GERHARD T. BECK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE BARNETT NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE, A NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATION UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
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Beck sued his former guardian bank for negligence committed during the guardianship, but the suit was filed approximately three years after the bank's discharge as guardian. The court held that Florida Statute § 746.14 barred the suit because it was not commenced within one year of discharge, and affirmed summary judgment for the bank.
F.S. § 746.14 applies and bars the action. Discharge of the guardian serves as a bar to any suit against the guardian unless the suit is commenced within one year from the date of discharge. The specific statutory language of § 746.14 controls over the general statute of limitations.
“Such discharge shall operate as a release from the duties of the guardianship and as a bar to any suit against said guardian or his surety, unless such suit is commenced within one year from the date of the discharge.”
The statutory language of F.S. § 746.14 that provides the one-year deadline for suits against guardians, which is dispositive of the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeck was under guardianship by The Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville while he was incompetent. Approximately four years after Beck's restoration t…
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Appellant-plaintiff Gerhard T. Beck appeals from a summary final judgment entered in favor of appellee-defendant, The Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville.
The defendant bank served as plaintiff’s guardian during a period of time when he was incompetent. Approximately four years after plaintiff’s restoration of competency and three years after defendant bank’s final discharge as guardian, plaintiff filed his complaint alleging negligence on the part of the bank while it was serving as plaintiff’s guardian.
The bank, for affirmative defense, asserted that F.S. § 746.14, F.S.A., operated as a bar to the institution of this action. Plaintiff urges that said statute is not applicable as to matters not actually adjudicated and that the general statute of limitations as provided in F.S. § 95.11(4), F.S.A., should be applied. Pertinent provisions of said statutes are as follows:
Section 746.14 reads, in part:
“Such discharge shall operate as a release from the duties of the guardianship and as a bar to any suit against said guardian or his surety, unless such suit is commenced within one year from the date of the discharge.”
Section 95.11(4):
“Actions * * * can only be commenced as follows: * * *
“(4) Within four years. — Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter.”
The complaint in this cause is clearly founded upon charges of negligence or wilful misconduct or omission on the part of the appellee guardian arising out of the fiduciary relationship existing between the *330guardian and ward. The allegations do not attempt to establish any cause of action except as to the guardian’s acts or omissions during the period of guardianship. The specific language of F.S. § 746.14, F.S.A., provides that discharge of the guardian shall serve as a bar to any suit against said guardian unless such suit is commenced within one year from the date of the discharge. There is no allegation of fraud, concealment, or other type of allegation that could serve to suspend the commencement of the running of the statute. The trial court was correct in applying F.S. § 746.14, F.S.A., and entering summary final judg-tnent for the defendant.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge, and STURGIS, J., concur.
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State of Fla. ex rel. Richard E. Gerstein as State Attorney for the 11th Jud. Cir. of the State of Fla. v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 245 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1971)…red by the one year statute of limitations. We do not agree with this ruling. In Lucom, the federal court briefly noted the following Florida cases concerned with the interaction of conflicting statutes of limitation: Beck v. Barnett National Bank, 142 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1962); Palmquist v. Johnson, 41 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1949); State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 149 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1963); and Perry v. Reichert, 113 Fla. 125, 151 So. 403 (1933). Among other observations, the federal court said that, “[Fjlorida cases…
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Lucom v. Atl. Nat'l Bank of W. Palm Beach, 354 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1965)…may be maintained. We find the Florida law to be to the contrary. Insofar as the briefs and our research have disclosed, only one Florida case has considered the interaction of these particular statutes. That case, Beck v. Barnett Nat’l Bank, Fla., 142 So. 2d 329, held tljiat an action commenced more than a year after discharge was barred by Section 746.14 notwithstanding that the period provided by Section [*54] 95.11 had not run since the acts complained of. Neither this holding nor any language in the opi…