SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

MICHAEL MORENO, ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January⁷, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-1968 Lower Tribunal No. 21-2723-CA-01 ________________

Security First Insurance Company, Appellant,

vs.

Michael Moreno, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez, Judge.

Orr | Cook, and Michael Fox Orr and Loreyn P. Raab (Jacksonville), for appellant.

Cassel & Cassel, P.A., and Michael Cassel (Hollywood), for appellees.

Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LOBREE, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

2

In this first-party insurance case, appellant Security First Insurance Company (“Security First”) appeals a final judgment rendered after a jury verdict in favor of its insureds, appellees Michael and Katherine Moreno (“the Morenos”), on the Morenos’ breach of contract claim. Security First claims that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether the Morenos gave Security First “prompt notice” of their Hurricane Irma loss under the terms of the parties’ all-risk property insurance policy. Because the undisputed trial evidence established that the Morenos’ claim notice – sent some two and half years after the Morenos discovered water damage – was untimely, we reverse the final judgment and remand for a new trial solely on the secondary issue that the jury did not reach in rendering its verdict: whether the Morenos’ untimely notice of their Hurricane Irma loss prejudiced Security First.

I.

Relevant Background On September¹⁰, 2017, the Morenos’ insured property was purportedly damaged by Hurricane Irma. The Morenos reported the loss to Security First on April 22, 2020. Security First opened a claim, sent the Morenos a reservation of rights letter that requested additional information, and hired an engineering firm to inspect the property.

1 The policy provided, in relevant part:

SECTION I – CONDITIONS

2. Your Duties After Loss.

In case of a loss to covered property, we have no duty to provide coverage under this Policy if the failure to comply with the following duties is prejudicial to us. These duties must be performed either by you, an “insured” seeking coverage, or a representative of either:

a. Give prompt notice to us or our agent . . .

At the close of the Morenos’ case, and again, at the close of Security First’s case, Security First moved for a directed verdict on the policy’s prompt notice provision. The trial court denied a directed verdict, finding there was a jury question on the prompt notice defense.

The trial court instructed the jurors and provided them a special verdict form agreed to by the parties. In the special verdict form, the jury answered “YES” to the question asking whether the Morenos’ property had suffered a direct loss during the policy period from Hurricane Irma. On separate line items, the jury addressed each of Security First’s coverage defenses. As to the prompt notice defense, the jury answered “NO” to the question: “Did Defendant prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Moreno, did not give prompt notice of their loss to Defendant, Security First.” Because the jury answered “NO” to this question, the jury did not reach the next question asking whether the Morenos had proved that Security First was not prejudiced by their failure to give prompt notice. The jury then answered “NO” to separate questions asking whether Security First had proven that the claimed damages resulted from a policy exclusion – i.e., wear

Security First then filed a motion renewing its motion for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the renewed directed verdict motion and Security First timely appealed the resulting judgment.

II.

Analysis2 In this appeal, Security First does not challenge the jury’s determination that the Morenos’ property suffered a direct loss during the

2 “A trial court should grant a motion for directed verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that a jury could not reasonably differ about the existence of a material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). An appellate court, on de novo review, should reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict if no reasonable view of the evidence – when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party – could sustain a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. JD Dev. I, LLC v. ICS Contractors, LLC, 351 So. 3d 57, 61-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).

3 We caution that this opinion is premised on the specific facts adduced at trial. As we have held, there are circumstances that will give rise to a jury question on whether an insured’s delayed notice to his insurer, even a significant delay, is nevertheless “prompt.” See, e.g., Castro v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 365 So. 3d 1203, 1207-08 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); Laquer, 167 So. 3d at 474-75.

4 If the jury determines that the Morenos failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, then Security First is entitled to a final judgment against the Morenos on its prompt notice coverage defense (i.e., the Morenos forfeited coverage under the policy). If, however, the jury determines that the Morenos proved that Security First was not prejudiced by their failure to give prompt notice of the loss, the trial court should reinstate the jury’s verdict on the inapplicability of Security’s First’s policy exclusions and enter a judgment for the Morenos, awarding the Morenos the same damages awarded in the challenged judgment.