HARRY WAYNE CASEY

v.

RICHARD R. FINCH, ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed April 9, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0946 Lower Tribunal No. 85-18364-CA-01 ________________

Harry Wayne Casey, Appellant,

vs.

Richard R. Finch, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig, Judge.

Fox Rothschild LLP, and Franklin L. Zemel (West Palm Beach) and Alan R. Poppe, for appellant.

Reiner & Reiner, P.A., and David P. Reiner, II, for appellee Richard R. Finch; Roberto Stanziale, P.A., and Roberto Stanziale (Fort Lauderdale), for appellees Evan S. Cohen, Esq., and Evan Cohen Music Law.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ.

SCALES, J.

2

Appellant Harry Wayne Casey (“Casey”) challenges two April 26, 2024 trial court orders that discharged orders to show cause why appellee Richard R. Finch (“Finch”) and appellees Evan Cohen and Evan Cohen Music Law (together “Cohen”) should not be held in contempt of court. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering these discharge orders, we affirm.

Relevant Background

Casey and Finch were bandmates in the musical group K.C. and the Sunshine Band.¹ After a falling out, Casey and Finch entered into a Property Division Agreement in 1983 (the “Agreement”). One purpose of the Agreement was the transfer to Casey of all of Finch’s copyright interests and rights to royalties in ninety-nine songs. Soon after entering the Agreement, Finch filed, in the Miami-Dade County circuit court, a declaratory judgment action that sought, based on various theories, to invalidate the Agreement. Casey prevailed in the litigation, and, within the action’s final declaratory judgment, the trial court

2 Section 203 provides that, after January¹, 1978, an “author” of a work – within a five-year window beginning after thirty-five years has passed from the date of the transfer – may terminate a prior transfer of a copyright. The termination process commences with the service of a written notice of termination in accordance with regulations issued by the Register of Copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. 203(a) (2021), While Finch appears to have complied with section 203’s procedures, Casey has disputed whether Finch was an “author” of the songs as contemplated by section 203.

3 Finch initially filed this lawsuit in federal court in California, voluntarily dismissed it, and re-filed it in the Southern District of Florida.

At the outset, we note that the issue before us is not whether Finch is entitled to section 203 relief, or even whether Finch and Cohen’s pursuit of section 203 relief violated the terms of the 1986 Injunction or the 2004 Injunction. We need not, and therefore do not, reach either of these issues because the discrete issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by not finding Finch and Cohen in contempt.⁴ To reverse the trial court, we would have to determine, as a matter of law, that no reasonable judge presented with the facts and circumstances of this case would have refused to hold Finch and Cohen in contempt. See Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Armand, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D272, 2025 WL 322028, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 29, 2025) (“The Court’s role in reviewing

4 Our standard of review of a contempt determination is abuse of discretion. Bath Club Ent., LLC v. Residences at the Bath Club Maint. Ass’n, 348 So. 3d 16, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Milton v. Milton, 113 So. 3d 1040, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“There is nothing that requires a trial court to hold a person in contempt; the court’s determination in this regard is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging both orders to show cause without holding Finch and Cohen in contempt. Affirmed.