JOSE BRETON

v.

MARIA RAUD

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 17, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0890 Lower Tribunal No. 18-29442-FC-04 ________________

Jose Breton, Appellant,

vs.

Maria Raud, Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Victoria Del Pino, Judge.

Cruz Legal, P.A., and Marisol Cruz, for appellant.

Estefano Law, P.A., and Delaila J. Estefano, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

2

In this post-judgment paternity proceeding, appellant Jose Breton (“Father”) appeals a September⁴, 2024 amended order (the “Order”) that ostensibly granted appellee Maria Raud’s (“Mother”) August 31, 2022 Urgent Motion for Temporary Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and All Professional Fees (the “Motion”). We affirm the Order’s factual findings related to the relief sought in the Motion, and that portion of the Order awarding temporary, prospective fees to Mother’s counsel and forensic accountant as sought in the Motion, but on due process grounds we reverse those portions of the challenged Order that adjudicated issues not raised, and that awarded Mother relief not sought, in the Motion.

I.

Relevant Background In a July 22, 2019 judgment, the trial court approved the parties’ May 6, 2019 Mediated Parenting Settlement Agreement that governed their respective responsibilities for their minor child. In December 2020, Father filed a petition seeking to modify the parties’ parental responsibility, timesharing, and child support obligations. Citing the need to “properly prepare for the pending mediation and hearings” associated with Father’s modification petition, Mother filed the Motion seeking an order “requesting that Father pay the Mother’s temporary attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of . . . $25,000.00 to get us through mediation and the upcoming

II.

Analysis¹ While Father makes several challenges to the trial court’s factual findings, the record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting each of the detailed findings contained in the Order as they relate to the

6 Motion. Without further discussion, we affirm the trial court’s factual findings as they relate to the relief sought in the Motion. See Gidwani v. Roberts, 349 So. 3d 917, 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Factual findings are reviewed to determine whether they are ‘supported by competent, substantial evidence,’ and the ‘findings of fact come to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.’” (quoting Haas Automation, Inc. v. Fox, 243 So. 3d 1017, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018))). We also affirm the trial court’s determination that Mother is entitled to the temporary fees sought in the Motion. Given the trial court’s factual findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Mother is entitled to temporary, prospective fees for hearings and mediation related to Father’s modification petition. Troike v. Troike, 271 So. 3d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Rose v. Rose, 883 So. 2d 348, 349-350 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). We are compelled, however, to reverse those portions of the Order awarding amounts not sought in Mother’s Motion. This Court has consistently held that a due process violation occurs if a trial court awards relief not requested in a pleading or motion. Greenwood, 406 So. 3d at 976 (“[W]e find that the trial court violated the Mother’s due process rights by

7 awarding the Father ultimate decision making authority over the Minor Child’s education when . . . the Father did not request this relief in the motion[.]”); Logreira v. Logreira, 322 So. 3d 155, 158-59 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“The constitutional guarantee of due process is implicated in determinations involving timesharing and modification of a parenting plan. . . . Here, the former husband did not request an award of sole parental responsibility or decision-making authority in his pleadings[.]”); see Blatt v. Blatt, 394 So. 3d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). In this case, the Motion sought $25,000 in temporary fees “to get us through mediation and the upcoming hearings” and a $5,000 “initial deposit for the forensic accountant.” The Motion defined the parameters of the relief Mother was seeking and was the only matter noticed for the April 10th hearing. Entertaining claims and awarding relief not sought in the Motion constituted a due process violation. Greenwood, 406 So. 3d at 978. This is distinctly the case here because the Order’s total awarded fees included an amount representing fees for Mother’s contempt proceedings, despite a separate order expressly reserving the determination of such fees for a later “final trial.” The record reflects no notice to Father that, at the April 10th hearing, the trial court would be adjudicating Mother’s fee claim associated with the contempt proceedings.

8 We are thus compelled to reverse those portions of the Order awarding any sums other than the $25,000 in temporary attorney’s fees and $5,000 in prospective forensic accountant fees that were sought in the Motion and noticed for the April 10th hearing.² We affirm the factual findings related to, and the discretionary determination that Mother is entitled to, the relief sought in the Motion. We reverse those other portions of the Order that adjudicate claims and award sums not sought in the Motion, and we remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.