STEVE MATTHEWS

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 2, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-0018 Lower Tribunal No. F97-29034A ________________

Steve Matthews, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal under from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Richard Hersch, Judge.

Steve Matthews, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.

EMAS, J.

2

INTRODUCTION

Steve Matthews filed a motion for postconviction relief based on a claim of newly-discovered evidence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Matthews’ motion. We affirm the trial court’s order, but write to address one of Matthews’ claims: the trial court erred in concluding that the testimony of Matthews’ co-defendant (Ezra Naylor) would not be admissible at a new trial, in light of Naylor’s refusal to be subject to crossexamination at the evidentiary hearing. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary determination that Naylor’s testimony would not be admissible at a new trial, and that the remaining evidence did not qualify as newly discovered. As a result, the trial court correctly determined the evidence presented by Matthews at the evidentiary hearing on his motion was not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal if presented at a new trial, and therefore properly denied Matthews’ motion for postconviction relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997, Steve Matthews and Ezra Naylor were indicted for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Shawn Duncombe. Matthews was tried

Soon thereafter, in response to radio calls, a different officer effectuated a stop of the Camry. Matthews was behind the wheel of the car when it was stopped, and a .357 revolver was found in a bag in the backseat;

1 The trials of Matthews and Naylor were severed because Matthews had given a post-arrest statement—implicating Naylor—which the State intended to introduce into evidence at Matthews’ trial. See Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 125 (1968) (holding that, in a joint trial, the admission of a non-testifying codefendant's confession that inculpates the other non-confessing codefendant constitutes a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment).

2 McGahee asserted in her affidavit that, in September 1997, police came to her home and informed her that Matthews had been arrested for murder. She averred that her mother (Simms) told the detectives that neither of them would give a statement about Matthews, thus directly refuting representations in the detective’s police report in which Estopinan said McGahee and Simms each gave a statement and that McGahee told police that Duncombe had threatened to shoot up her house over the debt and that Duncombe’s threat angered Matthews. Simms’ affidavit reiterated

1. That on December 17, 1997, I and Steve Matthews were

indicted as principals to the murder of Shawn Duncombe in case number 97-29034.

2. I was found guilty of the murder on February 22, 1999.

3. Although Steve Matthews was charged and subsequently

convicted of the crime charged in the above-said case number Matthews did not participate in and had no advance knowledge that Shawn Duncombe would get killed. This statement is being provided as proof that Steve Matthews stands convicted for an offense that he actually did not commit.

4. I refused to come forward with this information years ago. I was simply selfish and unwilling to testify about the facts of my case.

5. I am now willing to testify at any hearing to the fact that Steve Matthews did not know Shawn Duncombe would be

McGahee’s assertion that neither she nor McGahee provided a statement to police.

The trial court determined, and we agree, that the information contained in these two affidavits does not constitute newly-discovered evidence because Matthews failed to establish that this evidence was unknown to him and that, in the exercise of due diligence, could not have been discovered prior to trial. See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (“[I]n order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence ‘must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence.’”) (quoting Torres–Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994)).

6. That I am making this statement of my own free will and

because it is the truth.

7. That I have not been offered any inducement, monetary, or otherwise from Steve Matthews or anyone else on his behalf.

(Emphasis added).

The trial court determined that, on its face, Naylor’s affidavit constituted newly-discovered evidence, warranting an evidentiary hearing which the court held in April 2022. Matthews called Naylor to testify and, on direct examination, Naylor testified consistent with his affidavit, but provided no substantive testimony beyond that contained in his seven-paragraph affidavit. Naylor’s attorney accompanied Naylor and was in attendance during Naylor’s testimony at this evidentiary hearing on Matthews’ motion for postconviction relief. On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to question Naylor regarding his own pro se motions for postconviction relief, which attacked the legality of his guilty verdict and life sentence for the first-degree murder of Duncombe. Naylor filed at least two postconviction motions in 2009. In those motions, Naylor swore that he was “actually innocent” and that “I didn’t commit the crime, but I was chosen by Officer Messidor due to a falling out we had weeks earlier.”

Q: So you're attesting that everything that's in these motions is true, right? A: Yes, sir.

Q: All right. And you claim in these motions, as you've claimed in the past, that you were not the person that shot and killed the victim in this case; isn't that right? A: I'm here today to attest to the affidavit I wrote for Mr. Matthews. My trial is done and over with. I don't —— I don't understand what's going on.

Q: You prepared an affidavit with respect to Mr. Matthew's case; is that right? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Okay. And that‘s the affidavit that was shown to you earlier that's in evidence, right?

Q: And in that affidavit, You say that Mr. Matthews had no idea there was going to be a shooting taking place? A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when you‘re saying no idea that there was a shooting that was going to take place, are you referring to the death of Mr. Duncombe in this case? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, are you saying that you were there during the shooting of Mr. Duncombe or not? A: What I'm saying is I'm here to attest to the affidavit I wrote for Mr. Matthews.

Q: And in that affidavit, you say that he did not know there was going to be a shooting -- A: Yes.

Q: -- right? How do you know that Mr. Matthews did not know there was going to be a shooting? A: I didn't know there was going to be---

At this point, Matthews’ counsel objected to this line of questioning as “beyond the scope of direct” which the trial court properly overruled, as the questions went directly to (1) impeaching Naylor’s affidavit and direct testimony at the hearing with evidence that he previously averred under oath that he was not involved with, and was actually innocent of, the murder of Duncombe; and (2) exploring how Naylor could have personal knowledge of Matthews’ non-involvement in Duncombe’s murder. The cross examination continued:

Q: So, it's your position that the reason Mr. Matth—Mr. Matthews didn't know there was going to be a shooting is because he didn't have any kind of a prior criminal history or criminal conduct; is that right? A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Are you saying that Mr. Matthews was not there during the shooting or that he was present during the shooting? A: What I'm saying is that the history with Mr. Matthews, there's no violent streak. That's what I'm saying.

* * *

Q: Mr. Naylor, let me try and —— and put it a little more clearly. You say you‘re going to come into court if there's a new trial and you're going to testify for Mr. Matthews; is that right? A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you're going to be placed under oath and you're going to swear to tell the truth? A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you're going to say in your testimony that Mr. Matthews did not know there was going to be a death that day; is that right? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Are you going to say in your testimony, I was there in the car with him, I had the gun. I got out and shot him, but Mr. Matthews didn't know that that was going to happen. Is that what you're

Q: So your testimony would be limited to whatever language you used in the affidavit? A: Yes, sir.

Thereafter, Naylor’s counsel advised the court that Naylor “is not going to answer any questions about personal involvement that he had or did not have.” Naylor’s counsel also advised the trial court that, if there were a new trial, Naylor would likewise assert his Fifth Amendment right and refuse to testify in that regard. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for postconviction relief. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When . . . the postconviction court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court review[s] the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence. In addition, “we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo.” Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 250 (Fla. 2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Upon our review, we hold the trial court properly determined that, at any new trial, Naylor’s testimony would not be admissible: either it would be inadmissible as irrelevant and speculative (i.e., not based on personal knowledge) or excluded because of Naylor’s refusal to be subject to crossexamination regarding his own presence at or involvement in Duncombe’s murder—areas of inquiry which went directly to testing the veracity, credibility and basis of knowledge of his affidavit and direct examination testimony that Matthews had no involvement in or foreknowledge of Duncombe’s murder. See Bryant v. State, 124 So. 3d 1012, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“[A] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced which is sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. § 90.604, Fla. Stat. (2009). Where a witness has no personal knowledge of a matter, and the witness's knowledge is derived entirely from information given by another, the witness's testimony is incompetent and inadmissible as hearsay.”) (quotation omitted); Bryant v. State, 386 So. 3d 567, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“A speculation objection is rooted in section 90.604, Florida Statutes, which requires a witness to have personal knowledge of the matter testified to.”) (quotation omitted); Campbell v. Salman, 384 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding trial court erred in

Matthews’ claim that the State’s attempted inquiry on crossexamination was beyond the scope of the direct examination is equally without merit. As the Florida Supreme Court observed in describing the broad contours of permissible cross-examination: [W]hen the direct examination opens a general subject, the cross-examination may go into any phase, and may not be restricted to mere parts . . . or to the specific facts developed by the direct examination. Cross-examination should always be allowed relative to the details of an event or transaction a portion only of which has been testified to on direct examination. As has been stated, cross-examination is not confined to the identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement, contradict, rebut or make clearer the facts testified to in chief . . . .

Coxwell v. State, 361 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1978) (quoting Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla.1953) (additional citation omitted)). And while Matthews certainly had the right to present witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, that right is not unbridled: The defendant's right to present witnesses in his own defense, however, does not carry with it the right to immunize the witness from reasonable and appropriate cross-examination.... The fifth amendment provides no immunity from cross-examination for a witness who elects to testify; it is not a “positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.”

Q: Why? A: I know he wasn’t.

Q: How do you know that Mr. Maul was not involved in an accident on January 13th, 1986? A: I stand on the Fifth.

Q: Where was the car? A: I stand on the Fifth.

Q: Whose possession was the car in on January 13th, 1986? A: I stand on the Fifth.

Q: Who was driving the car on January 13th, 1986?

Id. at 1385-86 (Glickstein, J. concurring specially). The witness would not answer this final question. Accordingly, the trial court excluded the defense witness from testifying because he would not “subject[] himself to full, fair cross examination on the subject matter.” Id. at 1386. In a 2-1 decision, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s determination. The instant case presents an even more compelling basis for affirmance, whether it is because the co-defendant Naylor refused on Fifth Amendment grounds to answer any questions beyond the minimal narrative contained in his affidavit, including questions that sought to explore how Naylor knew Matthews was not involved in Duncombe’s murder; or because the questions Naylor was willing to answer revealed that he lacked personal knowledge of Matthews’ involvement (or non-involvement) in Duncombe’s

CONCLUSION

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary determination that Naylor’s testimony would not be admissible at a new trial, and that the testimony of the remaining witnesses did not qualify as newly discovered. Because Matthews failed to present sufficient, admissible, newly-discovered evidence at the hearing, the trial court correctly determined that the evidence presented was not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal if presented at a new trial, and properly denied Matthews’ motion for postconviction relief.

Affirmed.