STEVE GALLON, IV
v.
SHEREA GREEN, ETC., ET AL.

Fla. 3d DCA | 2024-05-08
No. 2024-0350
Logue, C.J., Emas, J., Scales, J.
2024 FL 5259 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2024)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Holding

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial bond following an Arthur hearing when the specific facts of the case, including evidence unique to the defendant, support the finding that proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, even if bond is granted to a co-defendant based on the same underlying evidence.

Headnotes

[1] Pretrial bond decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis with full consideration of legally relevant factors specific to each defendant, and the same evidence may sup…

[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial bond following an Arthur hearing when evidence specific to the defendant supports the finding that proof o…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence
Key Quotes

“the specific facts of the case inform the trial court's discretionary decision as to whether, following an Arthur hearing, to grant or deny bond.”

Establishes that bond decisions are fact-specific and discretionary, not subject to mechanical application across co-defendants.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence
Facts & Procedural History

Steve Gallon IV and Atiba Moore were charged as principals with attempted first-degree premeditated murder of a law enforcement officer. At an Arthur …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Topics
Lesser Included Offense Habeas Corpus Petition

Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Lesser Included Offense cases and more on FLexlaw

Per_curiam
Per Curiam

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed May 8, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0350 Lower Tribunal No. F23-4937A ________________

Steve Gallon, IV, Petitioner,

vs.

Sherea Green, etc., et al., Respondents.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.

Law Office of Roderick D. Vereen, Esq., P.A., and Roderick D. Vereen, for petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for respondent The State of Florida.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

1 State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980).

2 Even if there was insufficient proof to establish Petitioner knew the victim was a law enforcement officer, the trial court had a sufficient basis to deny bond to Petitioner on the charge of attempted first-degree premeditated murder – a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree premeditated murder of a law enforcement officer. See Fla. Std. Jur. Instr. (Crim.) 7.13. Although attempted first-degree premeditated murder is classified as a firstdegree felony, see § 777.04(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“If the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a capital felony, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a felony of the first degree. . . .”), the indictment alleges Petitioner used a firearm in the commission of the offense, which if proven would result in a reclassification of attempted first-degree premeditated murder from a first-degree felony to a life felony. See § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“Unless otherwise

provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, . . . the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.”).

Footnotes
2 In this petition for writ of habeas corpus, Steve Gallon IV (“Petitioner”) challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for pretrial bond following an Arthur1 hearing. The State charged Petitioner and Atiba Moore by Information, as principals, with one count of attempted first-degree premeditated murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm, a crime punishable by life imprisonment. The trial court denied Petitioner bond, finding that the State had met its burden of showing that proof of Petitioner’s guilt was evident or the presumption of guilt great. See Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131; Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 720. Petitioner’s principal assertion is that, because the trial court subsequently granted bond to Moore based on the same evidence introduced at Petitioner’s Arthur hearing, Petitioner, too, is entitled to bond. We deny the petition because the specific facts of the case inform the trial court’s discretionary decision as to whether, following an Arthur hearing, to grant or deny bond. See Hernandez v. Junior, 337 So. 3d 135, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021); Obando v. Bradshaw, 920 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (recognizing that rule 3.131 requires “that bond decisions be made on a case-by-case basis, with full consideration of legally relevant factors”); see also Roberson v. Junior, 338 So. 3d 341, 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)
3 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial bond to the petitioner following an Arthur hearing, observing that “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of evidence presented to a trier of fact, our task is not to . . . reweigh the evidence” (quoting Hernandez v. State, 56 So. 3d 752, 758 (Fla. 2010))). At the Arthur hearing conducted below, the trial court considered the testimony of witnesses, affidavits, surveillance videos and other evidence. The victim police detective testified that, on the day of the incident, he was conducting an undercover narcotics investigation and surveilling Moore; therefore, the detective was wearing plain clothes – without his badge displayed – and driving an unmarked rental vehicle, a Toyota Camry. At some point, Moore, who was driving a Nissan Maxima, realized that he was being followed by the Camry and a chase ensued through a residential neighborhood. The detective testified that the vehicles circled the same block three times and, on the third time, the detective accidentally crashed the Camry into the back of Moore’s Maxima. The detective testified that the collision occurred when someone jumped in front of the Camry, and, in order to avoid hitting the individual, the detective swerved and collided into the Maxima. At that point, the detective placed his badge around his neck, exited the
4 Camry, and verbally identified himself as the “police” to Moore, who by then had exited the Maxima. After the detective verbally identified himself as a police officer, the detective was shot in the back of the head by a firearm. The detective testified that Moore was not the shooter. Cellphone records reflected a call between Moore’s cellphone and Petitioner’s cellphone two minutes before the shooting and that Petitioner’s cellphone was located at the scene at the time of the shooting. Video evidence showed Petitioner hiding in close proximity to the incident scene, with a gun, at or about the time of the shooting. Plainly, in making its decision as to whether to grant Petitioner bond, the trial court considered evidence not applicable to Moore. On this record, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying bond to Petitioner.2
5 Petition denied.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw