DYRON TUCKER

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 28, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-277 Lower Tribunal No. F20-4475B ________________

Dyron Tucker, Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Deborah Prager, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and GORDO, JJ.

LOGUE, J.

Dyron Tucker appeals his convictions and sentences for attempted strongarm robbery, a third-degree felony, and the lesser included offense of burglary of an occupied dwelling, a second-degree felony.¹ We affirm Tucker’s convictions without further comment but write only to address the affirmance of his sentences. Tucker contends the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by sentencing him as a prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) and a violent career criminal (“VCC”), asserting that under Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), a jury, not the trial court, must determine whether the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that he qualifies as both a PRR and VCC. Here, during the sentencing hearing, the State called as a witness a fingerprint analyst with Miami-Dade Corrections. During her testimony, the Time and Crime Report for Tucker was introduced into evidence. Other exhibits, including certified judgments and convictions and a non-pardon letter from the Office of Executive Clemency, were also introduced into evidence. The defense did not specifically contend that any of the crimes in the report were not Tucker’s or that any of the dates were incorrect. At the hearing, Tucker’s counsel conceded that Tucker qualified as a PRR because the evidence provided “would allow [the trial court] to make the finding that he was released within three years of this offense being committed.” Further, the evidence presented below demonstrated that Tucker qualified as a violent career criminal under section 775.084(1)(d), Florida Statutes, and the trial court made specific findings as to which prior convictions it relied on in finding that Tucker qualified as a VCC. Thus, based on the record before this Court, without reaching the merits of his argument, we affirm Tucker’s sentences because error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jett v. State, No. 1D23-3158, 2025 WL 3534090, *1 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 10, 2025) (affirming without addressing merits of argument relating to Erlinger where “[b]ased on the uncontroverted evidence, any error in not submitting the PRR determination to a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” noting, among other things, that the State introduced a certified copy of the Department of Corrections Crime and Time Report, which reflected that “Jett was released from prison less than one month before committing the burglary in this case,” and the “State’s fingerprint analysis expert testified that the fingerprints on the [Crime and Time Report] matched Jett’s fingerprints”).²

5 Affirmed.

C.J., concurring) (“[V]iolations of th[e] right [to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether a defendant’s predicate offenses were committed on different occasions under the Armed Career Criminal Act] are subject to harmless error review.”).