RHONDA LYNN BLANTON, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LINDA EULEE DAUGHTRY

v.

ARBOR FACILITY, INC., APEX GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, VINTAGE HEALTHCARE, LLC, MICHAEL BLEICH, DWAYNE GRAHAM, MILLENNIAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, OLD WIRE ROAD CARE, INC., FLORIDA CARE FL, INC., AND PREMIER CLINICAL SOLUTIONS, INC., N/K/A KINGS HEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 5D2024-1126 LT Case No. 2023-CA-000098 _____________________________ RHONDA LYNN BLANTON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Linda Eulee Daughtry Appellant, v.

ARBOR FACILITY, INC., APEX

GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, VINTAGE HEALTHCARE, LLC,

MICHAEL BLEICH, DWAYNE

GRAHAM, MILLENNIAL

HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, OLD WIRE ROAD CARE, INC., FLORIDA CARE FL, INC., and PREMIER CLINICAL SOLUTIONS, INC., n/k/a Kings Health Management, Inc., Appellees. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter County. Michelle T. Morley, Judge. Joanna Greber Dettloff, Megan Archey, and Kyle D. Ross, of Mendes, Reins & Wilander, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant. Kelli Biferie Hastings and Mark A. Humphrey, of Humphrey Law Group, Longwood, for Appellees, Arbor Facility, Inc., Apex Global

JAY, C.J.

The trial court dismissed this case with prejudice after finding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. We reverse.

I.

Cypress Care Center (“CCC”) is the nursing home where Linda Daughtry (“Decedent”) lived for much of March and April 2021. Her estate later sued several defendants, alleging that they operated CCC as a high-census, high-acuity facility without providing commensurate staff. Estate alleged that this ongoing staffing shortage deprived Decedent of the care she needed. The court dismissed multiple iterations of the complaint, each time finding it to be legally insufficient. Ultimately, Estate filed its fourth amended complaint, which is the subject of this appeal. It raised nursing home negligence claims against Arbor Facility, Inc., Apex Global Solutions, LLC, Vintage Healthcare, LLC, Millennial Healthcare Services, LLC, Michael Bleich, and Dwayne Graham. Estate alleged that Arbor held the license to operate CCC, that Apex, Vintage, Millennial, and Bleich were management or consulting companies, and that Bleich and Graham were managing employees. Again, Estate claimed that CCC’s chronic understaffing caused Decedent to receive poor care and suffer various injuries. The defendants again sought dismissal. They argued that Estate did not properly explain how they were eligible to be sued under the nursing home negligence statute or how their actions or omissions caused Decedent’s injuries. At the hearing that followed, the court found that Estate was “still focused on conclusions rather

II.

Our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice is de novo. Poirier v. Vills. Senior Hous. I OPCO, LLC, 395 So. 3d 640, 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).

A.

“The purpose of a complaint is to advise the Court and the defendant of the nature of a cause of action asserted by the plaintiff.” Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1956). It is “merely a tentative outline” of the plaintiff’s position before the case is developed by discovery. See Poirier, 395 So. 3d at 643. The plaintiff need only set forth “a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts” that show entitlement to relief. Id. at 642 (quoting Beckler v. Hoffman, 550 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)). “It is not necessary or even proper” for the complaint “to allege . . . evidentiary facts.” See Philip J. Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 8:2 (2025 ed.). “This simplified pleading procedure is the primary intent” of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110, “which eliminated pleading technicalities.” Poirier, 395 So. 3d at 643. In turn, the “function of a motion to dismiss . . . is to raise as a question of law the sufficiency of the facts alleged to state a cause of action.” Connolly, 89 So. 2d at 484; see also Hernando County v. Hernando Cnty. Fair Ass’n, 385 So. 3d 668, 670 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (reiterating that a motion to dismiss tests a complaint for

B.

Estate’s allegation that several defendants were management or consulting companies also does not merit dismissal. The nursing home negligence statute allows claims “against the licensee, the licensee’s management or consulting company, the licensee’s managing employees, and any direct caregivers.” § 400.023(1), Fla. Stat. A management or consulting company is “an individual or entity who contracts with, or receives a fee from, a licensee to provide” certain services. Id. § 400.023(2)(b). These services are the hiring or firing of the administrator or director of nursing, controlling staffing levels or the budget, or implementing and enforcing policies and procedures. Id. Citing specific agreements, Estate alleged that Apex, Vintage, Millennial, and Bleich all met this definition. Seizing on the word “company,” the defendants argued that under the statute, a nursing home can have only one management or consulting company. They maintained that by alleging the existence of multiple such companies, the complaint contradicted itself. Regardless of whatever merit this argument could have eventually, it is not ripe for adjudication on a motion to dismiss. It is well settled that “a party may assert inconsistent claims in the same pleading.” Thomas v. Trench Training Sys., LLC, 377 So. 3d 198, 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Dep’t of HRS, 695 So. 2d 927, 930 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). “Indeed, parties may even plead allegations that negate one another.” Id. at 203. When pleading in the alternative, a plaintiff “invariably will encounter the argument” that the complaint is inconsistent. See Christine M. Hoke and Leeza D. Newman, Florida Civil Practice Before Trial § 12.5 (14th ed. 2022). “This is not a valid objection, because alternative pleading by its very nature is inconsistent.” Id. As such, it is not a pleading defect for Estate to allege that multiple defendants qualify as a management or consulting company.

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III.

Accepting Estate’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Estate pleaded grounds for relief under the nursing home negligence statute. Thus, the court erred by granting a dismissal with prejudice.* REVERSED and REMANDED. EDWARDS and PRATT, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ * The exhaustion of administrative remedies—which the court’s order cited—also does not support dismissal. That doctrine requires “a party challenging an agency action or decision” to “exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.” Pretzer v. Swearingen, 394 So. 3d 175, 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Estate did not challenge any agency action. Instead, it cited agency regulations when alleging the defendants’ negligence. The primary jurisdiction doctrine—a companion rule discussed by the answer briefs—is likewise irrelevant. It applies when a claim turns on issues that “a regulatory scheme” places “within the special competence of an administrative body.” Id. at 190 (quoting Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037 n.5 (Fla. 2001)). Holding that it applies here would negate the express purpose of the nursing home negligence statute, which creates an “exclusive cause of action” that “may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction.” See § 400.023(1), Fla. Stat.