MARY ANN JAMES DE HOLGUIN

v.

IN RE: RODRIGO ERNESTO HOLGUIN LOURIDO, ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed September 17, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D24-0014 Lower Tribunal No. 20-2073 ________________ Mary Ann James de Holguin, Appellant, vs. In Re: Rodrigo Ernesto Holguin Lourido, et al., Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jorge E. Cueto, Judge.

Holland & Knight LLP, and Adolfo Jimenez, Rebecca Plasencia, Katharine Menendez de la Cuesta, and Joshua Levenson, for appellant. Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Ricky L. Polston (Tallahassee), Jamie B. Wasserman (Fort Lauderdale), Steven M. Ebner, and Julissa Rodriguez, for appellees. Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ.

LINDSEY, J.

2

This appeal stems from a protracted and contentious probate dispute between Mary Ann James de Holguin, Rodrigo Holguin’s (the “Decedent”) second wife, and the Decedent’s adult children (the “Children”) from his first marriage.¹ Mary Ann appeals from an Order entering Final Summary Judgment in favor of the Children following cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that Mary Ann lacked standing to challenge the Decedent’s Will because she executed an Antenuptial Agreement releasing all claims on the Estate, and the Will expressly omits Mary Ann as a beneficiary. We affirm because we agree that Mary Ann, as a matter of law, lacks standing to contest the Will.

I.

BACKGROUND

The underlying probate dispute involves, inter alia, a marital agreement containing an express release of all claims against the Decedent’s property or estate. A brief history of the parties’ marital history is therefore necessary. It is undisputed that in March 1965, the Decedent married his first wife in Illinois. The marriage was subsequently registered in Colombia, where they were citizens and resided. They had three children together. In May 1984, the parties obtained a final judgment of divorce in Florida. But their marriage remained registered in Colombia.

8. Release. Except as otherwise provided in this

agreement, each party releases all claims or demands in the property or estate of the other, however and whenever acquired, including acquisitions in the future.

In November 1999, Mary Ann and the Decedent were legally married in New York according to a City of New York Marriage Certificate in the record before us. This was their third and final marriage. In June 2019, the Decedent executed his Florida Will, which concerns “only [Decedent’s] assets located in the State of Florida, and, if applicable, elsewhere in the United States[.]” The Will expressly excludes Mary Ann: Notwithstanding anything expressed or implied in this agreement to the contrary, I intentionally omit Mary Ann James de Holguin and her descendants as beneficiaries under this will.

In October 2019, approximately three months before the Decedent died, Mary Ann and the Decedent executed a Memorandum of Understanding (the “MOU”), which provides for the distribution of various assets in Colombia and the United States. The MOU also contains a Release Provision:

2 A separate September 1999 “Prenuptial Agreement” addresses the Colombian assets and contains a similar release provision.

In December 2019, the Decedent died in Colombia, survived by his three Children from his first marriage and Mary Ann. In June 2020, the lower court admitted the Decedent’s Florida Will to probate.³ In September 2020, Mary Ann filed the Objection and Counter-Petition at issue in this appeal. In her two-count Counter-Petition, Mary Ann sought (I) to be appointed personal representative and (II) to invalidate the Will for undue influence based on an alleged romantic relationship between the Decedent and the attorney who prepared his Will. The Counter-Petition does

3 Beyond the underlying probate action, the overall dispute also involves a probate action in Colombia (where most of the Decedent’s assets are located), Mary Ann’s federal action seeking discovery, Mary Ann’s independent creditor action based on the 2019 MOU, and Mary Ann’s 2024 equitable action based on alleged trusts. The Colombian probate proceedings are ongoing. Mary Ann’s federal application for discovery was denied. In re Holguin, No. 20-23410-MC, 2020 WL 13140609 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., In re James de Holguin, No. CV 20-23410-MC-SCOLA, 2022 WL 951667 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2022). The trial court dismissed Mary Ann’s independent creditor action for forum non conveniens. This Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. de Holguin v. Godin, 367 So. 3d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). And Mary Ann’s equitable action remains pending below.

In November 2020, the Personal Representative⁴ moved to dismiss Mary Ann’s Objection and Counter-Petition. The Personal Representative argued that Mary Ann lacked standing because the properly drafted and executed Florida Will expressly omitted her. In her Response, Mary Ann argued that she had standing as a “disinherited spouse.” The Response, like the Objection and Counter-Petition, failed to mention any of the agreements Mary Ann had voluntarily signed that contained express releases of all claims against the Estate. In Reply, the Personal Representative disputed that Mary Ann was a disinherited spouse and, in support, attached the 1999 Antenuptial Agreement. Following a hearing, the court entered a written order granting the Personal Representative’s Motion to Dismiss based on the Antenuptial Agreement.

Mary Ann appealed the dismissal, and this Court reversed, holding that “at this stage in the proceedings . . . the trial court erred in going beyond the four corners of the counter-petition and its attachments to determine Mary

4 The Personal Representative is Camila Holguin Godin, the Decedent’s daughter.

On remand, the Children moved for summary judgment arguing that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Mary Ann lacks standing to contest the Will because she repeatedly agreed to release all claims against the Estate. Mary Ann cross-moved for Summary Judgment. Rather than seeking to invalidate the Will, which was the relief she sought in her Objection and Counter-Petition, Mary Ann argued that under the Antenuptial Agreement and the MOU, she was entitled to the Key Biscayne condominium and the New York Co-Op. Additionally, in her Reply in support of her Cross- Motion for Summary Judgment, Mary Ann relied on two 2002 Trusts. She argued that the Trusts provided her with an interest in the Key Biscayne and New York properties. After a hearing, the trial court entered a detailed, 27-page Final Order. The court granted the Children’s Motion for Summary Judgment concluding that “there is no genuine issue of material fact that [Mary Ann] executed an Antenuptial Agreement, which contains a release provision and bars any claim to challenge Decedent’s Florida Will.” The trial court further concluded that “[Mary Ann] has not established that she will stand to gain if the Decedent’s Florida Will is somehow invalidated because Colombian law

II.

ANALYSIS

Our standard of review of an order granting final summary judgment is de novo. See, e.g., Jones v. Ervolino, 339 So. 3d 473, 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). We apply the federal summary judgment standard adopted in Florida in 2021. See In re Amends. to Fla. R. of Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2021).

This case arises from cross-motions for summary judgment on Mary Ann’s Objection and Counter-Petition in the underlying probate proceedings. The Objection and Counter-Petition sought to invalidate the Decedent’s Florida Will. We first address the threshold issue of Mary Ann’s standing to contest the Will. We then address Mary Ann’s arguments raised in her

5 The court also granted the Children’s Motion to Strike scandalous allegations from Mary Ann’s Counter-Petition. We affirm this ruling without further discussion.

6 Mary Ann also signed a September 1999 Prenuptial Agreement and a 2019 MOU with similar release provisions.

7 We note that in Mary Ann’s own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment she argues that the August 1999 Antenuptial Agreement is valid.

III.

CONCLUSION

Because Mary Ann lacks standing, as a matter of law, to contest the Will based on valid and enforceable agreements that she undisputedly signed, we affirm the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of the Children.⁹ Affirmed.

8 Mary Ann has separate pending actions in the trial court seeking to enforce these agreements. In October 2020, Mary Ann brought an independent creditor action under the MOU asserting her rights to these same properties (2020-002073—CP-02). In March 2024, Mary Ann filed an equitable action raising similar claims based on the two 2002 Trusts (2024-005442-CA-01).

9 Mary Ann also challenges the trial court’s order on fees and costs. This issue is not ripe for review because no amount has been awarded. See Yampol v. Turnberry Isle S. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 250 So. 3d 835, 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“An order granting entitlement to attorney’s fees but not determining the amount of fees or costs is a non-final, non-appealable order, and such an order is subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.”).