MERCO GROUP AT AKOYA, INC.
v.
GENERAL COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.

Fla. 3d DCA | 2025-12-10
No. 2025-0322
Scales, C.J., Miller, J., Bokor, J., Sanchez-Llorens, J.
2025 FL 11705 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2025)

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Holding

Section 56.10, Florida Statutes plainly authorizes a circuit court to appoint a receiver for a corporate judgment debtor when execution cannot be satisfied in whole or in part for lack of property subject to levy and sale.


Headnotes

[1] Section 56.10, Florida Statutes authorizes a circuit court in chancery to appoint a receiver for a corporate judgment debtor when execution cannot be satisfied in whole o…

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Key Quotes

“If an execution cannot be satisfied in whole or in part for lack of property of the corporate judgment debtor subject to levy and sale . . . the circuit court in chancery . . . may appoint a receiver for the corporate judgment debtor.”

Statutory language from section 56.10, Florida Statutes (2025) cited by the court to support its holding

Facts & Procedural History

Merco Group at Akoya, Inc., a corporate judgment debtor, had an unsatisfied nearly decade-old final judgment against it. General Computer Services, In…

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed December 10, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0322 Lower Tribunal No. 2006-26218-CA-01 ________________

Merco Group at Akoya, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

General Computer Services, Inc., Appellee.

An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Law Offices of Geoffrey B. Marks, and Geoffrey B. Marks (Vero Beach), for appellant.

Crabtree & Auslander, LLC, and John G. Crabtree, Charles M. Auslander, and Brian C. Tackenberg, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

2

Appellant, Merco Group at Akoya, the corporate judgment debtor in proceedings supplementary involving an unsatisfied nearly decade-old final judgment, appeals from an order appointing a post-judgment receiver under section 56.10, Florida Statutes (2025), at the request of appellee, General Computer Services, Inc., the judgment creditor. Casting aside the fact that there is no transcript of the pivotal hearing, the cases cited in furtherance of relief are inapposite because the plain language of section 56.10 of the Florida Statutes plainly authorizes the trial court to appoint a receiver for the corporate judgment debtor for the purpose of collecting the unsatisfied judgment. See § 56.10, Fla. Stat. (“If an execution cannot be satisfied in whole or in part for lack of property of the corporate judgment debtor subject to levy and sale . . . the circuit court in chancery . . . may appoint a receiver for the corporate judgment debtor.”); see also Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory.”). We decline the invitation to engraft further language onto the statute and affirm the order

3

under review.1 See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001) (“Under fundamental principles of separation of powers, courts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes where the Legislature clearly has not done so.”).

Affirmed.

Footnotes
1 We further note that chapter 56 proceedings are exempted from the scope of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(a)(15). See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(a)(15) (“The requirements of this rule apply to all civil actions except . . . all proceedings under chapter 56, Florida Statutes . . . .”).

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