BROWNING

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2024-0363 _____________________________

WILLIAM BROWNING,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

J. Lee Marsh, Judge.

August 20, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court dismissed the petition due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the order directing him to timely file his affidavit of indigency along with a copy of the previous six months’ statements of his Department of Corrections inmate trust account. See § 57.085(2), Fla. Stat. (2023). We affirm. Appellant’s petition in the trial court sought to compel the Department to compensate him or replace personal property lost in a search of his prison cell during his absence. The petition initiated a civil action, not a collateral criminal proceeding. See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (exempting any “criminal proceeding or

* The dissent contends that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal arguing that the order was a nonfinal, nonappealable order because the dismissal was without prejudice. The meaning of a dismissal without prejudice can be ambiguous and can mean either without prejudice to amend the initial pleading or that the dismissal is not a disposition on the merits such that res judicata precludes a future action. See Carlton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). But “[a] dismissal need not be with prejudice to be a final order for appeal purposes.” Adams v. Dixon, 409 So. 3d 197, 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (quoting James v. Crews, 132 So. 3d 896, 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)). Although the order dismissed the petition without prejudice, judicial labor came to an end with the order, making it a final, appealable order. See Prime Orlando Properties, Inc. v. Dep’t of

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

Bus. Regul., Div. of Land Sales, Condo. & Mobile Homes, 502 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “When leave to amend is not specified in the order, ‘without prejudice’ can indicate the trial court’s intention to ‘bring an end to the judicial labor in the action.’” Franklin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 202 So. 3d 923, 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). “The test to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory in nature is whether the case is disposed of by the order and whether a question remains open for judicial determination.” Prime Orlando Properties, 502 So. 2d 456, 459. If the order dismissing the petition without prejudice left any doubt whether any judicial labor remained, the subsequent orders made it explicit that no further labor was expected or even allowed to occur in the case.

I agree with the majority that Browning has not demonstrated entitlement to relief, but I would dismiss, rather than affirm. The trial court’s order administratively dismissing Browning’s petition for writ of mandamus was neither an appealable final order nor an appealable nonfinal order. And even if the court were to treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, Browning has not demonstrated entitlement to extraordinary relief. The trial court dismissed Browning’s mandamus petition— without prejudice—after Browning failed to file the prisoner trust account records required for him to qualify for indigency status and to proceed with his civil action while deferring prepayment of the filing fee required under section 28.241, Florida Statutes. See § 57.085(2), Fla. Stat. (2023). In the order of dismissal, the trial court also directed the clerk of court to “close this file.” I acknowledge that this court has exercised appellate jurisdiction in reviewing a similar order. See Sussman v. Dep’t of Corr., 257 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). In Sussman, a prisoner appealed an order dismissing his mandamus petition without prejudice after the prisoner failed to comply with the trial court’s order addressing his failure to file the required trust documents under section 57.085. Id. at 605. This court affirmed. But the opinion includes no discussion or analysis of the court’s jurisdiction or whether the order appealed was (1) an appealable final order, (2) an appealable nonfinal order, or (3) reviewable by certiorari. Id. I do so here, recognizing the court’s independent duty “to examine our jurisdiction in every case.” Wade v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 57 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Article V, section 4(b)(1) of Florida’s Constitution grants district courts of appeal appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders of trial courts and to review nonfinal orders “to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court.” The order dismissing Browning’s petition was neither. The order was not a final, appealable order because the trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice. See Augustin v. Blount, 573 So. 2d 104, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (explaining that a “final order” dismissing a claim “without prejudice” is not final for

William Browning, pro se, Appellant.

Dan Johnson, General Counsel, and Christine L. Wolfe, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.