we should adhere to Cable because it offers a judicial remedy conflicts with precedent and our constitutional role. See, e.g., Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130 (“remedies for violation of this statute fall within the purview of the Legislature"); see also art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (“No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches . . . .”). Similarly, the dissent's penalty/remedy distinction in this context is a red herring. We are not authorized to supply a remedy to a statute, even if chapter 933's enforcement provision is characterized as a penalty, because that policy choice remains with the Legislature. See Dade County. v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. 1984) (“The courts cannot amend or complete acts of the legislature intending to supply relief in instances where the legislature has not provided such relief.”).

III

Having receded from our decision in Cable, we answer the certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the First District, and remand this case to the First District for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.