TAMARA CARUS

v.

THE COVE AT ISLES AT BAYSHORE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed August⁶, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

Nos. 3D25-1079 & 3D25-1177 Lower Tribunal No. 20-11733-CC-05 ________________

Tamara Carus, Petitioner,

vs.

The Cove at Isles at Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael G. Barket, Judge.

Kenzie N. Sadlak, PA, and Kenzie N. Sadlak, for petitioner.

Douglas H. Stein, P.A., and Douglas H. Stein, for respondent The Cove at Isles at Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LOGUE and LOBREE, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

2

Petitioner Tamara Carus, the defendant and counter-plaintiff below, filed two petitions¹ in this Court that together seek prohibition, certiorari, and/or mandamus relief with respect to the proceedings and orders entered below in this county court action. We, sua sponte, consolidate the two petitions and, given the highly unusual procedural posture of the proceedings, dismiss the petitions without prejudice to Carus timely appealing any adverse, appealable order that the successor county court judge may enter on Carus’s rehearing motion that remains pending below.

I.

Relevant Background In March 2016, respondent The Cove at Isles at Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc. (“the Association”) filed a two-count complaint in the Miami-Dade County circuit court seeking (i) to foreclose a claim of lien on residential property owned by Carus for unpaid homeowner’s association assessments, and (ii) to recover the unpaid assessments. Over the next several years, the Association was unable to effectuate valid service of process on Carus. After the Association dismissed its lien foreclosure count in the circuit court action, the Association, in February 2020, moved to transfer the case

2 This Court invalidated the Association’s attempted substitute service on Carus. See Carus v. Cove at Isles at Bayshore Homeowners Ass’n, 354 So. 3d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

3 The rule states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the demand of any counterclaim . . . exceeds the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is pending, the action must be transferred immediately to the court of the same county having jurisdiction of the demand in the counterclaim . . . with only such alterations in the pleadings as are essential.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j).

4 Effective January¹, 2021, this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction was enlarged to include appeals from most orders of the county court. See Ch. 20-61, § 3, Laws of Fla. “[I]n light of this legislative enactment, a circuit court lacks extraordinary writ jurisdiction in a case where it does not have direct appellate jurisdiction.” Thompson v. Thompson, 342 So. 3d 818, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

II.

Analysis Generally, prohibition is the appropriate remedy when, as here, a party asserts that a trial court is acting without subject matter jurisdiction. See Dupree v. Dellmar, 323 So. 3d 342, 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (granting writ of prohibition where “the county court exceeded its jurisdiction in adjudicating issues related to Dupree’s claims of an equitable interest in real property and in continuing to exercise jurisdiction where none exists”); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Culbreath Isles Prop. Owners Ass’n, 103 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“A writ of prohibition may be appropriate if a circuit court

5 Carus’s rehearing motion has tolled the rendition date of the final judgment. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(2)(A).

6 acts in excess of its jurisdiction in a given case.”). As with all extraordinary writs, though, a writ of prohibition is typically not available as a substitute for a plenary appeal. See Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1986) (“[A] defendant cannot resort to a writ of prohibition where he has an adequate remedy via appeal.”). Moreover, it is well settled that prohibition will not lie as a remedy if the event to be prevented has already occurred. Id. (“Prohibition is preventative, not corrective. Thus, it cannot be utilized to revoke an order already entered, and the writ will not lie where the proceedings below have already been completed.”); see also Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577, 580 (Fla. 2022) (“[T]he purpose of the writ [of prohibition] is to prevent a court’s action beyond the scope of its jurisdiction, not to correct an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.”); Philip J. Padovano, 5. Fla. Prac., Civil Practice § 31:2. (2025 ed). Here, Carus’s first petition sought the wrong extraordinary relief (mandamus) and she filed it in the wrong court (circuit court appellate division). By the time the first petition was transferred to this Court (3D25- 1177), the trial court had already conducted the trial and entered both the written order denying Carus’s transfer motion and the final judgment. Adjudicating Carus’s first petition (3D25-1177) (seeking a writ from this Court