WILMA JANE CRAWFORD F/K/A WILMA E. SATTERWHITE, CODY CRAWFORD AND BROOKE CRAWFORD

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

WILMA JANE CRAWFORD F/K/A

WILMA E. SATTERWHITE, CODY CRAWFORD AND BROOKE CRAWFORD,

Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

v. Case No. 5D17-3027

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

__________________________________________/

Opinion filed March 22, 2019

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Flagler County, Scott C. Dupont, Judge.

Michael P. Nordman, of Taylor and Nordman, P.A., DeLand, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

David Rosenberg, Cynthia L. Comras and Jarrett Cooper, of Robertson, Anschutz & Schneid, P.L., Boca Raton, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Wilma Jane Crawford (“Wilma”), Cody Crawford, and Brooke Crawford (collectively, the “Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s final judgment granting claims for mortgage foreclosure, equitable subrogation, and equitable lien, asserted by Federal National Mortgage Association (“Appellee”), and dismissing Appellants’ counterclaims.

Joseph died in January 2014, and the last payment on the loan was made in June 2014. After notifying the “Estate of Joseph Crawford” that the refinance mortgage loan was in default due to the lack of payments, Bank of America assigned the refinance mortgage to Appellee who filed a foreclosure action and notice of lis pendens. Subsequently, Appellee filed a Third Amended Complaint for mortgage foreclosure,

The case proceeded to a bench trial. Appellee moved the refinance mortgage loan payment history into evidence which demonstrated that the last payment was made in June 2014, the total unpaid principal amount at the time of trial was $87,678.95, the unpaid interest was $18,403.56, and the total amount of escrow advances was $6,990.01.

Following trial, the court entered a final judgment in favor of Appellee, finding it had proven the requisite elements of a foreclosure action and was entitled to foreclose on the refinance mortgage. The trial court also concluded that Appellee was entitled to relief via equitable subrogation, and to thereby “stand in the shoes” of the prior mortgagees due to the refinance mortgage loan proceeds being used to satisfy the prior loans. Additionally, the trial court ruled that Appellee was entitled to the imposition of an equitable lien upon the property to prevent Appellants from being unjustly enriched by the satisfaction of the prior loans and by Appellee’s continuing payment of taxes and hazard insurance for the property after the default on the refinance loan. The trial court also reasoned that Wilma received both direct and indirect benefits from the cash disbursement and therefore found Appellee entitled to the full amount of the refinance mortgage as part of the equitable lien. Additionally, the trial court dismissed Appellants’ counterclaims, ruling that each failed to state a cause of action. Finally, the trial court awarded the Appellee $117,648.32 in damages, which included prejudgment interest. This appeal follows. The parties raise numerous issues on appeal and cross-appeal. We affirm in all respects except for two issues raised by Appellants. We agree with Appellants that the

I. The trial court erred by entering a judgment for

mortgage foreclosure against Wilma’s homestead but did not err in imposing an equitable lien on the property.

This issue presents a question of law that is to be reviewed de novo. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010). Appellants argue that the trial court erred by entering a final judgment of mortgage foreclosure, noting that Wilma never executed the refinance mortgage. We agree. The Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift.” Art. X, § 4(c), Fla. Const. Florida courts have consistently interpreted this constitutional provision as requiring spousal joinder in the execution of a mortgage on homestead property in order for the mortgage to encumber the property and be enforceable in foreclosure, even where only the signatory spouse is an owner of record on the property’s deed. See Vera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 178 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Wilma did not sign the refinance mortgage, and the subject property was Wilma’s homestead. Thus, the trial court erred in finding that Appellee was entitled to foreclose on the refinance mortgage.

However, a trial court is authorized to impose an equitable lien on a homestead if necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. See Palm Beach Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993). The evidence at trial fully supports the court’s determination that some of the loaned funds associated with the refinance mortgage benefited the

II. The trial court erred in finding the full amount of the

refinance mortgage loan to be subject to the equitable lien.

This issue involves questions of both fact and law. We review the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by competent substantial evidence, but we review questions of law de novo. See St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. v. Mem’l Healthcare Grp., Inc., 967 So. 2d 794, 799 (Fla. 2007). Appellants argue that the trial court miscalculated the amount secured by the equitable lien because it included the $44,576.31 disbursed directly to Joseph that did not benefit the homestead. The Appellee counters by claiming that the trial court properly found that Wilma would be “unjustly enriched” since she had limited access to a portion of the funds and the homestead indirectly benefited from the disbursement. We agree with Appellants. A trial court may impose an equitable lien to prevent unjust enrichment, but only for funds used to benefit the homestead. See Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 270-71. Thus, it is not appropriate to include in an equitable lien funds disbursed to the signatory spouse that were “not used to benefit the homestead” but, instead were used by the signatory spouse “for other purposes.” Id. at 271. At trial, Appellee produced no evidence demonstrating that the $44,576.31 disbursed to Joseph either directly or indirectly benefited the homestead. The Appellee’s speculation that the funds may have been used to make payments on the loan or provide

7 prejudgment interest.³ AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with instructions. GROSSHANS, SASSO,⁴ JJ., and WILSON, T., Associate Judge, concur.