RUSSELL S. GEORGE
v.
HARVEST CREDIT MANAGEMENT VII, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO HOUSEHOLD BANK (SB), N.A.
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The trial court's order denying appellant's motion to vacate was properly entered and affirmed, while the order denying all pending motions was treated as a nonfinal, non-appealable order subject to certiorari review.
[1] An order denying all pending motions in a post-judgment action is a nonfinal, non-appealable order subject to review by petition for writ of certiorari rather than direct…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRussell S. George appealed two orders entered in a small-claims post-judgment action against Harvest Credit Management VII, successor in interest to H…
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 6D2025-0855 Lower Tribunal No. 2009-SC-003470 _____________________________
RUSSELL S. GEORGE, Appellant, v. HARVEST CREDIT MANAGEMENT VII, as successor in interest to HOUSEHOLD BANK (SB), N.A., Appellee. _____________________________
Appeal from the County Court for Lee County. Tara P. Paluck and Devin S. George, Judges.
January 9, 2026
BROWNLEE, J.
Appellant Russell S. George appeals two orders entered in this small-claims post-judgment action. As to that portion of the appeal challenging the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to vacate, we affirm. We find, however, that the trial court’s order denying all pending motions is a nonfinal, non-appealable order. Accordingly, we treat that portion of the appeal which challenges the order denying all pending motions as a petition for writ of certiorari, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c)
2
(“If a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause must be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought . . . .”), and deny the petition on the merits. AFFIRMED in part; DENIED in part. STARGEL and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.
Russell S. George, Punta Gorda, pro se.
Ryan E. Sprechman, of Sprechman & Fisher, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.