ANTUAN DEANGELOS WILLIAMS

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-2334 LT Case No. 2023-CF-009499-A _____________________________

ANTUAN DEANGELOS WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Lindsay L. Tygart, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Brian Hyer, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

July 25, 2025

EISNAUGLE, J.

In this Anders¹ case, we affirm Antuan Deangelos Williams’ judgment and sentence. While our Anders review reveals no reversible error harmful to Williams, our record contains two

I

Williams pled open to trafficking in phenethylamines in violation of section 893.135(1)(k)1.a., Florida Statutes (2023), and resisting an officer without violence in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes. He was sentenced to four years in prison on the first count and time served on the second. But both the oral pronouncement and written sentence fail to impose the minimum mandatory sentence for drug trafficking, and the mandatory fine, as required by law. See id. § 893.135(1)(k)2.a.

This court and other district courts have, for some time now, used Anders cases to correct scrivener’s errors that harm the government. See Youngblood v. State, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D2030, D2030 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct.⁸, 2024) (requiring, among other items, that defendant “submit DNA samples as required by law”); Flowers v. State, 395 So. 3d 1077, 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (concluding that there was no prejudicial error to appellant in the record, but remanding “for entry of an amended sentencing order in which the ten-year mandatory minimum sentences are imposed”); Galvin v. State, 359 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (remanding to correct written sentence to impose¹² months’ probation instead of⁶ months); Pierre v. State, 336 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (remanding to impose pronounced sentence as to

2 See Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268, n.3 (Fla. 2003) (“The term scrivener’s error refers to a mistake in the written sentence that is at variance with the oral pronouncement of sentence or the record but not those errors that are the result of a judicial determination or error.” (citation omitted)).

While we have never, to our knowledge, sua sponte corrected a legal error to assist the government in an Anders case, we have not yet decided how far the reverse Anders review employed in Youngblood and Flowers extends. To be clear, both this case and Flowers involve the exact same substantive error—a failure to impose the minimum mandatory sentence as required by law. See also Aviles, 151 So. 3d at 555. The only difference between this case and Flowers is that, in this case, the error is legal in nature (the result of a judicial error) while the error in Flowers arose as a scrivener’s error. Given that the substance of each error is the same, at least from the perspective of the defendant,³ we must now decide whether decisions like Youngblood and Flowers permit a reverse Anders review in cases involving legal errors. To do so, we will examine the limits on a court’s constitutional authority and explain how adherence to the party presentation principle is necessary to maintain our proper judicial role within the separation of powers.

3 Allen v. State, 853 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[W]e do not agree with the state’s argument that the modification had no effect on Allen’s sentence. When a statute mandates a minimum sentence, the sentencing court must specify it on the sentencing order.”)

4 Nikolaus Thaddäus Gönner “is credited with the identification of the conception” in his work published in 1801– 1803. See Robert Wyness Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure¹¹ (Northwestern Univ. Press 1923).

Recently, the United States Supreme Court explained the principle as follows:

[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government. They do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. [They] wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, courts] normally decide only questions presented by the parties.

5 We are well aware that, at least in Florida, the party presentation principle applies to an appellant, but not necessarily to an appellee. In Florida, an appellant has the burden to demonstrate error, Lynn v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955), while an appellee has no burden to prove that the judgment is correct, MacNeill v. O’Neal, 238 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1970) (“[A] party who is content with the judgment below need not assign error in order to support that judgment.”); Chamberlain v. Lesley, 22 So. 736, 736 (Fla. 1897) (“Under our rules a party appellant is in many ways punished for his failure to brief his case, and the rules require an appellee to file briefs with us, though no penalty is named for his failure to do so.”). For that reason, an appellate court may properly affirm a judgment even when the appellee confesses error, Sims v. State, 260 So. 3d 509, 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“But we are not required to accept the State’s confession, and before we reverse any criminal judgment, we must be certain the law requires reversal.”); Nacius v. One W. Bank, FSB, 211 So. 3d 152, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“While we appreciate counsel’s candor and explanation in the confession of error, we are not required to accept a confession of error.”), or makes no argument at all, Freeman v. State, 373 So. 3d 1255, 1257 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“[T]he appellate court may affirm even when the appellee does not serve an answer brief.”); Bowman v. Bowman, 318 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

But while the party presentation principle is often understood simply as a wise judicial policy, we think it is something more. Our review of the evidence suggests that the principle plays a critical role in vindicating the original meaning of the term “judicial power” in Florida’s constitution. See Art. V, § 1, Fla. Const.

We see at least two specific ways in which application of the principle is necessary for the proper exercise of our passive constitutional authority. First, as we will explain, the party presentation principle is difficult to separate from the constitutional requirement that courts decide only cases. Second, the adversarial nature of our system of justice, as a component of judicial power, depends upon a faithful application of the principle.

A

The party presentation principle gives force to the constitution’s requirement that courts decide only cases. During the founding of our republic, Alexander Hamilton argued that our federal Constitution establishes a limited role for the judiciary where courts “have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment[.]” The Federalist No. 78, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Fall River Press ed., 2021). According to Hamilton, the judicial power “can take no active resolution whatever.” Id. This is reflected in Article III’s “cases and controversies” provision. Art. III, § 2, cl.¹, U.S. Const.; see also Marbury v. Madison,⁵ U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (“The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.”).

Both the federal and Florida Constitutions establish a separation of powers, and the division between the legislative and judicial powers is instructive. See Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.; Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222–23 (1995). While the “legislative power [is] to make general law . . . the judicial power [is] to apply that law in particular cases[.]” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 224.

The second characteristic of judicial power is, that it pronounces on special cases, and not upon general principles. If a judge, in deciding a particular point, destroys a general principle by passing a judgment which tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and consequently to annul it, he remains within the ordinary limits of his functions. But if he directly attacks a general principle without having a particular case in view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to confine his authority; he assumes a more important, and perhaps a more useful influence, than that of the magistrate; but he ceases to represent the judicial power.

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 75 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Democracy in America 73 (R. Heffner ed. 1956)). In other words, the requirement that a court decide only cases is so central to our concept of judicial power that if a court were to do otherwise, it would “cease[] to represent the judicial power” and would instead encroach upon the legislative domain. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 73 (R. Heffner ed. 1956).

So, the way in which a court exercises the judicial power matters. As Hamilton explained it, there is no meaningful “danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority” because of “the general nature of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, from the manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force.” The Federalist No. 81, at 459–60 (Alexander Hamilton) (Fall River Press ed., 2021) (emphasis added).

6 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 635 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

While the proper exercise of judicial power requires a case, that limitation would have little meaning if a court could sift through its entire docket in search of any and every unraised issue that the court itself wishes to consider. In the end, a court does not accomplish the unauthorized exercise of WILL by merely choosing a case—after all, a case without issues leaves nothing for the court to decide.

7 We do not find this proposition terribly controversial. We know of no legal mechanism by which a Florida court has general authority to reach a decision without a case. More importantly, Article V of Florida’s Constitution is replete with evidence that Florida’s courts act only on cases—both express and implied. For instance, the supreme court “[s]hall hear appeals” and “review any decision of a district court of appeal.” Art. V, § 3, Fla. Const. The supreme court must adopt rules of procedure to include “the time for seeking appellate review,” “the transfer to the court having jurisdiction of any proceeding when the jurisdiction of another court has been improvidently invoked,” and “a requirement that no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought.” Art. V, § 2, Fla. Const. District courts “shall consider each case” and “shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals.” Art. V, § 4, Fla. Const. District courts may also review interlocutory orders “in such cases.” Id. Circuit courts have had jurisdiction in “actions,” “proceedings” and “cases.” Art. V, § 20, Fla. Const. (schedule to Article V defining jurisdiction of courts “until changed by general law”). On the other hand, we find no evidence in the text of our constitution to indicate that the term “judicial power” is inconsistent with the long-understood requirement that courts remain passive unless and until a case is presented for decision.

B

The party presentation principle is also necessary to maintain our well-established adversarial system of justice. The English, and then American, legal systems have long employed an adversarial model of adjudication.⁸ Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 713, 713 (1983); Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2002). “From the 1640s onward the full range of adversarial mechanisms began to grow, and by the end of the 1700s the adversary system had become firmly established not only in England but also in America.” Landsman, 44 Ohio St. L.J. at 730.

We fail to see how our system of justice could remain truly adversarial without a faithful application of the party presentation principle. The principle is not merely a matter of procedure. It is “crucial to [our] adversarial system of adjudication,” Jeffrey M. Anderson, The Principle of Party Presentation, 70 Buff. L. Rev. 1029, 1033–34 (2022), and as a result, a failure to enforce it alters “the character of our institution.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

8 We are aware of rare and limited exceptions to the adversarial nature of our system that require a court to take a more engaged role. See, e.g., § 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2024); Doe v. Uthmeier, 407 So. 3d 1281, 1288 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“[T]he circuit judge demonstrated precisely the kind of engagement that the nonadversarial proceeding below required.”).

10

To be sure, the principle’s “observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). The very “premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as selfdirected boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci, 714 F. 2d at 177 (emphasis added).

If the development of our adversarial system is centuries old, was well-established long before the adoption of Florida’s constitution, and is “[t]he heart of the American legal system,” Anderson, 70 Buff. L. Rev. at 1034, absent any notable evidence to the contrary, we must conclude that the adversary system is an integrated part of judicial power in Florida. As such, any diversion, not otherwise specifically authorized, would change the “character” of our judicial institutions, and ultimately, threaten the nature of judicial power as we know it. Id. at 1048.

C

For these reasons, the party presentation principle is more than sound policy. The passive design of the judicial power, as reflected in our constitution, requires a steadfast application of the principle.

In this case, the State has not filed a cross-notice of appeal or raised any error in an initial brief. In short, no party has raised the issues of the minimum mandatory sentence or mandatory fine on appeal. Therefore, as we have explained, if we have authority to correct these errors sua sponte, we must identify a specific exception to the limits on our judicial power.

III

One exception to the judiciary’s passive constitutional baseline is established in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

As a result, our Florida Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]hile courts should not assume the role of appellate counsel, reversible error should not be ignored simply because an indigent appellant or a public defender failed to point it out.” State v. Causey, 503 So. 2d 321, 322–23 (Fla. 1987) (emphasis added). According to the court, “pursuant to Anders, in order to assure indigents fair and meaningful appellate review, the appellate court must examine the record to the extent necessary to discover any errors apparent on the face of the record.” Id. at 322.

According to Anders, Causey, and Robbins, the Anders review exception to our otherwise limited and passive authority is exercised solely for the benefit of the defendant. Indeed, the purpose of the Anders procedure is “to protect indigent defendants’ constitutional right to appellate counsel.” Robbins, 528 U.S. at 264.

Given this purpose, the Anders exception does not extend to reviewing the record to assist the government—which we observe is neither indigent nor the “accused.” Amend. VI, U.S. Const. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.” (emphasis added)). If Causey instructs us to avoid “assuming the role of appellate counsel” for a defendant—we clearly are not authorized

9 We recognize that there are other exceptions not applicable here, see, e.g., Mapoles v. Wilson, 122 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960) (“Although the question of this court’s jurisdiction was not raised by the parties, it is a matter of primary concern to which we must address ourselves sua sponte when any doubt exists.”), but we need not itemize them all.

IV

We are bound by our prior decisions, yet we are not required to extend their reach. We remain mindful that a written sentence failing to impose a minimum mandatory sentence is substantively the same whether that error is categorized as a legal error or a scrivener’s error. Both sentences are illegal. Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007); Wilder v. State, 967 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). But given that we can find no authority for a reverse Anders review in either instance, we must limit our decisions in Youngblood and Flowers.

As such, we now hold that the sua sponte correction of errors harmful to the government in an Anders case is strictly limited to scrivener’s errors. We have no authority to sua sponte correct legal errors harmful to the government in an Anders case, even if those errors are substantively identical to the errors addressed in our reverse Anders review jurisprudence.

10 We, of course, are aware that the trial court was required by law to impose the minimum mandatory term and mandatory fine. But a record may contain countless errors, and some form of error can be found in many cases—some of those cases are appealed and some are not. The mere existence of error, without more, is not enough to justify the exercise of judicial power.¹¹ This writer readily acknowledges joining Roberts v. State, 252 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), which remanded for correction of an error that was, at best, harmless to the defendant. As Justice Scalia once observed, sometimes “wisdom [] come[s] late.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, at xxx (2012).

Finally, we observe that this decision, and decisions like Youngblood and Flowers, will often evade review. In an Anders case, the appellant largely proceeds pro se because, after submitting an Anders brief (identifying no grounds for reversal), counsel moves to withdraw from the case.

Moreover, there is often limited incentive to seek review in the Florida Supreme Court. For instance, an appellant may lack motivation to challenge our court’s sua sponte remand to impose an additional minimum mandatory sentence if the appellant is serving several concurrent sentences of similar length. Even so, a court’s fidelity to our proper role within the constitution’s separation of powers is no less important.¹²

Due to this limited opportunity for review, we direct the Clerk of this court, pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.140, to refer this opinion to the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court and the Appellate Court Rules Committee of The Florida Bar for consideration of a rule amendment clarifying that the scope of an appellate court’s Anders review is limited solely to correction of errors that are harmful to the defendant.¹³

AFFIRMED.

12 Notably, this court has been unable to decide a similar issue en banc. Youngblood v. State, No. 5D2023-3067, 2025 WL 1084218, at *1 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr.¹¹, 2025) (denying rehearing en banc).¹³ One possible solution would be to amend Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(g)(2)(A) to state that an appellate court must “independently review the record to discover any arguable issues apparent on the face of the record. On the discovery of an arguable issue, other than an unpreserved sentencing, disposition, or commitment order error, the court must order briefing on the issues identified by the court. The court may only address errors that are both reversible and harmful to the defendant.”

14

JAY, C.J., and PRATT, J., concur.

______________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________