FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

v.

JOHNSON

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2024-0549 _____________________________

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT,

Petitioner,

v.

ANGELA JOHNSON,

Respondent. _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

November 19, 2025

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement petitions for review of the trial court’s order directing the Department to produce certain emails identified on its privilege log in response to a request for production. The Department asserts that the emails are protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The trial court conducted an in camera inspection. But it failed to consider each document individually to determine whether the documents were privileged. Instead, the court made a blanket ruling that because the Department’s attorney who made or received the emails in question functioned as a “de facto HR officer,” none of the emails

2 should be excluded from production. We grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order.

Angela Johnson sued the Department for disability discrimination and retaliation. In response to Johnson’s discovery requests, the Department identified certain documents on a privilege log that it claimed were protected by attorney-client privilege or as work product. The documents in question are all emails made or received by James Martin, Deputy General Counsel for the Department. After receiving the privilege log, Johnson moved for an in camera inspection by the trial court. She claimed that the emails related to her job performance, attendance, leave, fitness-for-duty and performance evaluations, and termination/resignation. She requested the trial court to inspect the documents and determine the application of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.

The Department’s representatives explained during deposition that the Department handles human resource issues differently than many other state agencies. While other agencies have a designated person within the human resources department that handles any human resources issues, including disciplinary issues, the Department filters human resources issues through its general counsel’s office—specifically, Jim Martin. Thus, the question arose whether Martin was acting in his role as Deputy General Counsel or acting as a human resources officer when he sent or received the emails identified on the privilege log.

The trial court granted Johnson’s motion for an in camera inspection. It then made a blanket determination that with respect to the emails made or received by Martin, Martin was acting as a de facto human resources officer. The court concluded that Martin likely advised on human resources issues related to the suit, including whether Johnson should be terminated or whether accommodations could be made, which the court determined are issues usually handled by human resources.∗ The trial court

∗ In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on an unelaborated per curiam decision from this Court, where we denied certiorari relief in what the trial court considered to be a similar context—Florida Department of Business & Professional

The Department asks this Court to quash the order, petitioning for a writ of certiorari. “Certiorari is appropriate when the petitioning party establishes that a trial court departed from the essential requirements of law and the departure will result in a material injury that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beylotte, 357 So. 3d 307, 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (citing Emed Urgent & Primary Care, P.A. v. Rivas, 335 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)). “[C]ertiorari review is ‘appropriate in cases that allow discovery of privileged information.’” Butler v. Harter, 152 So. 3d 705, 709–10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., 940 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). “The attorney-client privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to render sound and informed advice.” Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota, LLC/Sentry Ins., 45 So. 3d 73, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981)).

Here, the trial court ordered the Department to produce all of Martin’s emails listed on its privilege log based on the court’s blanket finding that Martin was acting as a human resources officer and not as the Department’s counsel when he made or received the emails. In making this finding, the trial court compelled discovery based on a broad observation of Martin’s role and not based on individualized consideration of the documents at issue and their context. While it is certainly possible that some of the emails were not protected by the attorney-client privilege or as work product, given Martin’s position as Deputy General Counsel, some of the emails could have been related to the rendition of legal services and advice and thus should have been shielded from

Regulation v. Blackman, 292 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). But a per curiam decision “without opinion, has no precedential value.” Maradriaga v. 7-Eleven, 35 So. 3d 109, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Thus, the trial court’s reliance on that decision was misplaced.

Besides its blanket ruling that none of the emails were protected by the attorney-client privilege or as work product due to Martin’s purported role as de facto HR officer, the trial court ruled in the alternative that the Department had to produce the emails listed on the privilege log “because there’s no way that this information can be replicated,” and “[i]f it is work product it’s the type of work product that must be produced because it can’t be gathered in some other way.” This ruling also departed from the essential requirements of law.

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4), a party may obtain discovery of certain protected documents only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has need of the materials in preparing the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. But the rule maintains protection for privileged attorney-client communications and materials: “In ordering discovery of the materials when the required showing [of need and undue hardship] has been made, the court must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4).

The petition is GRANTED and the order on review is QUASHED.

ROWE, M.K. THOMAS, and NORDBY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

J. Craig Knox, Surama Suarez, and Riley Landy of Andrews,

Crabtree, Knox & Longfellow, LLP, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Ashley N. Richardson of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for Respondent.