CHARLES MUSZYNSKI
v.
MARCIA E. MUSZYNSKI
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An order threatening contempt sanctions if a party does not comply within thirty days is not a final order and therefore not appealable; the case must be dismissed and remanded for further proceedings. Contempt proceedings for failure to secure post-divorce payment obligations are legally permissible under Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, even though contempt generally cannot enforce equitable distribution payment obligations themselves.
[1] An order threatening contempt sanctions if a party fails to comply within a specified period is not a final order and therefore is not appealable; the case must be dismis…
[2] Contempt proceedings are proper for failure to perform affirmative acts required by a final judgment, such as securing payment obligations through a security interest or…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Former Husband breached his postjudgment obligations, the order on appeal did not actually impose sanctions. Rather, it warned Former Husband of the potential for sanctions if he did not comply in thirty days. Accordingly, this is not a final order, and we dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings.”
Establishes that a warning of potential sanctions is not a final order and therefore not appealable.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles and Marcia Muszynski divorced after 17 years of marriage; the trial court awarded Marcia an equitable distribution payment of $1,322,982 in mo…
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CHARLES MUSZYNSKI,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D18-2445
MARCIA E. MUSZYNSKI,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed February 14, 2020
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Tanya Davis Wilson, Judge.
Gennifer L. Bridges and Douglas K. Gartenlaub, of Burr & Forman, LLP, Orlando, and Cynthia L. Greene, of Young, Berman, Karpf & Gonzalez, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, and Lauren M. Ilvento, of Ilvento Law, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Charles Muszynski (“Former Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order holding him in contempt and threatening further sanctions, including incarceration. Following his divorce from Marcia Muszynski, n/k/a Marcia Waddell (“Former Wife”), Former Husband has failed to adhere to at least three requirements outlined in the parties’ final judgment.
2
While competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Former Husband breached his postjudgment obligations, the order on appeal did not actually impose sanctions. Rather, it warned Former Husband of the potential for sanctions if he did not comply in thirty days. Accordingly, this is not a final order, and we dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings. See Torres v. Lefler, 257 So. 3d 1095, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018); Nathanson v. Rishyko, 140 So. 3d 1054, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). DISMISSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
LAMBERT and EDWARDS, JJ., concur. TRAVER, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
3
5D18-2445 TRAVER, J., concurring and concurring specially.
Because the trial court has not yet rendered a final order, I concur. I write separately to address the remedy suggested by the trial court and Former Husband’s arguments in opposition. Some background is necessary. The parties are both 55 years old, and they were married for 17 years. They have no minor children. Former Husband founded a waste management company that has grossed over $20 million in annual revenue. Their divorce began in 2013, and despite reaching an early agreement on permanent periodic alimony, their equitable distribution dispute required over three years of litigation and a six-day trial to resolve. This dispute focused on whether Former Husband’s interest in a trust he had formed to protect his substantial assets from creditors and taxes was marital property. In concluding it was, the trial court found Former Husband had “complete control over the trust as if it were in his own name.” The final judgment declared Former Husband owed Former Wife an equitable distribution equalizing payment of $1,322,982, due in interest-free monthly installments of $6,485.21. It also decided special circumstances existed requiring Former Husband to secure Former Wife’s future payments. Specifically, the trial court found Former Husband had “failed to follow through” on his financial obligations to Former Wife and his family throughout the divorce, necessitating “numerous motions for contempt.” Accordingly, the trial court ordered Former Husband to secure Former Wife’s equitable distribution and alimony payments in two ways. First, it directed him to give Former Wife a security interest on his personally held shares in the still-operational waste management company. It also precluded him from selling or transferring this interest until he satisfied his equitable distribution obligation in full. Second, it required him to maintain $2 million
1 The parties agreed to subordinate Former Wife’s security interest to a marital debt Former Husband owed to his company, and for which he assumed responsibility under the final judgment. So perhaps some defensible financial reason explains why he transferred his interest despite the final judgment’s clear admonition to the contrary. It is harder, however, to imagine a meritorious reason why he took this action without notice to Former Wife. Notice would have at least allowed her to question the propriety, necessity, and value of Former Husband’s transfer. Instead, it appears Former Husband extinguished an obligation he owed to his own company while saving the company foreclosure litigation costs.
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