UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

NELSON RODRIGUEZ AND YOSEIDA CUEVAS

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 6D2024-1194 Lower Tribunal No. 2020-CA-002266 _____________________________

UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. NELSON RODRIGUEZ and YOSEIDA CUEVAS, Appellees. _____________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Jennifer Swenson, Judge. February⁶, 2026 SPRYSENSKI, C., Associate Judge. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Universal”) appeals the entry of a final judgment for breach of contract in favor of Nelson Rodriguez and Yoseida Cuevas (collectively “the Homeowners” or “Homeowners”) after a jury entered verdict in favor of the Homeowners. Based on the plain language of section 627.7011(3)(a), Florida Statutes, we affirm.

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BACKGROUND

Universal provided the Homeowners a replacement cost value homeowner’s insurance policy on the Homeowners’ residence in 2020. Per the insurance policy, for covered property losses, Universal would pay: first, “at least the actual cash value of the insured loss, less any applicable deductible,” and then “any remaining amounts necessary to perform such repairs as work is performed and expenses are incurred.” Following the issuance of the policy, the Homeowners experienced damage to their residence as a result of a storm. Universal denied the Homeowners’ claim for coverage. The Homeowners subsequently filed suit for breach of contract that ultimately proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the Homeowners testified that they did not perform repairs on the property after the storm. Over Universal’s objection, the Homeowners presented evidence in the form of a contractor’s estimate of the replacement cost value of the repairs necessary to fix the damage to their residence. Universal argued that since the Homeowners had not performed any repairs to the property, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the correct measure of damages was the actual cash value of the repairs and that the Homeowners should be limited to presenting only evidence of damages as to the actual cash value of the loss to the Homeowners. The trial court overruled both a motion in limine filed by Universal and an objection made by

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Universal argues that the trial court incorrectly denied its motion in limine and motion for directed verdict, both of which argued that the Homeowners were limited to presenting evidence of the actual cash value of the loss to the Homeowners’ residence since the Homeowners failed to make any repairs to the residence as of the date of trial. “Generally, ‘[t]he standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is abuse of discretion.’” Vazquez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 304 So. 3d 1280, 1284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (citing Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Fla. 2012)). “However, where the trial court’s order presents questions of insurance policy interpretation and statutory construction, our review is de novo.” Id. Likewise, “[t]he standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict is de novo, and the court must look at all evidence in the light most favorable to the

D. Loss Settlement

. . . Covered property losses are settled as follows: . . . 2. Buildings and screened enclosures covered under Coverage A or B replacement cost without deduction for depreciation, subject to the following: . . . d. We will initially pay at least the actual cash value of the insured loss, less any applicable deductible. We will then pay any remaining amounts

8 of the insurance policy is derived, an initial analysis of the plain language of both the contract and statute is required. It is clear on the face of section 627.7011(3)(a) that an insurance company’s ability to limit initial payments to an insured to the actual cash value of the damage applies to covered claims only. Pursuant to section 627.7011(3)(a), “[f]or a dwelling, the insurer must initially pay the actual cash value of the insured loss . . .” (Emphasis added). Similarly, the language of the insurance policy between Universal and the Homeowners under this instant appeal allows Universal to “initially pay at least the actual cash value of the insured loss” when settling a “covered property loss.” (Emphasis added). Here, there is no question that Universal denied the Homeowners’ claim. As such, the Homeowners were not limited to the presentation of only evidence of damages based on the actual cash value of repairs actually made, as found by the Third District in Tio, and the Second District in Brito. Universal argues that this Court should reject the reasoning in Tio because its holding is irreconcilable with Citizens Property Insurance Co. v. Manor House, LLC, 313 So. 3d 579 (Fla. 2021). Universal asserts that the holding Manor House requires that the express contractual language of the insurance contract still controls the measure of damage, regardless of whether the insurer extended coverage for the claim or denied the claim.

9 This argument ignores that Manor House answered a specific question, a question not presented by this appeal. In Manor House, an insured sued an insurer for breach of contract to recover extra-contractual consequential damages in the form of lost rental income. Manor House, 313 So. 3d at 580. The question certified to the Florida Supreme Court for resolution was whether an insured could recover extra-contractual consequential damages in a first-party breach of insurance contract action not involving suit under section 624.155, Florida Statutes. Id. at 581. The Florida Supreme Court answered that question in the negative, reasoning that extracontractual consequential damages were not available because the contractual amount due to the insured was the amount owed pursuant to the express terms and conditions of the policy. Id. at 582-84. In this case, the Homeowners seek damages for which the contract expressly provides. Indeed, this is a “replacement cost value” insurance policy. In reaching our conclusion that an insured is not bound to the actual cash value of the loss when presenting evidence of damages, we borrow the sound logic of Judge Atkinson’s concurrence in Brito. Specifically, that: The damages inquiry in the trial of an action for an insurer’s breach of contract based on a denial of coverage is, essentially, what the insurer would have been required to pay had it not denied coverage. . . . The legal proceedings necessitated by the insurer’s alleged contractbreaching denial of coverage are designed to adjudicate not only

10 whether the contract was breached but also the precipitate damages incurred by the insureds by way of an assessment of what position they should have been in had the breach not occurred. That includes not only the actual cash value payment but also the additional payments to account for the replacement cost that the insurer would have been obligated to pay upon the making of repairs had it not allegedly breached the contract by denying coverage. In an action precipitated by a denial of coverage that allegedly breached the insurance contract, the fact that the insurance contract makes such replacement cost payments contingent on the costs having already been incurred does not foreclose adjudication of what those replacement costs would be had the insurer complied with the policy. Brito, 415 So. 3d at 257-258 (Atkinson, J., concurring specially) The trial court neither erred when it denied Universal’s motion in limine nor when it denied Universal’s post-trial motions for a directed verdict. We agree with Judge Atkinson that “[i]t defies logic to limit such an inquiry to actual cash value when the contract governing the action entitles the insured to ‘replacement cost without deduction for depreciation,’” the verbatim contractual language presented to us in the instant appeal. Id. at 257. As such, we join the Second District and certify conflict with the Qureshi majority.

AFFIRMED. CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

STARGEL and MIZE, JJ., concur. Kara Rockenbach Link and David A. Noel, of Link & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant. Michael A. Cassel, of Cassel & Cassel, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellees.

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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING

AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED