CHRISTINA FANO SCHULTHEIS

v.

MILAN SCHULTHEIS

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1250 Lower Tribunal No. 20-9950-FC-04 ________________

Christina Fano Schultheis, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

vs.

Milan Schultheis, Appellee/Cross Appellant.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Multack, Judge.

Perez-Abreu & Martin-Lavielle, P. A., and Ana-Maria Mejer and Javier Perez-Abreu, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Easley Appellate Practice, PLLC, and Dorothy F. Easley; Richard A. Schurr, P.A., and Richard A. Schurr, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

GORDO, J.

I.

“Where entitlement to attorney’s fees depends upon the interpretation of a statute . . . the standard of review is de novo.” Spano v. Bruce, 62 So. 3d 2, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

1 Known as, “fees for fees.”² We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).

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II.

On cross-appeal, the Former Husband challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for time spent litigating the amount of fees pursuant to section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes. As a basic proposition, “under Florida law, each party generally bears its own attorneys’ fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise.” Price v. Tyler, 890 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. U.S., 850 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 2003)). “This Court has followed the ‘American Rule’ that attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1993). “Because statutes providing for attorney’s fees are in abrogation of the common law, such statutes are to be strictly construed.” Daniels v. Florida Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 2005). “Similarly, contractual provisions concerning attorney’s fees must also be strictly construed.” Air Turbine Tech., Inc. v. Quarles & Brady, LLC, 165 So. 3d 816, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Historically, attorney’s fees and costs have been treated differently. “In American jurisprudence, there is a well-settled distinction between ‘costs’ (expenses) and ‘attorneys’ fees’ (compensation for services rendered).”

A.

In Florida, attorney’s fees for the time an attorney spends litigating the amount of his or her own fees are almost never recoverable.³ This principle was established in the landmark case of State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 834 (Fla. 1993), wherein the Florida Supreme Court held that attorney’s fees incurred in determining entitlement to fees are properly recoverable, but fees incurred in litigating the amount of fees are not recoverable. In Palma, the court analyzed both the language of the statute under which attorney’s fees were sought and the underlying purpose of the statute. See Palma, 629 So. 2d at 833 (“Our conclusion that statutory fees may be awarded for litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney’s fees but not the amount of attorney’s fees comports with the purpose of section 627.428 and with the plain language of the statute.”).

3 We recognize that under certain limited circumstances, Florida courts have determined they are not bound by Palma and have permitted fees for fees. See, e.g., Condren v. Bell, 853 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (permitting fees for fees because the award of attorney’s fees was a sanction); Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank v. Sandel, 766 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (permitting fees for fees because federal law, not Florida law, controlled the award of attorney’s fees); Diaz v. SantaFe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (permitting fees for fees in claim for lost wages filed pursuant to section 448.08, Florida Statutes, based on language of the statute).

B.

We find Palma’s analysis applicable when looking at the text of section 61.16(1). To determine whether an award of fees for litigating the amount of fees incurred by the non-party attorney falls within the scope of section 61.16(1), we first look to the plain language of the statute. See Fortune v. Gulf Coast Tree Care Inc., 148 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“In construing a statute, courts must first look to its plain language.”). “[O]ur task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory text.” Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022). “The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” Id. (quoting Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020)). Our objective “is

(1) The court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals. In those cases in which an action is brought for enforcement and the court finds that the

§ 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The plain language of section 61.16(1) provides that, in a dissolution of marriage or post-dissolution of marriage proceeding, the court may, after considering the financial resources of both parties, enter an award of attorney’s fees, suit money and costs. Specifically, it provides for the awarding of “attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals.” § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Nowhere in the text does the statute provide for an award of fees incurred by the non-party attorney.

4 If “costs” are not historically construed to include attorney’s fees, they certainly do not include fees for fees.⁵ The fee-shifting schedule set forth in the statute and in Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997) is sufficient to protect the interests of the impecunious spouse in post-judgment proceedings. This scheme ensures access to the courts without encouraging abuse. The difficulty with the dissent’s view is that it overlooks the risk posed when the impecunious spouse, motivated by anger or a desire for retribution, seeks to weaponize litigation. Allowing fees for fees carries the danger of enabling such a spouse to financially punish the other through extended fee litigation, rather than to resolve disputes fairly. We see this as an issue fitting squarely within the Legislature’s policy making role.

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C.

We next address whether authorizing a trial court to award attorney’s fees incurred for the attorney’s time spent litigating the amount of his or her own fees comports with the underlying purpose of section 61.16(1). It is well settled that a statute’s purpose “is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of context.” Mercury Indem. Co. of Am. v. Cent. Fla. Med. & Chiropractic Ctr., Inc., 380 So. 3d 477, 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)). When read in proper context, we see nothing in the text of section 61.16(1) that suggests we should deviate from the general rule that fees for fees may not be recovered. The expressly stated purposes of chapter 61, as laid out by the legislature in section 61.001, are “[t]o preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard meaningful family relationships” and “[t]o promote the amicable settlement of disputes that arise between parties to a marriage” and “[t]o mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage.” § 61.001(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Authorizing a trial court to award additional fees to non-party attorneys for litigating their own amount of fees does not comport with the stated purposes behind the enactment of chapter

14 61. To allow such an award could invite a cycle of endless fee disputes when there is no incentive to settle where the process itself insures continued compensation. This outcome would serve the interests of counsel, not clients, and stands in stark contrast to the chapter’s purpose—to reduce conflict, preserve family stability and protect litigants and their children from protracted and harmful litigation. Neither does it comport with the underlying purpose of section 61.16(1), which is to “ensure that both parties possess a similar ability to retain competent legal counsel.” Wight v. Wight, 880 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). If section 61.16(1)’s primary aim is to “level the playing field” between financially unequal parties, it cannot be to promote the representation of the poor.⁶ And it certainly is not to create incentives for prolonged fee disputes between attorneys. Fees for fees litigation rewards aggressive billing from non-party attorneys, which drives up costs and diverts attention from the merits of the case. In other words, the work performed by a non-party attorney concerning

6 As stated in Wight, “[f]ollowing the Palma court’s analysis, if a statute’s intent is to promote the representation of the poor, attorneys would be permitted to recoup fees for litigating the amount of fees.” Wight, 880 So. 2d at 694. However, “there is no indication of legislative intent in this statute to encourage lawyers to represent indigent clients.” Id. at 695.

7 See § 61.001, Fla. Stat.⁸ The dissent’s reasoning invites us to “level the playing field” between a party to the case and the nonparty attorney who alone benefits from fees for fees, a result we reject as inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. See § 61.001(2), Fla. Stat.⁹ The dissent’s interpretation might as well earn section 61.16(1) the moniker “Family Lawyer Continued Employment Act.”

10 We agree with the dissent that section 61.16(1) is not a “prevailing party” fee statute. See Widder v. Widder, 673 So. 2d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[A] prevailing party standard does not govern in determining whether a party in dissolution or post-dissolution proceedings is entitled to attorney’s fees. Rather, it is the relative financial circumstances of the parties that controls.”).

III.

Based on the plain language and purpose of section 61.16(1), we find the Former Wife was entitled to an award of fees, but not fees expended to litigate the amount of fees due to the non-party attorney. Accordingly, we reverse on this issue and remand for the trial court to recalculate the award, eliminating those fees incurred for time spent litigating the amount of

EMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I.

Introduction I concur in that portion of the majority opinion affirming the appeal and cross-appeal of the trial court’s Initial Attorney’s Fees Order. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s reversal of the Subsequent Attorney’s Fee Order, which awarded the Former Wife “fees for fees.” The discrete issue presented is whether section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2023), permits a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to award “fees for fees”—that is, attorney’s fees incurred in establishing the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. The majority opinion holds that, as a matter of law, the answer to that question is “no,” concluding that “such an award is not supported by the plain language and underlying purpose of section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes.” See Maj. Op. at *2. While it’s true that the statute does not expressly provide for “an award of fees for fees,” this is not the end of the analysis. In determining whether a statute authorizes an award of fees for fees, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla.

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1993), and its progeny, require a contextual analysis of the language of the statute as well as the underlying purpose of the statute. Palma, 629 So. 2d at 833 (addressing the issue in the context of section 627.428, Florida Statutes (1983) and holding: “Our conclusion that statutory fees may be awarded for litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees but not the amount of attorney's fees comports with the purpose of section 627.428 and with the plain language of the statute.”) (emphasis added); Oquendo v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 998 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Palma is based both on (a) statutory interpretation, and (b) the proposition that litigating the amount of fees inures solely to the attorney's benefit.”). The expansive language of section 61.16(1)—which authorizes the trial court, after consideration of certain relevant factors, to order one party to pay the other party a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees for “maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter”—meets the requirements of Palma and grants trial courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees for services incurred for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded to a party. I therefore dissent from this portion of the majority opinion, and write to explain my reasoning. In this case, the majority opinion concludes that “[n]owhere in the text does the statute provide for an award of fees incurred by the non-party

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attorney.”¹ Maj. Op. at *9. Yet that is not the dispositive issue. Rather, the dispositive issue (and the rest of the analysis) requires us to determine (1) whether the language of section 61.16(1), read in proper context, is broad enough to encompass an award of fees for fees; and, if so, (2) whether authorizing a trial court to award fees for fees comports with the underlying purpose of section 61.16. I answer both questions in the affirmative, and would therefore affirm the trial court’s Subsequent Fee Order, awarding fees for fees to the Former Wife. I would adopt the analysis and holding of our sister court’s opinion in Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) and certify direct and express conflict with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wight v. Wight, 880 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), so that the Florida Supreme Court may review these decisions and establish uniformity within the State of Florida.

II.

Discussion Section 61.16(1) provides in pertinent part: 61.16. Attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs

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(1) The court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals.

(Emphasis added).

As indicated, the majority opinion concludes: “Nowhere in the text does the statute provide for an award of fees incurred by the non-party attorney. . . . If the legislature wanted to allow fees for fees in this context, it would have said so.” Maj. Op. at *9, 11.2 The majority opinion’s analysis fails to properly

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apply relevant principles of statutory interpretation. As the Florida Supreme Court observed in Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022): [J]udges must “exhaust ‘all the textual and structural clues’ ” that bear on the meaning of a disputed text. Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Niz-Chavez v. Garland, __U.S.__, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480, 209 L.Ed.2d 433 (2021)). That is because “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).

(Emphasis added).

Expanding on this principle, the Conage Court noted: It would be a mistake to think that our law of statutory interpretation requires interpreters to make a threshold determination of whether a term has a “plain” or “clear” meaning in isolation, without considering the statutory context and without the aid of whatever canons might shed light on the interpretive issues in dispute. Id. See also Incident 365 Fla., LLC v. Ocean Pointe V Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 404 So. 3d 475, 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“In Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2022), the Florida Supreme Court made clear that in reviewing the plain meaning of words utilized in a statute, courts cannot do so in isolation. Instead, courts must consider ‘the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”) (emphasis added).

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It is necessary, therefore, to analyze the language of this statutory provision in its proper context, including the underlying purpose served by the provision and by the statutory framework of Chapter 61. Doing so leads to the inescapable conclusion that section 61.16(1) grants the trial court the discretion, after consideration of appropriate factors, to award fees for “any proceeding,” including an award of fees incurred at a postjudgment proceeding to determine the amount of the fees to be awarded.

III.

The Broad Language, Unique Nature, and Salutary Purpose of Section 61.16(1)

There are several unique and distinguishing features of this statute. As an initial matter, section 61.16(1) is not a “prevailing party” attorney’s fee statute. Indeed, it is unlike virtually any other statutory attorney’s fee provision. Sweeping in its scope, this statute serves a unique salutary purpose by authorizing a trial court to use its discretion and equitable powers to “level the playing field” in a dissolution of marriage or related proceeding under Chapter 61. See, e.g., Schneider, 32 So. 3d at 156 (recognizing that section 61.16 is not a prevailing party statute; it permits the award of temporary attorney’s fees as well as a final award, based upon the parties’ relative financial circumstances and their relative need and ability to pay).

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For instance, section 61.16(1) authorizes a trial court, under appropriate circumstances and in consideration of certain requisite factors, to order one party (even the “prevailing” party) to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fee, suit money, and costs to the other party (even if that other party is the “losing” party).³ Lamolinara v. Lamolinara, 85 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (finding former wife’s lack of success on appeal, alone, was an insufficient reason to deny her an award of appellate attorney’s fees: “Unlike most statutes authorizing attorney’s fees, [under] section 61.16, Florida Statutes . . . where the relative financial circumstances of the contestants justify it, even the losing party may be awarded a fee.”) (quotation omitted); Humerickhouse v. Humerickhouse, 932 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“An award of attorney's fees in domestic support cases is not dependent on one party's success in the litigation but rather upon the parties’ relative financial resources.”); see also Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1997) (noting that “proceedings under chapter 61 are in equity and governed by basic rules of fairness as opposed to the strict rule of law.”); id. at 699 (“The purpose of [] section [61.16(1)] is to ensure that

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both parties will have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel.”); Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 835 (Fla. 1990) (“Our case law implementing this statute requires a judge to consider the needs of the party seeking a fee and the financial resources of the parties to assure that both parties receive adequate representation.”). Neither does the statute require entry of a final judgment before the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees. To the contrary, the statute plainly provides that “[t]he court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees. . . .” § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). This dovetails with the fact that the statute is not a prevailing-party attorney’s fee statute, but instead authorizes the award of both temporary attorney’s fees during the course and pendency of the proceedings, as well as a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees at the conclusion of the case.⁴ See Schneider, 32 So. 3d at 156 (noting that section 61.16(1) “permits awards of temporary attorney’s fees as well as a final award. It is not a

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prevailing party fee statute”). Section 61.16(1)’s grant of discretion to award temporary attorney’s fees manifests the statute’s expansive language authorizing the trial court to order one party to pay the other’s reasonable attorney’s fees “for maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter . . .” (emphasis added). Again, the overriding purpose underlying this statute is to “level the playing field in family-law proceedings, ensuring both parties have an equal ability to obtain competent legal counsel.” Alvarez v. Jimenez, 337 So. 3d 117, 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting Martin v. Martin, 959 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)); Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 835 (noting that section 61.16 “requires a judge to consider the needs of the party seeking a fee and the financial resources of the parties to assure that both parties receive adequate representation. A significant purpose of this fee-authorizing statute is to assure that one party is not limited in the type of representation he or she would receive because that party's financial position is so inferior to that of the other party.”); see also Helinski v. Helinski, 305 So. 3d 703, 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (noting section 61.16(1) “should be ‘liberally’ construed ‘to allow consideration of any factor necessary to provide justice and ensure equity between the parties.’”) (quoting Rosen, 696 So. 2d at 700).

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This underlying purpose is analogous to the one addressed in Palma— “to encourage attorneys to represent indigent clients.” Palma, 629 So. 2d at 833. Put differently, while the primary purpose of section 61.16 fees is to create a level playing field between the parties for “any proceeding” in the course of a dissolution or other action under Chapter 61, subsumed within it is the equitable objective of ensuring that a spouse with “a lack of access to money or other assets” can nevertheless hire counsel. Haslauer v. Haslauer, 381 So. 3d 662, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (discussing purpose of section 61.16: “[A] trial court must consider whether the requesting party has a lack of access to money or other assets that precludes him or her from hiring counsel to assist in ably seeing the proceeding through to its conclusion.”) (quoting Jessup v. Werner, 354 So. 3d 605, 608-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)); Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 622 (Fla. 1988) (“Where one spouse effectively is unable to pay for legal counsel and the other suffers no similar disability, the very purposes of Florida's dissolution statute are jeopardized and the trial court risks inequity.”); Caryi v. Caryi, 119 So. 3d 508, 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“The purpose of section 61.16 is to ensure that both parties have similar ability to secure legal counsel.”). Under those circumstances— where one spouse “lacks access to money or other assets”—an award of

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fees for fees to that spouse would not “inure[] solely to the attorney’s benefit” but would help ensure the spouse is properly represented by counsel.⁵ To fulfill the purpose of section 61.16, the statutory language is exceptionally broad. It does not simply provide for an award of fees for some proceedings, nor limit the nature of the attorney’s fees to be awarded or which party may receive fees. Instead, it authorizes the court to order one party to pay the other party a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees for maintaining or defending “any proceeding” under Chapter 61 (even if the party receiving the fee award “lost” that proceeding). And the term “any

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proceeding,” as used in the context of section 61.16, is the equivalent of “all proceedings.” See, e.g., Dows v. Nike, Inc., 846 So. 2d 595, 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“The definition of ‘any,” as the [T]hird [D]istrict explained in Acceleration National Service Corp. v. Brickell Financial Services Motor Club, Inc., 541 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), means ‘one or another without restriction or exception; often synonymous with ‘either,’ ‘every’ or ‘all.’”); Carlson v. State, 227 So. 3d 1261, 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“[G]enerally ‘any’ means ‘all’ . . . .”); Dickinson v. Cahoon, 144 So. 345, 347 n.4 (Fla. 1932) (“For this reason the last two paragraphs of section¹¹ should not be construed as being confined to certificates of vehicles ‘in common carriage’ only, but as applying to ‘any’ (which means all) vehicles falling within the scope of the act for regulatory purposes.”); Baker v. Econ. Rsch. Servs., Inc., 242 So. 3d 450, 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Because ‘any’ means ‘all,’ Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F. 3d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F. 3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997)), the forum-selection clauses apply to all disputes related to the contracts, whether those disputes arose before or after termination of the contracts.”); see also Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F. 3d 1184, 1194 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We have repeatedly explained that when Congress uses the word ‘any’ without language limiting the breadth of that word, ‘any’

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means all.”); United States v. Caniff, 955 F. 3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020) (“As we have often had occasion to say, when interpreting a statute, ‘any’ means ‘all.’”); Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 526 F. 3d 715, 726 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he term ‘any’ in a statute has a ‘broad,’ ‘powerful,’ and ‘expansive’ meaning; ‘it does not mean ‘some’ or ‘all but a few,”’ but instead means ‘all.’”). This position is supported by the case law. In Waverly at Las Olas Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Waverly Las Olas, LLC, 88 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), the Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s award of fees for fees, holding the contractual attorney’s fees provision was broad enough to encompass an award of fees for time spent litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. The contract between the parties provided: In the event of any litigation between the parties under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys', paralegals' and para-professionals' fees and court costs at all trial and appellate levels.

Id. at 387 (Emphasis added).

In like fashion, section 61.16(1) provides for an award of attorney’s fees for “any proceeding” which is at least as broad as the “any litigation” contractual provision construed in Waverly. See also Trial Practices, Inc. v. Hahn Loeser & Parks, LLP for Antaramian, 228 So. 3d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), quashed on other grounds, 260 So. 3d 167 (Fla. 2018)

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(contractual provision between the parties provided that the “prevailing party in any action arising from or relating to this agreement will be entitled to recover all expenses of any nature incurred in any way in connection with the matter . . . including, but not limited to, attorneys' and experts' fees.”) (emphasis added). In support of its rationale, the majority opinion posits that a “fee hearing[] to determine the amount of the fees to be awarded to the non-party attorney . . . is not a proceeding under chapter 61.” Maj. Op. at *11. I do not agree. Here, the Former Wife’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement was filed under Chapter 61, triggering entitlement to fees under the statute. § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (“The court may from time to time . . . order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees . . . to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals.”). Those fees were thus incurred in a Chapter 61 proceeding, and subsequently awarded “under” Chapter 61—meaning a fee hearing is not independent of the dissolution litigation, but is necessarily a Chapter 61 “proceeding” under the statute’s purposely broad language. And any fees incurred seeking payment of those fees are “recoverable as incidents of ‘maintaining or defending any proceeding’ under Chapter 61,” Leone v. Weed, 448 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 4th

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DCA 1984) (“[W]e hold that a trial court can award attorneys' fees for the collection of attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1981) . . . .”); see also Proceeding, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“1. The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger action.”) (emphasis added); see also De Campos v. Ferrara, 90 So. 3d 865, 869 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding section 61.16(1) governed entitlement to fees in the declaratory action which sought to enforce the party’s property settlement agreement: “Because the petition in this matter invoked the trial court's jurisdiction under chapter 61, which it had acquired and retained over the Former Husband and Former Wife in the dissolution proceedings, to enforce the agreement as incorporated into the judgment, section 61.16(1) is applicable to the proceedings below.”); compare with Lewis v. Lewis, 689 So. 2d 1271, 1273-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (denying wife’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees under Chapter 61: “It cannot be said that this proceeding involved enforcement or facilitation of a chapter 61 proceeding. The domestic violence proceeding is an action independent of the dissolution process.”); Bane v. Bane, 775 So. 2d 938, 942 n.4 (Fla. 2000) (distinguishing

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domestic violence actions from proceedings under Chapter 61 for purposes of fees: “[T]he important distinction between these cases and the present case is that the cases concerning domestic violence injunction proceedings all involved an independent action under chapter 741, and none of the actions were filed under chapter 61 or pertained to enforcement or modification of the final judgment of dissolution.”) (emphasis added). Finally, and unlike many other statutory (or contractual) attorney’s fees provisions, “[a] trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorney’s fees in a dissolution case.”⁶ Kouzine v. Kouzine, 44 So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). See also Rose v. Rose, 883 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Williams

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v. Williams, 365 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Chhouri v. Chhouri,² So. 3d 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom, 892 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). This broad discretion vested in the trial court is essential to achieving the statute’s underlying equitable purpose, as the Florida Supreme Court noted in its seminal decision of Rosen v. Rosen, 696 so. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997): [P]roceedings under chapter 61 are in equity and governed by basic rules of fairness as opposed to the strict rule of law. See § 61.011, Fla. Stat. (1995) (“Proceedings under this chapter are in chancery.”). The legislature has given trial judges wide leeway to work equity in chapter 61 proceedings. See, e.g., § 61.001, Fla. Stat. (1995). Thus, section 61.16 should be liberally—not restrictively—construed to allow consideration of any factor necessary to provide justice and ensure equity between the parties.

Section 61.16 constitutes a broad grant of discretion, the operative phrase being “from time to time.” The provision simply says that a trial court may from time to time, i.e., depending on the circumstances surrounding each particular case, award a reasonable attorney's fee after considering the financial resources of both parties. Under this scheme, the financial resources of the parties are the primary factor to be considered. However, other relevant circumstances to be considered include factors such as the scope and history of the litigation; the duration of the litigation; the merits of the respective positions; whether the litigation is brought or maintained primarily to harass (or whether a defense is raised mainly to frustrate or stall); and the existence and course of prior or pending litigation. Had the legislature intended to limit consideration to the financial resources of the parties, the legislature easily could have said so.