ANYTIME RESTORATION SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC., ETC.

v.

CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 26, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1258 Lower Tribunal No. 21-13698 SP ________________

Anytime Restoration Services of Florida, Inc., etc., Appellant,

vs.

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Christopher Green, Judge.

Alonso & Perez, LLP and Rafael F. Alonso, for appellant.

GrayRobinson, P.A., Kristie Hatcher-Bolin (Lakeland), Shakiva L. Brown (Fort Lauderdale), and Richard L. Barry (Orlando), for appellee.

Before MILLER, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

GORDO, J.

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Anytime Restoration Services of Florida, Inc. (“Anytime Restoration”) appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the final summary judgment entered in favor of Citizens and remand for entry of final summary judgment in favor of Anytime Restoration.

I.

Anytime Restoration brought the underlying action for breach of an insurance contract as an assignee of the insured, Josefina Campos (“Campos”). Citizens issued a homeowners insurance policy to Campos. While the policy was in effect, a vehicle crashed into the property causing damages. Campos timely reported the loss to Citizens. Thereafter, Campos sought the services of Anytime Restoration to remove debris from the property. After performing the services, Anytime Restoration submitted an estimate, an invoice reflecting an amount due of $2,228.16 and an executed assignment of benefits to Citizens. Citizens denied Anytime Restoration’s claim for payment of the mitigation services. In doing so, it advised Anytime Restoration that there was no coverage for damage to “other structures,” such as the fence, due to

1 Campos opted not to purchase coverage for “other structures” under Coverage B. 2 Campos filed a separate action for breach of contract against Citizens, which resulted in the payment of an appraisal award.

II.

“The standard of review of a summary judgment order is de novo[.]” Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). “Our new summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict such that the inquiry focuses on ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Chowdhury v. BankUnited, N.A., 366 So. 3d 1130, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 192 (Fla. 2020)). “Insurance policy construction is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Arguelles v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 278 So. 3d 108, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017)). “[A] question of insurance policy interpretation, which is a question of law, is also

III.

We start with the basic premise that “insurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy.” Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003)). Policy terms “should be given their plain and unambiguous meaning as understood by the ‘man-on-the-street.’” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Castillo, 829 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Further, “[a] court may resort to construction of a contract of insurance only when the language of the policy in its ordinary meaning is indefinite, ambiguous or equivocal.” Id. (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Morejon, 338 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)). “If the language employed in the policy is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction or the exercise of a choice of interpretations.” Id. “In the absence of ambiguity . . . it is the function of the court to give effect to and enforce the contract as it is written.” Id. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that “in construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Auto-Owners

The core dispute in this appeal arises out of different interpretations of the two policy provisions that separate coverage for the “dwelling” and “other structures.” The relevant policy provisions under “Coverage A – Dwelling” and “Coverage B – Other Structures” provide as follows: A. Coverage A – Dwelling

1. We cover:

a. The dwelling on the “residence premises” shown in the Declarations, including structures attached to the dwelling; and b. Materials and supplies located on or next to the “residence premises” used to construct, alter or repair the dwelling or other structures on the “residence premises.”

This coverage is limited to the “principal building” for the peril of “catastrophic ground cover collapse.”

B. Coverage B – Other Structures

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1. We cover, other structures on the

“residence premises” set apart from the dwelling by clear space. This includes structures connected to the dwelling by only a fence, utility line, or similar connection.

The definition section provides: “Principal building” means that part of your dwelling on the ‘residence premises’ shown in the Declarations, including structures attached to the dwelling as described under SECTION I – Coverage

A.

However, “principal building” does not include:

a. Appurtenant structures, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, decks, patios, pools, spas, or fences;

b. Buildings or other structures covered under Coverage B . . . .

“Residence premises” means:

a. The one family dwelling; or b. That part of any other building where you reside and which is shown as the ‘Location of Residence Premises’ in the Declarations. . . .

“Residence Premises” also includes other structures . . . at that location.

The trial court relied on the definition of “principal building” to exclude coverage for the debris removal and temporary fencing services rendered by

a. The abrupt collapse of ground cover;

b. A depression in the ground cover clearly visible to the naked eye;

c. “Structural damage” to the “principal building”, including the foundation; and d. The “principal building” being condemned and ordered to be vacated by the governmental agency authorized by law to issue such an order for that “principal building.”

Here, it is undisputed that the cause of loss was a vehicle crashing into the property. Because the cause of loss was not “catastrophic ground cover collapse,” the definition of “principal building” is not applicable and therefore, it was error for the trial court to apply it to exclude damages related to the fencing.

Because the underlying damages are covered under Coverage A of the policy, we must then determine whether the services performed by Anytime Restoration are covered. The policy, in pertinent part, provides:

F. Reasonable Emergency Measures

2. For covered loss caused by SECTION I –

PERILS INSURED AGAINST . . .

a. In the event that covered property is damaged by an applicable Peril Insured Against, we will pay the reasonable costs incurred by you for necessary measures taken solely to protect covered property from further damage.

G. Additional Coverages

1. Debris Removal a. We will pay your reasonable expense for the removal of:

(1) Debris of covered property if a Peril Insured Against that applies to the damage property causes the loss; or (2) Ash, dust or particles . . . . By a plain reading, these sections cover reasonable expenses for emergency services and debris removal if the underlying damage to the insured’s property is covered. As the damage here is covered under Coverage A, there is coverage for the services rendered by Anytime Restoration, which included the removal of debris along with the placement of temporary fencing to prevent intrusion into the property. Accordingly, because there existed no genuine issues of material fact, including the amount of services provided, we find the trial court should have entered final summary judgment in favor of Anytime Restoration in the invoiced amount of $2,228.16. We reverse and remand for the trial court to do so.

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Reversed and remanded with instructions.