JONATHAN DAVID CAPPS
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A trial court must orally pronounce discretionary fines individually rather than in a lump sum to allow a defendant an opportunity to contest them, and must clarify statutory costs imposed under section 938.05 when discrepancies exist between oral pronouncement and written orders.
[1] Discretionary fines imposed under section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes, must be orally pronounced individually and separately from other costs, not as part of a lump sum,…
[2] When a discrepancy exists between the amount of costs orally pronounced at sentencing and the amount reflected in the written sentencing order, the trial court on remand…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“discretionary costs must be orally pronounced, not in a lump sum, to allow a defendant an opportunity to contest them”
Citing Whitley v. State, 376 So. 3d 79, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), regarding the requirement for individual oral pronouncement of discretionary fines.
Jonathan David Capps pleaded no contest to sexual battery and was sentenced to ten years in prison followed by five years of probation. The trial cour…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-0034 _____________________________
JONATHAN DAVID CAPPS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee. _____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. Kelvin C. Wells, Judge.
September 17, 2025
PER CURIAM.
Jonathan David Capps pleaded no contest to sexual battery. Capps was sentenced to ten years in prison, followed by five years of probation, and costs were imposed. Capps appealed and filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) to correct costs, which the trial court denied. We reverse the sentence in part and remand to correct costs and fines.
Capps does not challenge his conviction but raises three sentencing issues on appeal: (1) discretionary costs were not orally
Capps claims the trial court erred by failing to pronounce discretionary costs orally. The court orally pronounced fines amounting to $1,026: (1) $775 in court costs, (2) $100 for a local government trust fund, and (3) $151 to the Crimes Against Children Trust Fund. Yet the $775 in court costs included a discretionary fine of $342.86 under section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes, and a mandatory 5% surcharge of $17.14. The trial court erred by not orally pronouncing the discretionary fine of $342.86 individually, rather than collectively. See Whitley v. State, 376 So. 3d 79, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (holding discretionary costs must be orally pronounced, not in a lump sum, to allow a defendant an opportunity to contest them). Thus, the discretionary cost should be struck, and because the surcharge attaches only to a valid fine, see § 938.04, Fla. Stat., it is struck as well. The trial court may still, however, impose the fine and surcharge if it gives Capps notice and follows the resentencing procedure. Bryant v. State, 302 So. 3d 995, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
Capps further claims that the costs imposed under section 938.05, Florida Statutes, exceed the permitted statutory amount. Section 938.05 allows for two fines totaling $225; but Capps was fined an additional time for $100, totaling $325. Appellant claims that the $100 fine should be stricken, whereas the State claims that the statutory basis for the additional $100 is a scrivener’s error, and if remanded, the trial court may still impose the fines. The State is correct, in part. The $100 discrepancy in the section 938.05 cost correlates with the discrepancy between the $1,026 orally pronounced and the $1,126 on the written order. The error appears to reflect the mandatory state attorney’s costs of prosecution under section 938.27(8), Florida Statutes, which the State included in its recommendation and was reflected in the written order, but was not pronounced. Thus, on remand, the trial
* With regard to the third issue, Capps correctly notes that Section 12 of his scoresheet was left blank and does not indicate that Capps entered a plea. We do not address this matter further.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the sentence in part and remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
LEWIS, ROWE, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________
Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.