FQS ENTERPRISE, LLC
v.
B & K FACTOR, INC., ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A trial court lacks procedural jurisdiction to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution after entry of a final judgment that reserves jurisdiction solely for a specific limited purpose, such as enforcing a judgment debtor's obligation to complete a required form.
[1] A trial court's procedural jurisdiction after entry of final judgment is limited to the matters expressly reserved in that judgment.
[2] When a final judgment reserves jurisdiction solely for a specific purpose, such as enforcing a judgment debtor's obligation to complete a required form, the trial court l…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the trial court's jurisdiction was expressly limited to only enforcing that obligation, we find the court lacked procedural jurisdiction to enter the dismissal order after the rendition of final judgment.”
Establishes the core holding that reserved jurisdiction limits the trial court's authority to act on matters outside the scope of what was reserved.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court entered a final judgment on October 15, 2018, in a case between FQS Enterprise and B & K Factor, Inc. The judgment expressly reserved …
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed April 2, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1844 Lower Tribunal No. 16-1485-CA-01 ________________
FQS Enterprise, LLC, Appellant,
vs.
B & K Factor, Inc., et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig, Judge.
Law Guard and Mark W. Rickard (Plantation), for appellant.
No appearance, for appellees.
Before SCALES, GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.
GORDO, J.
2
FQS Enterprise, LLC (“FQS”) appeals a final order dismissing the underlying action for lack of prosecution.1 We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We quash the challenged order because the trial court lacked procedural jurisdiction to enter the order.
On appeal, FQS argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss its case for lack of prosecution after the rendition of final judgment. We agree. The record before us shows the trial court entered a final judgment on October 15, 2018. That judgment reserved jurisdiction solely “to enter further orders that are proper to compel the judgment debtor(s) to complete form 1.977[.]” Because the trial court’s jurisdiction was expressly limited to only enforcing that obligation, we find the court lacked procedural jurisdiction to enter the dismissal order after the rendition of final judgment. See Akuwudike v. McKenzie, 328 So. 3d 1051, 1052-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“The record reveals that, on June 14, 2019, the trial court entered a final summary judgment against [the] appellees . . . . That judgment, which was not appealed, reserved jurisdiction only ‘to enter further orders that are proper to compel the judgment debtor(s) to complete form 1.977.’ . . . Hence, after the expiration of the time allotted for altering, modifying, or vacating the trial
Order quashed.
FQS Enterprise, LLC v. B & K Factor, Inc., et al. Case No. 3D24-1844 GOODEN, J. (specially concurring). I fully concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to address the differences between certain types of jurisdiction and how each operates. Neither the bench nor bar have been a model of clarity on which type of jurisdiction they are referring to in briefing and opinions. “Jurisdiction is a broad term that includes several concepts, each with its own legal significance.” Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 801 n.3 (Fla. 2003). Florida courts recognize three types of jurisdiction:1) subject matter jurisdiction; 2) personal jurisdiction; and3) case or procedural jurisdiction.1 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Anthony-Irish, 204 So. 3d 57, 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Yet jurisprudence in this State has been less than clear on the third type of jurisdiction and often misidentifies it as subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., MTW Jordan, Inc. v. Baskerville, 323 So. 3d 331, 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (holding trial court did not have “subject matter jurisdiction” to entertain motion for final judgment after voluntary dismissal filed as part of settlement agreement); Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 So. 3d 256, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding trial court did not have “subject1 The Fourth District has also recognized “divisional jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Partridge v. Partridge, 790 So. 2d 1280, 1284–85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 4
2 This discussion concerning case jurisdiction does not address what happens when an appeal is filed. There are many rules that come into play
35.
Yet case jurisdiction “can appear and disappear depending on various events, and indeed it can be split into pieces when a court retains ‘jurisdiction’ over some issues but not others . . . .” Stephens, supra at 17. This is especially true with entry of final judgment. Continuing case jurisdiction is largely dependent on what the trial court reserves in its final judgment. See Paulucci, 842 So. 2d at 803; Padron v. Padron, 356 So. 3d 306, 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); ATM Ltd. v. Caporicci Footwear, Ltd., 867 So. 2d 413, 413–14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).
in those fact-specific scenarios. See generally Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(f); Fla. R. App. P. 9.600.
3 There presently is a split among the Districts as to whether case jurisdiction can be waived. Compare MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Schroeder v. MTGLQ Invs., L.P., 290 So. 3d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); Clarke v. Global Guaranteed Goods & Servs., Inc., 364 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023); Ocean Bank v. Caribbean Towers Condo. Ass’n, 121 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), with Schmidt v. JJJTB, Inc., 357 So. 3d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023), review granted, No. SC2023-0915, 2023 WL 7132835 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2023); Pulte v. New Common Sch. Found., 334 So. 3d 677, 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).
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Authorities Cited (30 total)
- Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1985)
- Malone v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla. 1926)
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)
- Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2005)
- Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass'n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2005)
- State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982)
- Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1994)
- MCR Funding & Mortg. Cap. Res. Corp. v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Pro-Art Dental LAB, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008)
- State OF Fla. ex rel. Fulton BAG & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599 (Fla. 1943)