PMT NPL FINANCING

v.

CENTURION SYSTEMS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

PMT NPL FINANCING 2015-1,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D17-2711

CENTURION SYSTEMS, LLC, AS

SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER

THE 5055 SHALE RIDGE TRAIL

LAND TRUST DATED JULY 6, 2012,

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION

SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL.,

Appellees.

________________________________/

Opinion filed August 24, 2018

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Bob Leblanc, Judge.

Nancy M. Wallace, of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, William P. Heller, of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and Eric M. Levine, Akerman LLP, West Palm Beach, for Appellant.

Mark P. Stopa, of Stopa Law Firm, Tampa, for Appellee, Centurion Systems, LLC, as Successor Trustee Under the 5055 Shale Ridge Trail Land Trust Dated July 6, 2012. No Appearance for Other Appellees.

ORFINGER, J.

5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that after note owner was substituted for original servicer as plaintiff in action, it had standing at trial where it introduced into evidence original blankindorsed note, which had been filed in court two years before substituting note owner as party plaintiff); see also Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Johnson, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1509, D1510 (Fla. 2d DCA June 29, 2018) (holding that bank’s physical possession of original blank-indorsed note at beginning of trial was sufficient to establish standing at trial); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Heath, 219 So. 3d 104, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“Here, Bank established standing because the original note and blank-endorsed allonge was properly authenticated and introduced into evidence at trial, which was identical to the copy of the note and blank-endorsed allonge attached to the complaint.”). See generally § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017) (defining “holder” as “[t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession”).

standing to foreclose when it filed the complaint with a copy of the blank-indorsed note attached, and PMT established standing in its own right by physically possessing the original blank-indorsed note at the trial and entering it into evidence. Compare Geweye, 189 So. 3d 231 (holding evidence was insufficient to support standing of assignee of mortgage to enforce note at time of trial in foreclosure action because even though mortgagee had standing when foreclosure complaint was filed and assignee was substituted as party plaintiff, assignee did not submit note with blank or special indorsement, assignment of note, or affidavit otherwise proving assignee’s status as holder of note; mortgagee filed original note indorsed in blank with court long before assignee was substituted in action, and nothing in assignment of mortgage conferred standing on assignee to enforce note), and Creadon, 166 So. 3d 952 (holding purported successor trustee, which was substituted as plaintiff in foreclosure action, failed to establish standing to foreclose note and mortgage where original note was filed in court registry years before successor trustee appeared in suit, and thus, successor trustee could not be holder of note or nonholder in possession with standing to foreclose, and successor trustee did not advance any alternative basis for standing), with Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Johnson, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1509, D1510 (Fla. 2d DCA June 29, 2018) (distinguishing case from Geweye and Creadon due to substitute plaintiff’s possession of original note at trial).

6 We reject Centurion’s argument that PMT did not have standing to foreclose at the time of trial since the blank indorsement was allegedly deficient. According to Centurion, the blank indorsement, which was executed “Without Recourse CitiMortgage, Inc./By and through its Attorney in Fact PNMAC Capital Management LLC,” was deficient because there was no competent evidence that PNMAC was authorized to execute the indorsement as attorney-in-fact for CitiMortgage. An indorsement is a “signature” on the note “for the purpose of negotiating the instrument.” § 673.2041(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). A signature can be placed on an instrument by a person or a person’s representative. Id. § 673.4021(1). “In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings.” Id. § 673.3081(1). The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) Comment to this provision explains that “until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff is not required to prove that it is valid.”² Id., U.C.C. cmt. 1. Here, assuming, without deciding, that this issue was properly pled, Centurion did not introduce any evidence to support a finding that the signature on the blank indorsement was forged or unauthorized. Thus, PMT was not required to prove that the signature was authorized. See Rivera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 189 So. 3d 323, 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (finding that bank was not required to prove that borrower’s signature was valid where borrower did not introduce any evidence to support finding that signatures were

7 forged or unauthorized); Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 124 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding bank could rely on statutory presumption of validity of signatures on allonge, based on section 673.3081(1), in absence of any evidence from mortgagors that signature was unauthorized). Because the original plaintiff had standing to foreclose when it filed the complaint with a copy of the blank-indorsed note attached and PMT established standing in its own right by entering the original blank-indorsed note into evidence, the trial court erred in granting Centurion’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the foreclosure action and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA and WALLIS, JJ., concur.