RONALD HUMMEL

v.

KIMBERLY TAFT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RONALD HUMMEL,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D18-459

KIMBERLY TAFT,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed October 4, 2019

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Osceola County, Kevin B. Weiss, Judge.

The Law Office of Michael H. Gotschall, Maitland, and Elizabeth K. Russo and Paulo R. Lima, of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

Nicholas A. Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Ronald Hummel, defendant below, timely appeals an order granting Kimberly Taft, plaintiff below, a new trial after the jury returned a defense verdict in an automobile negligence case. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

Hummel’s vehicle rear-ended a car in which Taft was a passenger. Hummel admitted liability but disputed Taft’s claim that she suffered injuries from the automobile

2 collision. Taft testified that she felt pain following the collision and sought treatment the following day, and that she continued to receive medical care for a period of time thereafter. Taft presented medical witnesses who opined that she was injured as a result of this collision. In granting a new trial, the trial court determined “that the jury was required, at a minimum, to award [Taft] medical care and treatment that she received shortly after the accident.” We agree and observe that Hummel’s only expert witness on causation initially agreed that Taft suffered an injury as a result of the accident before vacillating on the issue. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 252–53 (Fla. 2013) (confirming general rule that where trial court orders new trial because verdict was against manifest weight of evidence “the appellate court applies the reasonableness test—if an appellate court determines that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion”).

However, we agree with Hummel that the new trial should be limited to determining damages that Taft is entitled to recover for non-permanent injuries. Only one of the three medical experts presented by Taft testified that she suffered a permanent injury as a result of the collision. Indeed, in its order granting a new trial, the trial court observed that Hummel’s medical expert’s opinion that Taft did not receive a permanent injury was “certainly within the realm of the jury to accept or reject.” Cf. Hertz Corp. v. Gleason, 874 So. 2d 1217, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that new trial was to be limited to determining damages for orthopedic and soft tissue injuries, where evidence on whether plaintiff suffered any neurological damages as result of accident “sharply conflicted”).

AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED with instructions.

EVANDER, C.J., EDWARDS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.