EARL R. HARWICK, APPELLANT,
v.
INDIAN CREEK COUNTRY CLUB, A FLORIDA CORPORATION NOT FOR PROFIT, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Harwick purchased a lot in an exclusive subdivision with single-family residence restrictions but later discovered a 1944 agreement between some (but not all) owners that would have relaxed the restrictions to permit apartments. He sought rescission claiming material misrepresentation, but the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal because the 1944 agreement was unenforceable and the deed restrictions remained valid.
The court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal because the 1944 agreement was unenforceable (lacking execution by all property owners), the single-family deed restrictions remained enforceable, municipal zoning did not alter deed restrictions, and therefore no material misrepresentation supporting rescission occurred.
“The record on appeal discloses that the agreement of 1944 was unenforceable and void because of the failure of all the property owners in the subdivision to execute it.”
Establishes the legal principle that restrictive covenants require unanimous consent from all affected property owners to be modified or relaxed.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1960, Harwick purchased a lot in an exclusive subdivision from Indian Creek Country Club, relying on deed restrictions limiting all lots to single-…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Deed Restrictions cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant, plaintiff below, seeks review of a summary final decree dismissing his cause of action seeking recission of the purchase and sale agreement of certain real property.
In 1960, the appellant purchased a lot in an exclusive subdivision from the ap-pellee, in reliance upon certain deed restrictions which restricted the use of all lots in the subdivision to single family residences. Subsequent to the closing, the appellant learned that in 1944 there had been an agreement entered into by some, but not all, of the owners of the lots in the subdivision, the effect of which would have been to relax the single family deed restrictions to permit the construction of apartment units on certain property in the vicinity of that purchased by the appellant. Upon learning of this purported agreement and the fact that this property was zoned for multiple family residence by the municipal authorities, notwithstanding the deed restrictions, the appellant offered to reconvey the property to the appellee in exchange for the return of the consideration he had expended in purchasing the property. This the appellee refused to do, and the appellant instituted an action for recission, contending that there had been a material misrepresentation as to the restrictive nature of the use of all the lots in the subdivision for residential purposes. Subsequent to discovery proceedings and certain requests for admissions being propounded by the appellant, the ap-pellee moved for a summary decree which was granted, dismissing the cause.
There appearing to be no material issue of fact in dispute, the entry of the summary decree will be affirmed. The record on appeal discloses that the agreement of 1944 was unenforceable and void because of the failure of all the property owners in the subdivision to execute it. Tolar v. Meyer, Fla.App.1957, 96 So.2d 554. Therefore, same did not operate to relax the restrictive single family residence restrictions within the subdivision which are still enforceable by the appellant. Neither did the apartment house zoning have the effect of altering or modifying the deed restrictions. Therefore, there could not have been any material misrepresentation warranting recission of the purchase and sale, and the summary final decree entered by the chancellor be and it is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
S & T Anchorage, Inc. v. Lewis, 575 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…c., 426 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), see Lakes of Emerald Hills v. Silverman, 558 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (association bylaws do not support association’s entitlement to attorney fees); Roth; see also Harwick v. Indian Creek Country Club, 142 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (agreement between developer and some property owners invalid where not executed by all lot owners in subdivision). Even if, as Anchorage asserts, the Assignment and settlement were adopted pursuant to a proper vote as provided b…
-
Roth v. Springlake II Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 533 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…eber, 155 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). The language of the original declaration sub judice was akin to subdivision restrictions which normally cannot be amended without the consent of all the property owners. Harwich v. Indian Creek Country Club, 142 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). “That residential lot owners are the beneficiaries of restrictive covenants is well settled.” Gercas v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Moore v. Dykes, 225 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); also see Downey v. Jungle Den…
-
Dolphins Plus, Inc. v. Hobdy, 650 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…of the developers subsequently gave Dolphins Plus a lease for this purpose does not alter this result because, as a matter of law, the lease alone was not sufficient to release or terminate the plat restriction. Harwich v. Indian Creek Country Club, 142 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (agreement to allow apartment units unenforceable and void where the deed restriction required single family homes and all the property owners did not execute subsequent agreement); Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)