USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

v.

MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed December¹⁷, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ Nos. 3D24-1056, 3D24-1316, 3D24-1278 Lower Tribunal Nos. 18-42110-CA-01, 18-42205-CA-01, 18-42463-

CA-01

________________ USAA Casualty Insurance Company, et al., Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, et al., and MGA Insurance Company, Inc., etc., Appellants, vs. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, etc., et al., Appellees. Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C. Miller, Judge. Akerman LLP, Alexander J. Hall, Valerie B. Greenberg, and Nancy A. Copperthwaite, for appellants. MSP Recovery Law Firm and Ryan H. Susman, for appellees. Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.

2

FERNANDEZ, J.

In case numbers 3D24-1056, 3D24-1278, and 3D24-1316, defendants/appellants USAA Casualty Insurance Company and USAA General Indemnity Company (“USAA”); MGA Insurance Company; and Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, et al. (“Progressive”), respectively, appeal the trial court’s orders in each of their appeals denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs/appellees MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC (“MSP Recovery”); MSPA Claims 1, LLC (“MSPA Claims”); MSP Recovery Claims Series 44, LLC; and Series PMPI (all three referred to collectively as “plaintiffs”) are represented by the same counsel in these cases. USAA, MGA, and Progressive, et al. are represented by the same counsel before this Court and in the trial court.

The three appeals arise from circuit court actions filed by plaintiffs for pure bills of discovery under the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault (“PIP”) Statute, section 627.376, Florida Statutes (2018). The subject complaints in each case make the same allegations regarding personal jurisdiction. In each case, the trial court denied the insurance companies’ motions to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction. Each motion to dismiss relied on Florida and federal caselaw finding no personal jurisdiction in similar cases filed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, because the three related appeals raise the

Facts Related to the Three Underlying Cases In each of plaintiffs’ complaints, plaintiffs sought information about unspecified insureds who were involved in auto accidents and who also had Medicaid coverage. Plaintiffs filed the lawsuits after assignments were allegedly obtained from managed care organizations and related entities. No merits discovery took place while plaintiffs were trying to disqualify the insurance companies’ counsel. Plaintiffs started to prosecute the three underlying lawsuits after this Court rejected their disqualifications motions and after the Florida Supreme Court denied plaintiffs further review. When the merits litigation resumed, plaintiffs amended their complaints, increased the number of assignors, and added claims involving Medicare beneficiaries in addition to Medicaid beneficiaries. They also sought relief as a class action. Plaintiffs now seek declarations that contrary to federal requirements, the Insurers “must coordinate benefits with Secondary Payors”; the Insurers must “alert Secondary Payors of their primary obligations”; that contrary to Florida law, Secondary Payors “are not

1Plaintiffs define “Secondary Payors” as “all nongovernmental organizations, including but not limited to Medicaid Managed Care Organizations [‘MCOs’], Medicare Advantage Organizations [‘MAOs’], first-tier and downstream entities and their assignees, that provide health and prescription benefits in the State of Florida.” The Assignors allegedly are Secondary Payors.

The USAA appeal – 3D24-1056 Plaintiffs filed the underlying action for a pure bill of discovery regarding PIP claims then amended their pleading and added a second count for declaratory relief. USAA moved to dismiss both complaints. There was no hearing or ruling on either motion. The proceedings were paused from 2020-2023 while plaintiffs sought to disqualify USAA’s counsel, which was not successful. Akerman LLP v. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, 338 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), rev. denied, 2022 WL 4930534 (Fla. Oct.⁴, 2022). After the action resumed in the trial court, plaintiffs amended their complaint again. USAA moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on various grounds, including that the complaint had insufficient allegations as to personal jurisdiction. The trial court at first denied USAA’s motion to

2Later, in Coloplast Corporation v. MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, 415 So. 3d 353, 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“Coloplast II”), this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Coloplast’s second motion to dismiss. This Court rejected MSP’s position that it had established jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery against a foreign medical device manufacturer, including under the business-venture prong of Florida’s long-arm statute. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2023).

The MGA Appeal – 3D24-1278

The Progressive Appeal – 3D24-1316 Plaintiffs filed an action for a pure bill of discovery regarding PIP claims. Plaintiffs amended their pleading and added a second count for declaratory relief. Progressive moved to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint for various reasons, including that there were insufficient allegations regarding personal jurisdiction. There was no ruling or hearing on Progressive’s motions. As with the other two insurance companies’ cases, the case was stayed for two years while plaintiffs tried to disqualify Progressive’s counsel. Plaintiffs eventually withdrew their disqualification request, and Progressive renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court held hearings in March 2023 and July 2024 on Progressive’s motions to dismiss. Progressive raised its personal jurisdiction defense at the beginning of the case before any hearing or ruling on its motions. The trial court denied the renewed motion and ordered Progressive to answer the amended complaint.

Standard of Review This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s rulings on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Coloplast I, 353 So. 3d at 707; Facebook, LLC v. Grind Hard Holdings, LLC, 390 So. 3d 142, 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). In addition, when reviewing such a motion, the appellate court must construe the long-arm statute “strictly . . . in favor of non-resident defendants.” Blumberg v. Steve Weiss & Co., Inc., 922 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Discussion The insurers now argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss because plaintiffs did not allege any basis for the court to assert jurisdiction over the non-resident insurers. They further assert that each insurer properly raised its jurisdictional defense before the trial court

“Under Florida law, ‘personal jurisdiction . . . [is] necessary before a defendant, either an individual or business entity, may be compelled to answer a claim brought in a court of law.’” Facebook, 390 So. 3d at 144 (quoting Borden v. E.-Eur. Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006)). “The initial inquiry is whether ‘the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of [Florida’s long-arm] statute[.]’” Id. (quoting Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)). Florida’s Long-Arm statute provides, in part: (1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself for herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:

1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a

business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. . . .

4. Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located

within this state at the time of contracting. . . . (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.

See § 48.193(1)(a)(1) and (4), Fla. Stat. (2018); 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2018).

Plaintiffs argue that the insurers did not timely raise their jurisdictional defenses. However, the records in each case reflects that each insurer did, in fact, raise its jurisdictional defense before the trial court heard or ruled on each insurers’ motion to dismiss. In Waxoyl, A.G. v. Taylor, Brion, Buker & Green, 711 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), this Court held that a defendant does not waive a jurisdictional defense that it raises in the first motion to dismiss that the trial court addresses.³

In addition, the insurers never sought “affirmative relief inconsistent with the defense of personal jurisdiction.” Modway, Inc. v. OJ Com., LLC, 331 So. 3d 723, 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (holding defendant did not waive jurisdictional defense by first seeking to vacate a default and to quash service). Here, each insurer defended against plaintiffs’ disqualification

3 The Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal agree with this reasoning. See Cepero v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 189 So. 3d 204, 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“Where the initial motion to dismiss does not include a claim of lack of jurisdiction or insufficiency of service of process, those claims are not waived if, prior to a ruling on the initial motion, the defendant amends the motion to assert the issue.”); Re-Emp. Servs., Ltd. v. Nat’l Loan Acquisitions Co., 969 So. 2d 467, 470-71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The First and Second District Courts of Appeal do not. See Retherford v. Kirkland, 363 So. 3d 132, 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Gannon v. Cuckler, 281 So. 3d 587, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

USAA raised its personal jurisdiction defense in the first motion to dismiss the trial court addressed, which was USAA’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. In addition, USAA preserved the jurisdictional defense in the certification proceeding that came later. USAA did not engage in discovery, nor did it seek affirmative relief before it moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.

MGA raised its jurisdictional defense in the first motion to dismiss the trial court addressed, which was MGA’s renewed motion to dismiss. MGA preserved the jurisdictional defense in its later filings. This included the motion to dismiss that underlies this appeal and MGA’s Answer to plaintiffs’ final complaint. In addition, like USAA, MGA did not engage in discovery nor did it seek affirmative relief before the trial court denied MGA’s motion to dismiss and before the underlying appeal was filed.

Progressive raised its personal jurisdiction defense in its motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ initial complaint. Progressive preserved the defense in its later filings, including in the motion to dismiss that led to this appeal and in its Answer. Just like the other two insurers, Progressive did not engage in discovery nor did it seek affirmative relief before the trial court ruled on

Conclusion

In Coloplast I, we declined to extend long-arm jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery claim in the manufacturing context. In Coloplast II, we declined to extend long-arm jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery against a foreign medical device manufacturer, including under the business-venture prong of Florida’s long-arm statute. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). Now, in the three cases before us, we reject plaintiffs’ positions and decline to extend long-arm jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery in the insurance context as illustrated in the three underlying cases to these appeals. The trial court erred in each of the three cases when it allowed plaintiffs to sue USAA, MGA, and Progressive for equitable claims that do not arise from the non-resident insurers’ activities within Florida. Furthermore, we find that each of the insurers timely asserted their jurisdictional defenses before any hearing or ruling by the trial court on their motions to dismiss. For these reasons, we

Reversed and remanded with directions.