MELISSA MARTINEZ
v.
BRANDON LEBRON
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Florida had subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because Florida was the child's home state under section 61.514(1)(a), and alternatively, the trial court obtained jurisdiction under section 61.514(1)(b) when New York declined to exercise jurisdiction and found Florida the more convenient forum.
[1] Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, a Florida court has subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if the st…
[2] When a child custody proceeding is commenced in another state and that state's court declines to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Florida is the more convenient f…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A Florida court may not exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding in Florida, a child custody proceeding concerning the child had been commenced in another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA, unless the court of the other state terminated or stayed the proceeding because Florida is a more convenient forum.”
This establishes the statutory framework governing Florida's jurisdiction in child custody matters when competing petitions exist in multiple states.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMother and Father, never married, had a child born in New York and initially lived there. The parties and child eventually moved to Florida, but after…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
MELISSA MARTINEZ,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D18-2966
BRANDON LEBRON,
Appellee. ________________________________/
Opinion filed November 15, 2019
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Diana Michelle Tennis, Judge.
Patrick Michael Megaro and Jaime T. Halscott, of Halscott Megaro, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
COHEN, J.
Melissa Martinez (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s second amended final judgment of paternity related to Brandon Lebron’s (“Father”) paternity petition. Primarily, Mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). She also contends that the trial court erred in entering a time-sharing schedule and granting Father attorney’s fees. We affirm.
2 Mother and Father are the parents of J.D.L. (“Child”), who was born in New York. The parties were never married, but Father acknowledged paternity immediately after Child’s birth. The parties and Child initially lived in New York, but eventually moved to Florida, although the parties disputed the precise date on which Mother intended to permanently move to Florida with Child. Mother and Father’s relationship, which was rocky at best, deteriorated further while the parties were living in Florida, and Mother and Child returned to New York. Unbeknownst to Father, Mother filed a paternity petition in New York shortly after her return. Two days later, Father filed a paternity petition in Florida, alleging that Mother had absconded with Child to New York. Unaware of the New York petition, the Florida court entered an initial order establishing a temporary time-sharing schedule. A Florida court may not exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding in Florida, a child custody proceeding concerning the child had been commenced in another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA, unless the court of the other state terminated or stayed the proceeding because Florida is a more convenient forum. § 61.519(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Upon learning of the New York paternity petition, the Honorable Michael Murphy stayed his initial order, ruling that before exercising jurisdiction, the Florida court must communicate with the New York court. In May 2017, the New York court declined to
3 exercise jurisdiction, finding that Florida was a more convenient forum.1 Following that ruling, the Orange County circuit court proceeded with its handling of the case.2 At trial, Mother’s counsel conceded that “jurisdiction has been established for the child as a resident of Florida.” On appeal, despite that concession, Mother primarily challenges the authority of the Florida court to hear and decide the paternity action.3 The UCCJEA addresses subject matter jurisdiction in child custody proceedings. §§ 61.502–61.542, Fla. Stat. (2017). Section 61.514 provides: (1) Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum under s. 61.520 or s. 61.521, and:
4 1. The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
2. Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) All courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under s. 61.520 or s. 61.521; or (d) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c).
Here, the trial court found Father’s UCCJEA affidavit credible and concluded that Florida was Child’s home state pursuant to section 61.514(1)(a). While Mother contested the allegations within Father’s affidavit, the trial court was tasked to determine the parties’ credibility and did so. Competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Florida was Child’s home state. Additionally, as Father points out, even if we agreed with Mother that New York was Child’s home state, the trial court nevertheless had jurisdiction pursuant to section 61.514(1)(b). The New York court declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Florida was a more convenient forum. Ample testimony was presented at trial of Father’s significant connection to Florida, Child’s extended family within the Orlando area, and the care, protection, training, and relationships of Child in Florida. Accordingly, even if New York was Child’s home state, Florida nevertheless obtained jurisdiction under section 61.514(1)(b) when the New York court declined to exercise jurisdiction. Thus, Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction fails.
AFFIRMED.
EDWARDS and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
4 The trial court recognized that this case was first and foremost about which parent would facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship with the other parent. That consideration is part of the first factor listed in section 61.13(3). In its order, the trial court detailed the actions Mother took to impede Father’s efforts to maintain a relationship with Child, including preventing Father from contacting Child and going through “breathtaking” lengths to anger Father and “bait him to action.” The trial court also detailed that Mother attempted to thwart time-sharing by failing to meet Father with Child for prearranged visits when Father flew from Florida to New York to see Child.
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