CRISTIAN OLANO SANCHEZ
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
An officer's testimony explaining how an Intoxilyzer machine works, its maintenance, and inspections, derived from years of personal experience in that role, constitutes factual lay witness testimony rather than expert testimony, even though the witness possesses specialized knowledge.
[1] A witness's possession of specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education does not automatically require that witness to be designated and disclosed as a…
[2] Testimony derived from a witness's years of personal experience in performing regular job duties, not obtained for purposes of litigation or to evaluate another's work, c…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's failure to conduct a Richardson hearing is reversible error unless a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced.”
Establishes the standard of review for whether a trial court erred in failing to conduct a Richardson hearing when expert testimony is allegedly provided without proper disclosure.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCristian Olano Sanchez was found unresponsive in a crashed vehicle with bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and signs of impairment. He submitted to field…
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September10, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0231 Lower Tribunal No. A85U4HE ________________
Cristian Olano Sanchez, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Cristina Rivera Correa, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Nicholas A. Lynch, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J.
2
In this DUI case, the question before this Court is whether the police officer testified as an undisclosed expert or a disclosed lay witness. If he testified as an undisclosed expert witness, the trial court was required to perform a Richardson1 hearing—which it did not do. Finding that the trial court correctly found that the officer did not provide expert testimony, we affirm.
I.
At approximately6:00 a.m. on August 16, 2021, Appellant Cristian Olano Sanchez was found unresponsive, slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle, which had crashed into a light pole. He did not have a shirt on, but had Mardi Gras beads around his neck. The keys were still in the ignition and the car was in drive.
Once stirred, Olano’s eyes were bloodshot and watery. He was confused, unbalanced, and his speech slurred. He kept using a public trashcan to hold himself up. Officers smelled alcohol. The officers conducted field sobriety tests, during which Olano Sanchez declared, “I’m wasted.” Officers took a breath test using the Intoxilyzer 8000. See §
Olano Sanchez is a Type I diabetic. He claims he was having a diabetic emergency and was not impaired. A diabetic episode can make a patient appear intoxicated. Diabetics in ketoacidosis produce a chemical called acetone that can interfere with breathalyzer machines.
The State charged Olano Sanchez with one count of driving under the influence and one count of reckless driving. The State listed Officer Angel Hernandez as a Category A witness—but did not designate him as an expert.2 P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(i). Officer Hernandez is the City of Miami’s agency inspector for the Intoxilyzer. He was not present on the day of Olano Sanchez’s arrest, but conducts maintenance and inspections on the machine.
2 The State withdrew its previously listed expert witness.
3 The jury also heard from the officers who responded to the scene and saw camera footage from their body worn cameras.
II.
“Florida’s criminal discovery rules are designed to prevent surprise by either the prosecution or the defense. Their purpose is to facilitate a truthful fact-finding process.” Kilpatrick v. State, 376 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1979). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 requires certain disclosures from both parties if the defendant elects to participate in discovery. See generally Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220. This includes disclosing “expert witnesses who have not provided a written report and a curriculum vitae or who are going to testify.” Id. at (b)(1)(A)(i). See also Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1127 (Fla. 2000) (“By rule, Florida provides for two-way discovery and imposes obligations on both parties, including a list of expert witnesses.”). “Both sides are entitled to rely on full and fair compliance with the rule in preparing their cases for trial.” Kilpatrick, 376 So. 2d at 388. If a party makes a Richardson objection, the trial court must first determine whether a discovery violation occurred. Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 1995). When it finds that a violation has occurred, the trial court must then conduct an inquiry as to whether the violation was willful, substantial, and had a prejudicial effect on trial preparation. Richardson, 246
A.
“In Florida[,] as in many states, a distinction exists between factual evidence or testimony, and opinion testimony.” Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 390 (Fla. 1994). Factual testimony provides concrete facts and is based on the witness’s personal knowledge through his or her own observations and perceptions. See § 90.604, Fla. Stat. (2024); Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “fact witness” as “A witness who has firsthand knowledge of something based on the witness’s perceptions through one of more of the five senses.”). Whereas opinion testimony provides opinions or inferences drawn from those facts. See Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “opinion evidence” as “A witness’s belief, thought, inference, or conclusion concerning a fact or facts.”). See generally Damen v. State, 793 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (providing examples of fact versus opinion testimony).
(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness's use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and (2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.
§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2024). Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, governs expert testimony. It reads: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
§ 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2024). See also §§ 90.703, Fla. Stat. (2024); 90.704, Fla. Stat. (2024).
Officer Hernandez began his testimony explaining his background, training, and his familiarity with the specific Intoxilyzer used in this case. He elaborated on how the machine is stored, how it works, and the maintenance
All this testimony is derived from his years of personal experience maintaining and inspecting the Intoxilyzer. He did not obtain this knowledge for purposes of litigation. He also was not evaluating someone else’s work. So, his testimony was not expert in nature. See Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2003) (holding witness testimony factually explaining contents of phone record and comparing the locations on the phone records to the cell site maps was not expert testimony); Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding general background information to explain the concept of a cell site and how it relates to cell phone records did not constitute expert testimony); Bonded Inv. & Realty Co. v. Waksman, 437 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (holding witness’s testimony on what
III.
Since Officer Hernandez did not provide expert testimony, he was properly disclosed as a lay witness. There was no discovery violation that warranted a Richardson hearing. The trial court correctly identified the nature of the testimony and its corresponding duties. Thus, the trial court did not err.
Affirmed.
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Authorities Cited (16 total)
- Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)
- Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2000)
- Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2009)
- Kilpatrick v. State, 376 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1979)
- Knight v. State, 76 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 2011)
- Fittipaldi USA, Inc. v. Helio Castroneves, 905 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- Gutierrez v. Jose Luis Vargas, M.D., 239 So. 3d 615 (Fla. 2018)
- Tetrault v. Fairchild, 799 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Kipp v. State, 128 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
- Ishmael D. Damen v. State, 793 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)