GONZALEZ

v.

AXIOM CONTRACTING GROUP, NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-1498 _____________________________

JESUS GONZALEZ,

Appellant,

v.

AXIOM CONTRACTING GROUP and NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Appellees. _____________________________

On appeal from the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. Neal P. Pitts, Judge of Compensation Claims.

September 24, 2025

TANENBAUM, J.

Though Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.180 specifically regulates appeals taken in workers’ compensation cases, it is not the only rule that applies. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.180(a) (“Appellate review of proceedings in workers’ compensation cases will be as in civil cases except as specifically modified in this rule.” (emphasis supplied)); see also § 440.271, Fla. Stat. (providing that the filing of workers’ compensation appeals with this court will be governed by rules of procedure adopted by the Florida Supreme Court). Relevant to the discussion to follow, those other appellate rule provisions include 9.020(h) (governing when an appealed order’s rendition is tolled for the purpose of determining an appeal’s timeliness) and 9.600(b) (allowing this court to authorize a lower

6 rehearing, or the amended final order? Cf. St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 249 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 1971) (determining under prior rules that when the time would run for appealing an order or judgment that has been altered on rehearing turn on whether “the modification or amendment materially changes the original order or judgment”). The tolling provided by rule 9.020(h) obviates any question on this and makes clear that a final order is not rendered until all motions are withdrawn or disposed of by order; the OJCC cannot adopt an administrative rule that interferes with a judicial policy choice made by the supreme court. To be sure, the supreme court’s rule on delaying rendition provides that tolling occurs “unless another applicable rule of procedure specifically provides to the contrary.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1) (emphasis supplied). This caveat, however, does not reference administrative agency rules. At most, the reference is to an applicable rule of court procedure. Cf. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.120 (referring to a “rule of practice or procedure” as a “court rule” (emphasis supplied)); Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.140 (referring consistently to “rules of court”). The better reading is that the provision references an applicable appellate rule—the appellate rules expressly controlling “all proceedings” in this court over “any conflicting rules of procedure.” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.130 (emphasis supplied); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.010 (providing that the appellate rules “supersede . . . all conflicting rules of procedure,” as provided by rule 2.130). For several possible examples in the appellate rules where rule 9.020(h)’s generalized tolling would be specifically modified under this exception, see Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5), 9.146(i)(2), and 9.180(b)(2). Notwithstanding the OJCC’s rules, then, Gonzalez’s motion for rehearing tolled the FCO’s rendition date, so his appeal cannot be untimely. II One more procedural problem arose in this case. As noted, the JCC ruled on the employer’s motion for rehearing; he did not enter a written order on Gonzalez’s motion. Neither party noted this, presumably because under the OJCC’s rules, if a JCC has not decided the motion within ten days, it is “deemed denied.” Rule

7 60Q-6.122(1), Fla. Admin. Code. Still, we are required by court rule to hold an appeal in abeyance until a pending rehearing motion is withdrawn or “resolved by the rendition of an order”—“rendition” being “when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h), (h)(2)(C) (emphases supplied).² We explained above, and we state again: appellate procedure in this court—especially when it affects timeliness and jurisdiction—is governed by the supreme court’s promulgated rules, not by the OJCC’s administrative rules, promulgated from within the executive branch. There is nothing wrong with OJCC’s deeming a rehearing motion as denied based on the passage of time for its own internal purposes, but the rules governing how we operate include a requirement that there be a “signed, written order” on a tolling motion before the rendition occurs that then would allow an appeal in this court to move forward. To resolve this abatement problem, we utilized another generally applicable rule: Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600. That rule allows this court to authorize the lower tribunal— here, the OJCC—“to proceed with specifically stated matters

8 during the pendency of the appeal,” if the tribunal already “has been divested” of jurisdiction by appeal, which was the case here. Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(b).³ Under this rule, we issued an order explaining the problem and granting the OJCC concurrent jurisdiction to render a written order disposing of the rehearing motion. The JCC assigned to the case did render such an order. That order, however, granted Gonzalez’s motion and vacated the FCO that Gonzalez had appealed. That now leaves us without an order on review.⁴

DISMISSED.

ROBERTS and ROWE, JJ., concur. _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

Patrick John McGinley of Law Office of Patrick John McGinley, P.A., Winter Park, and R. Dale Albright II of The Leach Firm, Winter Park, for Appellant.

Samuel B. Spinner, Hinda Klein, and Jesse Dyer of Conroy Simberg, Hollywood, for Appellees.