NATHANIEL J. BROWN
v.
PAMELA JO BONDI; ATTORNEY GENERAL ETC. ET AL.
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A pro se litigant who has been barred from filing pro se actions in the appellate court may not proceed with an appeal, and continued violations of such orders may result in referral for disciplinary sanctions.
[1] A court may bar a pro se litigant from filing further pro se actions when such filings consume inordinate judicial resources and are frivolous, and may enforce such order…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“those filings ha[ve] consumed an inordinate amount of our limited judicial resources.”
Explanation for the 2010 bar on pro se filings
Nathaniel J. Brown filed numerous pro se actions challenging his 2005 criminal conviction. The court had previously barred him from filing pro se appe…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D17-1211 _____________________________
NATHANIEL J. BROWN,
Appellant,
v.
PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General of Florida,
Appellee. ___________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. James O. Shelfer, Judge.
April 20, 2018
PER CURIAM.
Appellant has filed myriad actions in this Court and others attacking his 2005 judgment and sentence entered in Duval County. See Brown v. State, 229 So. 3d 397 (Mem.) (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). This appeal is the latest in that collection, and like the rest, it is frivolous. In 2010, we barred Appellant from “filing any future [pro se] appeals, petitions, motions, pleadings or other filings” challenging his conviction, in part because “those filings ha[ve] consumed an inordinate amount of our limited judicial resources.” Brown v. State, 35 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
2
Apparently unfazed by our warnings, Appellant continued filing pro se actions in this Court challenging that conviction. E.g., Brown v. Tucker, 75 So. 3d 393, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In 2017, this Court broadened Appellant’s bar to include any further filings, unless they are signed by a member in good standing with The Florida Bar after rejecting Appellant’s argument that his civil litigation should be considered separate from his criminal litigation when considering sanctions. Brown v. State, 221 So. 3d 1284, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). After barring Appellant twice, we also warned him that future “violation of this order could result in referral to the Department of Corrections for sanctions under section 944.279, Florida Statutes.” Brown, 221 So. 3d at 1284–85. That brings us to Appellant’s current appeal. First, we dismiss the appeal because Appellant is barred from filing any pro se actions in this Court. Second, all pending motions are stricken as unauthorized. But because Appellant has yet to heed our warnings to stop filing frivolous actions, we also direct a certified copy of this opinion be provided to the Department of Corrections to be forwarded to the appropriate institution or facility for disciplinary procedures pursuant to section 944.279, Florida Statutes. Finally, we note that Appellant is still barred from filing any document with this Court that is not signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar, and the Clerk of this Court is directed to reject any further filings by Appellant not signed by a member in good standing with The Florida Bar. This includes any post-disposition motion filed in this case. WETHERELL, MAKAR, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. Any such motion must be signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. _____________________________
3
Nathaniel J. Brown, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Charles J. F. Schreiber, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Brown v. State (Fla. 5th DCA 2026)
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 35 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Brown v. Jones, 229 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
- Lake v. State, 35 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Rollins v. State, 75 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
- Brown v. Jones, 221 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
- Brown v. Tucker, 75 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)