PHYLLIS A. CRISPIN

v.

ORLANDO REHABILITATION GROUP D/B/A CLERMONT NURSING & REHAB CENTER/GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-0863 _____________________________

PHYLLIS A. CRISPIN,

Appellant,

v.

ORLANDO REHABILITATION

GROUP D/B/A CLERMONT

NURSING & REHAB

CENTER/GALLAGHER BASSETT

SERVICES, INC.,

Appellees. _____________________________

On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Margaret E. Sojourner, Judge.

Date of Accident: April 18, 2011.

November 20, 2019

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant, Phyllis Crispin, challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) view of one sentence in section 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), which reads as follows: If the accident occurred on or after the employee reaches age 70, [permanent total disability] benefits shall be

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payable during the continuance of permanent total disability, not to exceed 5 years following the determination of permanent total disability. The JCC held that the 5-year period was a calendar period rather than a bank of five years’ worth of benefits which may extend beyond five calendar years. On de novo review, we affirm the order, for the reasons that follow. Claimant was 73 when, on April 18, 2011, she sustained compensable injuries to her right shoulder and right hip. Once she attained overall maximum medical improvement (MMI) on May 25, 2012, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) administratively accepted her as permanently and totally disabled and began to pay permanent total disability (PTD) benefits on May 26, 2012. They paid those benefits continuously until stopping precisely five years later, on May 25, 2017. But in the interim Claimant had undergone shoulder surgery for her compensable injury. Her doctor had rescinded her MMI status during her recuperation from surgery, which took place from October 22, 2014, to January 4, 2015. Claimant argues that the PTD benefits she received during that recuperation period (10½ weeks) should be reclassified as temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, and that therefore she is entitled to an additional 10½ weeks of PTD benefits payable for dates after May 25, 2017. In other words, she advocates a “bank” reading of section 440.15(1)(b), to permit entitlement to five years’ worth of PTD benefits, cumulatively. The JCC instead gave it a “calendar” reading, ruling that the sentence permits entitlement to PTD benefits for only five consecutive years, and terminates eligibility five years after a date certain. We hold that the plain meaning of the statute means that an affected claimant’s eligibility for PTD payments ends five years to the day after the claimant is determined to be permanently and totally disabled. Cf. Hinzman v. Winter Haven Facility Operations LLC, 109 So. 3d 256, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“If the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous, courts should rely on the words used in the statute without involving rules of construction or speculating as to the legislature's intent.” (quoting Germ v. St.

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Luke’s Hosp. Ass’n, 993 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))). Here, “the determination of” PTD was the date the E/C administratively accepted her as PTD, so the E/C properly stopped paying PTD benefits five calendar years later. Given this outcome, we need not (and do not) address the other issue asserted by Claimant on appeal. The order is

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

Bill McCabe of William J. McCabe, P.A., Longwood; and William

G. Berzak, Orlando, for Appellant.

William H. Rogner and Scott B. Miller of Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox & Waranch, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellees.