W. E. RAYLE, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM H. MERRILL AND STELLA L. MERRILL, APPELLEES
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In this equity case, the appellant sought to establish a constructive or resulting trust in real property and obtain specific performance of an alleged agreement. The chancellor denied these prayers but awarded the appellant a judgment for money advanced. After accepting full payment of the judgment, the appellant appealed; the court dismissed the appeal, holding that acceptance of the benefits of a decree estopped the appellant from challenging its correctness.
A party who voluntarily accepts the benefits of a judgment or decree with knowledge of the facts is estopped to appeal and seek reversal of that judgment or decree. Acceptance of payment constitutes a waiver of error and release of errors.
“where a party recovering a judgment or decree accepts the benefits thereof voluntarily and knowing the facts, he is estopped to afterwards seek a reversal of such judgment or decree on appeal”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that voluntary acceptance of decree benefits constitutes estoppel to appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant and appellees purchased real estate in which they each owned an undivided one-half interest. Appellant sued in equity seeking to establish a…
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This cause is before the court on appel-lees’ motion to dismiss the appeal.
Appellant instituted a suit in equity seeking to establish a constructive or resulting trust in a parcel of real estate alleged to have been purchased by the parties and in which they each own an undivided one-half interest. It was also prayed that appellees be required to specifically perform the agreement between the parties by conveying to plaintiff the interest claimed by him. The complaint sought judgment for damages suffered by plaintiff as a result of defendants’ failure to comply with the alleged agreement.
On final hearing the chancellor rendered a decree finding the equities of the cause to be with appellees and denying appellant’s prayer for specific performance and for establishment of a resulting or constructive trust. The decree did find, however, that appellees were indebted to appellant for money advanced by appellant in connection with the acquisition and operation of the property in dispute, for which judgment was entered in appellant’s favor. Subsequent to entry of the final decree appellant demanded of and received from appellees payment in full of the judgment awarded by the decree.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is premised upon the contention that having accepted the benefits of the decree awarded him, appellant is estopped to question by appeal its correctness.
In the recent decision rendered by this court in the Carter case 1 we recognized the principle of law prevailing in this jurisdiction that where a party recovering a judgment or decree accepts the benefits thereof voluntarily and knowing the facts, he is estopped to afterwards seek a reversal of such judgment or decree on appeal. His conduct amounts to a release of errors. His acceptance of payment or enforcement of the judgment is a waiver of error, and estops the successful party from appealing. It was there pointed out that if under such circumstances an appeal were permitted *289which resulted in a reversal of the judgment or decree subjected to review, there would be no means by which the status quo of the parties could be restored, and would give the prevailing party an inequitable and unjust advantage over his unsuccessful adversary. Appellant’s entitlement to payment of the judgment awarded him by the decree under assault was dependent upon the validity of the decree in its entirety. Having accepted payment of the judgment, appellant is now estopped to question its correctness.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, and an order of dismissal will be entered accordingly.
CARROLL, DONALD K., C. J., and RAWLS, J., concur.
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Citator
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E.G. Green v. First Am. Bank & Tr., 511 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…l of the money and property awarded to her under the decree; having accepted the benefits thereof, she was es-topped to question the validity of any part of the judgment. Shortly after its decision in Carter, the same court decided Rayle v. Merrill, 141 So. 2d 288, 288-289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), in which the court set forth the reasons for the rule as follows: [*573] It was there [in Carter ] pointed out that if under such circumstances an appeal were permitted which resulted in a reversal of the judgment or de…
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Bennett Stewart Fort v. Fort, 167 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…y F.A.R. 3.8(b), it is necessary to make timely application to the trial court for payment of separate maintenance, support or alimony pending an appeal from a final decree providing benefits as in this case.” (Emphasis supplied.) Rayle v. Merrill, 141 So. 2d 288 (Fla.App.1962), and McMullen v. Fort Pierce Financing & Construction Co., 108 Fla. 492, 146 So. 567 (1933), are causes unconnected with divorce, in which pending the appeal the appellant accepted the benefits of the final decree or judgment pending…1 / 2
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Brown v. Epstein, 208 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)…EN, C. J., and REED, J., concur. .Capital Finance Corporation v. Oliver, 1934,116 Fla. 790, 156 So. 736; Weatherford v. Weatherford, Fla.1956, 91 So. 2d 179; In re Fredcris, Incorporated, Fla.App.1958, 101 So. 2d 49; Rayle v. Merrill, Fla.App.1962, 141 So. 2d 288; Hart-ley v. Hartley, Fla.App.1961, 134 So. 2d 281; Fort v. Fort, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 315; McDaniel Gift Shop, Inc. v. Balfe, Fla.App.1965, 179 So. 2d 588; Sedgwick v. Shaw, Fla.App.1966, 188 So. 2d 29. . Kuharske v. Lake County Citrus Sales,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. Carter, 141 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)