DANIEL JOSEPH QUIGLEY
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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Revocation of probation may be based on hearsay evidence that falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, including business records and evidence of absence of entries in regularly conducted business activity.
[1] Business records and evidence of absence of entries in regularly conducted business activity, as defined by Florida Statutes sections 90.803(6) and 90.803(7), are admissi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“revocation [of probation] may . . . be based solely upon hearsay evidence that falls within an exception to the hearsay rule”
Court citing D.D. v State, 271 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
Daniel Joseph Quigley appealed a probation revocation decision from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County. The trial court admitted business records…
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed April 9, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-1682 Lower Tribunal No. F09-1244 ________________
Daniel Joseph Quigley, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Amy Weber, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
2 Affirmed. See § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2025) (providing that “[r]ecords of regularly conducted business activity” are admissible as evidence even though the declarant is available as a witness, so long as it is established that the acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis contained therein are “made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation”); § 90.803(7), Fla. Stat. (2025) (providing for the admissibility of the absence of an entry in records of regularly conducted activity: “Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, of a regularly conducted activity to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.”); see also D.D. v State, 271 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (reaffirming that “revocation [of probation] may . . . be based solely upon hearsay evidence that falls within an exception to the hearsay rule”) (quoting Ruise v. State, 43 So. 3d 885, 886-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)(“Hearsay is admissible in a probation or community control violation
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Thomas v. State, 711 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Ruise v. State, 43 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- D.D. v. State, 271 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)