ALONZO B. HUNTER, III

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 5D2024-0300 LT Case No. 2021-CF-009878-A _____________________________ ALONZO B. HUNTER, III, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Tatiana Salvador, Judge. Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Brian Hyer, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. August 1, 2025

EDWARDS, J.

Appellant, Alonzo B. Hunter, argues that the failure to bring him to trial within 180 days from receipt of his Interstate

IADA.

2 The State previously nolle prossed Appellant’s charges of sale, manufacture, or delivery or cocaine; possession of a controlled substance; possession of cannabis; and resisting a law enforcement officer without violence. 3 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

3 arrest. It turns out that Appellant had not simply run off and skipped his Duval County court date. Instead, on November 29, 2021, he was arrested in Florida on an Atlanta, Georgia warrant. He was transferred from the custody of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (“JSO”) to Atlanta law enforcement on December 13, 2021, and transported to Georgia. On January 10, 2022, Appellant sent a letter to the Duval County court informing it that he had been incarcerated in Georgia since November 2021.

While still imprisoned in Georgia, Appellant made a demand for speedy trial which was mailed February 4, 2022, and filed in the Duval County Clerk of Court’s office ten days later. On March 15, 2022, the JSO lodged a detainer which requested the Georgia authorities to place a hold on Appellant based on the charges described above. The JSO advised that it would extradite Appellant if the Georgia authorities confirmed his identity. Additionally, the JSO requested information as to where Appellant would be held pending extradition to Duval County. Interstate Agreement on Detainers

It seems logical at this point to discuss the IAD in some detail. The IAD is a compact entered into by the federal government, forty-eight states, two territories, and the District of Columbia to establish clear procedures for resolution of one jurisdiction’s outstanding but untried charges against a prisoner in the custody of a different jurisdiction. Monroe v. State, 978 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Article I of the IAD notes that such untried charges underlying detainers can interfere with programs and treatments otherwise available to assist with rehabilitating the prisoner. § 941.45(I), Fla. Stat. A related situation exists when a state wants to resolve charges pending against a defendant imprisoned outside their jurisdiction. The IAD addresses both concerns. If a prisoner, such as Appellant, who is imprisoned in one party state (Georgia the “sending state” per Article II(b) of the IAD) wishes to resolve any untried indictment or information pending in another party state (Florida the “receiving state” per Article II(c) of the IAD) that has lodged a detainer against him, Article III of the IAD permits the prisoner to initiate the process

4 by sending a formal written notice or request for transfer and resolution of charges to the receiving state. Id. § 941.45(III)(a). The IAD requires the prisoner to provide or send a written notice and request for disposition to the warden or other corrections official having custody over him. The appropriate official must provide a signed certificate “stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.” Id. The IAD next provides that the warden or other official having custody of the prisoner “shall promptly forward [the prisoner’s written notice and request for final disposition] together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” Id. § 941.45(III)(b). Once the prisoner’s conforming notice has been delivered to the prosecutor and appropriate court in the receiving state, the IAD provides that the prisoner shall be brought to trial in the receiving jurisdiction within 180 days, subject to any continuances granted for good cause. Id. § 941.45(III)(a). If the prisoner is not brought to trial within that time period, the “indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing same with prejudice.” Id. § 941.45(III)(d). There is also a procedure available under Article IV of the IAD for the receiving state, rather than the prisoner, to initiate the process by requesting the prisoner to be transferred to its state for trial. Id. § 941.45(IV)(a). When initiated by the state, trial must be commenced within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival in the receiving state. Id. § 941.45(IV)(c). Appellant’s IAD Paperwork On September 15, 2022, Appellant prepared a formal, written, signed, and witnessed IAD request for transfer and final disposition using the appropriate IAD Form II, which was directed to both the Assistant State Attorney in Jacksonville, Florida prosecuting his case, Jalisa Curtis, and to the “Clerk of Duval

6 initiated the IAD transfer. The State first advised the trial court that Appellant made the IAD request, then the State candidly admitted that it did not know whether it or Appellant initiated the IAD transfer. Later in that same hearing, the State asserted that it, rather than Appellant, had initiated the IAD transfer based on the IAD request prepared by the State on November 8, 2022. Based upon the evidence before it, the trial court found that “it is clear that” Appellant had initiated the transfer by the submission of his formal IAD request. It noted that Appellant’s IAD request was received by the State on November 1, 2022, prior to the State preparing and filing its own IAD request to Warden Perkins nearly a week later. Thus, the trial court consistently used April 30, 2023 as the IAD trial deadline. Proceedings After Appellant’s Return to Florida The record is unclear, as acknowledged by the trial court, as to why Appellant was not transported to Florida from Georgia until March 8, 2023. At that time, seven weeks remained before reaching the IAD trial deadline. Commencing in March 2023, Appellant was represented in Duval County by attorney Cobbin. At a hearing on May 10, 2023, ten days (10) after the 180-day IAD trial deadline had expired, Appellant appeared and told the court that he had filed a request for transfer and final resolution of the Duval County charges pursuant to the IAD and for speedy trial, but Cobbin had not adopted or pursued Appellant’s pro se motions. During that same post-expiration hearing, Appellant’s counsel agreed with the State to a trial period commencing on June 26, 2023. However, the trial did not take place in June because attorney Cobbin requested and received a continuance. Appellant discharged Cobbin as his counsel in mid-September 2023 because of Cobbin’s failure to adopt and pursue Appellant’s pro se pleadings regarding speedy trial and the IAD.

9 his imprisonment in New York to Florida for final disposition of charges filed against him in a Pasco County, Florida information. Roberts, 427 So. 2d at 789. Unlike Appellant in our case, Roberts did not use the official IAD forms and when it came to providing the information regarding his New York prison term, jail credits, parole status, and the like, he had provided the Pasco County State Attorney’s office with a memo which he had received from the New York authorities. Id. There was no certificate from the warden or other official, and Roberts sent the IAD request himself, rather than having the New York warden sign and send it. Id. Technically, Roberts’ request was not fully compliant with the IAD. Id. However, the Second District found that Roberts had substantially complied with the statutory requirements which provided Pasco County with the information it needed to proceed. Id. at 790. It noted that [t]hese documents informed the Pasco County officials which charges were at issue, notified them of Roberts' current place of incarceration, requested final disposition of the charges pursuant to the IADA, and waived extradition. The memorandum from the New York prison officials to Roberts, which Roberts sent to the Pasco officials, contained the information which is usually supplied in a certificate of inmate status. Id. In our case, the trial court noted that, “the State has not contended that the Defendant’s September 2022 documents were in any way deficient or not in substantial compliance with [the] IAD.” The court also remarked that Appellant’s formal IAD request may not have been sent by certified mail, return receipt; however, given that the State Attorney’s office had acknowledged receipt in the November 1, 2022 interoffice memorandum, the trial court did not see that as anything to be concerned about. Nor has the State raised either of those two points to support its claim that Appellant’s formal request for transfer and final disposition did not substantially comply with the IAD.

13 received it, absent continuances, as the trial court found that it was Appellant rather than the State, who initiated the transfer. It is clear that given the expiration of the 180-day trial date deadline would have been April 30, 2023, Appellant was entitled to discharge and dismissal of those charges with prejudice if the IAD were to be considered in isolation. However, the IAD does not operate in a vacuum. The Florida Supreme Court has held that Florida’s speedy trial rule, Rule 3.191, applies to IAD matters. Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925–26 (Fla. 1994); see also State v. Garza, 807 So. 2d 790, 792–93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The Rule protects the State from “surprise” dismissals based upon technical, inadvertent speedy trial violations. Monroe, 978 So. 2d at 184. Rule 3.191 requires a defendant to file a pleading entitled “Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time” and to serve a copy on the prosecuting authority. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(h) (2022). That rule mandates that a hearing must be held within five (5) days to schedule a trial, which must commence within ten (10) days. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3).9 This is often referred to as the “recapture” period or window. State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 2010). Rule 3.191 “is not self-executing and requires a defendant to take affirmative action to avail him—or herself of the remedies afforded under the rule based on the State’s failure to comply with the time limitations.” Id. (citing State v. Clifton, 905 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). The trial court entered a written order on January 19, 2024, adding detail to its oral ruling that denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. In that same order, the court set forth its speedy trial and IAD-related findings, including that Appellant had initiated the

IAD

transfer and substantially complied with the requirements of the IAD, which started the 180 days running for his trial to commence. The court determined that the IAD deadline for Appellant’s trial was April 30, 2023 and had expired before he was set for trial. The court noted that Appellant’s failure to have 9 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p) has since been revised in several respects, one of which makes the recapture period thirty (30) days now, instead of ten (10).

14 earlier served a notice of expiration of speedy trial time thwarted his right to immediate dismissal of the Florida charges. However, in that January 19, 2024 order, the trial court treated Appellant’s December 28, 2023 motion to dismiss and for reconsideration, which clearly raised IAD and speedy trial issues, as his notice of expiration of speedy trial time, thereby triggering the process and time periods set forth in the then-existing version of Rule 3.191(p)(3). Computation of Time Error The trial court noted that it had conducted a hearing on January 2, 2024, following the filing of Appellant’s motion on December 28, 2023; thereby within the initial five-day window provided by the Rule. However, as noted above, Appellant’s trial did not commence until January 16, 2024. In calculating January 16, 2024 as the deadline for commencing trial within the recapture period, the trial court announced that it excluded weekends from its ten-day count. Appellant correctly argues that the trial court erred in its exclusion of weekend days. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040 states that, “[c]omputation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.514 (2021), except for the periods of time of less than 7 days contained in rules 3.130, 3.132(a) and (c), and 3.133(a).” Because the setting of the trial date within the recapture period involved more than seven days, Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.514 governed. That rule provides, in pertinent part: (a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing time periods specified in any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that does not specify a method of computing time. (1) Period Stated in Days or Longer Unit. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time: (A) begin counting from the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday;

16 court noted that during Cobbin’s representation of Appellant, the case was set for trial on four occasions and continued four times— twice at the request of Appellant and twice by the State. Relying upon Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1983), the State argues that by agreeing to a trial date beyond the 180-day deadline of April 30, 2023, Appellant waived his speedy trial rights under the IAD. The Florida Supreme Court in Johnson clearly held that the IAD trial deadline, like a defendant’s right to speedy trial pursuant to Rule 3.191 and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution, is neither unwaivable nor self-executing. Id. at 196. In Roberts, the Second District rejected a similar claim, finding that the IAD time period was not tolled by Roberts’ motion for continuance that was made after the IAD time limit had already expired. Roberts, 427 So. 2d at 790. More recently, Nelson, cited by the State, engaged in a detailed analysis regarding when a defendant’s request for continuance may impact the exercise of his or her speedy trial rights guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions and rule 3.191. 26 So. 3d at 574. When “rule 3.191 was originally promulgated in 1971, the State was not afforded the benefit of a recapture period.” Id. at 575. “If the default period expired, the defendant was generally entitled to automatic discharge upon motion, provided that the defendant was continuously available for trial and an extension of time had not been ordered.” Id. When the Rule was amended in 1984, it eliminated automatic discharge and created the recapture period so as to provide a remedy for a mistaken failure to bring the defendant to trial within the default period. Id. “In other words, the recapture period illustrates the principle that a defendant has a right to speedy trial, not a right to speedy discharge without trial.” Id. at 576. A defendant may waive the right to speedy trial explicitly by filing a specified notice. Id. A waiver of speedy trial may also be implied, even presumed, when a defendant seeks a continuance, making him unavailable for trial. Id. (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(j)(3)). The timing of the request for a continuance is relevant. “It is clear that a preexpiration continuance [requested by the defendant] operates as a

17 waiver [of speedy trial rights] . . . .” Id. The Florida Supreme Court went on to note that some courts have treated postexpiration defense continuances as a nullity, meaning that there was no waiver of speedy trial. Id. at 577. After reviewing several “nullity” rule cases, the supreme court noted that, “the nullity principle is inapplicable where the State is entitled to the recapture period because the defendant is not subject to automatic discharge.” Id. at 578. Following the discussion of several other nullity rule cases, the supreme court then analyzed Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), which has more than a few similarities to this case. Citing to Ryan, the supreme court noted that “the defendant requested a post-expiration continuance, which was granted.” Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 578 (citing Ryan, 768 So. 2d at 20). The defendant then filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial. Id. There was no “indication [in Ryan] that the effect of the continuance was considered at that time.” Id. “The trial court scheduled a trial during the recapture period, but the State still failed to bring the defendant to trial within that time.” Id. The supreme court agreed with the Third District that Ryan was entitled to discharge, “despite the post-expiration continuance.” Id. The supreme court explained that [t]hough the post-expiration continuance initially operated as a waiver because the State was entitled to the recapture period, this decision is distinguishable from Nelson¹⁰ because the State failed to assert the waiver issue prior to the case being set for trial. Furthermore, the State failed to bring the defendant to trial within the recapture period. Thus, the continuance [at the defendant’s request] operated as a nullity because it was not the principal reason the trial could not [timely] commence. Id. at 578–79. 10 State v. Nelson, 993 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Applying Nelson and Ryan to the instant case we note the following. First, Appellant’s agreement to a post-expiration trial date was made after the expiration of the 180-day IAD trial deadline. Second, Appellant’s first request for continuance was likewise made post-expiration. The timing of any further continuances requested by the State or defense do not seem relevant at this point. Third, Appellant then filed his motion to dismiss and for reconsideration on December 28, 2023, which the trial court treated as a notice of the expiration of speedy trial. Fourth, nobody raised, below, Appellant’s continuances as a bar to his speedy trial rights. Fifth, the trial court did conduct a hearing within five days as provided by Rule 3.191 to schedule trial. Sixth, because of the trial court’s time computation error, Appellant was not brought to trial within the actual recapture period. We conclude that taken separately or together, Appellant’s agreement to a post-expiration trial date and his post-expiration motion for a continuance prior to serving his notice of expiration were not the principal reason that the trial was not timely commenced within the recapture period. Accordingly, under Nelson, neither operated as a waiver of his entitlement to discharge pursuant to the IAD and Rule 3.191. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the final judgment and remand for entry of an order dismissing the subject charges he faced in Duval County with prejudice and forever discharging Appellant. REVERSED and REMANDED. MAKAR, J, concurs. EISNAUGLE, J, concurs in result with opinion.