JAMES ABRAMSON, ARTHUR ZINNAMON, RICHARD B. PEMSTEIN AND ROBERT ABRAMSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
EDMUND BRANT, APPELLEE
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Partners in a joint venture disputed profit distribution after a receiver was appointed to manage their affairs. The court ordered the appointed receivers to distribute half of accumulated surplus profits according to the venture agreement percentages. The appellants' challenge to this distribution order was rejected.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the distribution. The court properly exercised its authority over property held by a receiver to make orders necessary and proper for protecting the property and interests involved, and it was appropriate to distribute the surplus profits given the adequate reserves for liabilities.
“Property in the hands of a receiver is, in a legal sense, in the possession of the court”
Establishes the legal principle that gives the trial court discretion to manage and control receiver property
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants and appellee were partners in a written joint venture agreement giving the appellee a 42% interest in profits. After a dispute, the appelle…
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This interlocutory appeal brings up for review an order directing court appointed receivers to make a distribution of a portion of the surplus profits accumulated prior to and during their operation of a joint venture.
The appellants and the appellee are partners in a joint venture evidenced by a written agreement and supplements thereto. Under the terms of this agreement, the appellee was given a 42% interest in the total profits derived from the venture. As a result of a dispute between the parties, the appellee brought an action seeking declaratory decree, temporary injunction, accounting, appointment of a receiver and other relief. After hearing, the chancellor entered an order appointing the attorneys for the respective parties receivers to operate and manage the affairs of the venture. Further hearing culminated in the entry of an order (not appealed) which adjudicated the joint venture agreement to be valid and binding, and ordered the parties to comply with its terms with the exception that the appellee was relieved of his managerial duties. As to the latter, the court found that the appellee had performed his contractual obligations. An accounting was ordered and a special master appointed for that purpose. Subsequently the appellee filed a petition for distribution of surplus profits. After hearing, the court entered the order appealed directing the receivers to make a distribution of one-half of the accumulated surplus, with 42% of that one-half going to the appellee, and the balance to the appellants in accordance with the percentages designated in the agreement.
Basically the appellants contend the chancellor abused his discretion in ordering the distribution of surplus profits. We find this contention to be without merit.
Property in the hands of a receiver is, in a legal sense, in the possession of the court, Mirror Lake Co. v. Kirk Securities Corp., 98 Fla, 946, 124 So. 719; McKinnon-Young Co. v. Stockton, 55 Fla. 708, 46 So. 87, and the court making- the appointment may, at its discretion, during the pendency of the action make such further orders as are necessary and proper for the protection of the property and interests concerned. Hood v. Ocklawaha Valley R. Co., 78 Fla. 659, 84 So. 97. In the instant case, it appears from the record that there was on hand in the treasury of the venture $190,000 in surplus profits, with further accumulations expected at the rate of $20,000 a month, adequate provision having been made for existing and contingent liabilities. Since the court’s receivers were in control of the venture, it was within the chancellor’s dis*779cretion whether or not a distribution was warranted, necessary and proper for the protection of the property and interests concerned. We concur with his finding that a distribution should be made. A review of the record indicates to us that it would have been inequitable and an abuse of discretion to have denied the ap-pellee’s petition for distribution.
It follows that the order appealed should be, and is hereby,
Affirmed.
PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., concurs in the decision.
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Citator
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Puma Enters. Corp. v. Vitale, 566 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…1921). “[T]he court making the appointment [of a receiver] may, at its discretion, during the pendency of the action make such further orders as are necessary and proper for the protection of the property and interests concerned.” Abramson v. Brant, 141 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 752 (Fla.1962); see also Hood v. Ocklawaha Valley R. Co., 78 Fla. 659, 84 So. 97 (1920). The receivership was expanded pursuant to the plaintiffs’ motion showing that the partnership assets had been assig…
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Fugazy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. State, 188 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)…pertaining to the receiver. 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 148. In addition the court may require other safeguards in a proposed sale by the receiver such as public notice, sealed bids or public auction as may appear proper. Abramson v. Brant, Fla.App.1962, 141 So. 2d 777; Hood v. Ocklawaha Valley R. Co., 1920, 78 Fla. 659, 84 So. 97. If the court approves the sale then any petition for rehearing should be served upon the prospective purchaser. Oakland Properties Corporation v. Hogan, 1928, 96 Fla. 40, 117 So. 846.…
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In re The Receivership of Int'l Forum OF Fla. Health Benefit Tr. v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 607 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…n and control of the court.” Fugazy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dickinson, 188 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). Accord Edenfield v. Crisp, 186 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (a receiver is the agent of the court); Abramson v. Brant, 141 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA) (property in the hands of a receiver is legally in possession of the court), cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 752 (Fla.1962). As to issue III, appellants claim they had no notice of assessment liability, thus the assessment is void. Sect…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mirror Lake Co. v. Kirk Sec. Corp., 98 Fla. 946 (Fla. 1929)
- Hood v. Ocklawaha Valley R.R. Co., 78 Fla. 659 (Fla. 1920)
- The McKinnon-Young Co. v. Page, 55 Fla. 708 (Fla. 1908)