ISRAEL OTERO AND PURA RODRIGUEZ

v.

OMAR J. ARCIA

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ISRAEL OTERO AND PURA RODRIGUEZ,

Appellants,

v. Case No. 5D17-3043

OMAR J. ARCIA,

Appellee.

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Opinion filed February 22, 2019

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Heather L. Higbee, Judge.

Israel Otero and Pura Rodriguez, Orlando, pro se.

Omar J. Arcia, of The Arcia Law Firm, P.L., Miramar, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, Israel Otero and Pura Rodriguez, appeal the trial court’s final order dismissing their complaint with prejudice. Appellants sued Appellee, Omar Javier Arcia, alleging that he committed legal malpractice and breached fiduciary duties while representing them in defense of a mortgage foreclosure case. Appellants claimed in their complaint that they entered into a consent judgment foreclosing their interest in property based upon the negligent advice and negligent representation provided to them by

3 than a year before Appellants filed their complaint against Appellee. Appellants repeatedly objected to all efforts to conduct the foreclosure sale, and appealed one order denying their motion to cancel the sale. This appeal of a post-judgment nonfinal order was still pending in this Court when their complaint was dismissed. At the hearing on Appellee’s motion to dismiss, whether intentionally or negligently, Appellee misled the trial court when he told the judge multiple times that Appellants had “appealed the consent judgment to the 5th District Court of Appeals” and that the appeal of the consent final judgment was still pending in this Court. The trial court accepted Appellee’s representation and dismissed Appellants’ complaint, ultimately with prejudice, on the basis that Appellants’ malpractice claim against Appellee was not ripe. However, at the time Appellants’ complaint was dismissed, there were no appeals pending that attacked the consent final judgment of foreclosure. The only appeal still pending when the trial court dismissed Appellants’ complaint was of the order denying their motion to cancel the foreclosure sale. Finally, although at the time of their complaint Appellants had not determined the extent of their alleged damages, Silvestrone “merely establishes a bright line for establishing when the client has suffered some loss as a consequence of the attorney’s negligence”; it “does not require that there be a determination of the full extent of all losses suffered by the client due to the lawyer’s negligence.” Larson, 22 So. 3d at 42; see also R.S.B. Ventures, Inc. v. Berlowitz, 211 So. 3d 259, 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[T]he foreclosure judgment resulted in RSB’s loss of any rights to the foreclosed property. . . . [A] foreclosure judgment adverse to RSB has reached the point of finality, so RSB’s legal malpractice claim has accrued with respect to the foreclosure judgment.”).

For the reasons expressed above, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ malpractice complaint against Appellee. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

EVANDER, C.J., ORFINGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.